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The object of this thesis is to examine the policies of South African 
agricultural marketing boards, both as separate entities and within 
the broader context of South African agricultural policy. 
Stabilisation and subsidisation are examined from a theoretical stand-
poin~ and the analysis supported with empirical evidence. The possibility 
of a centralised policy of price control is considered and a technique 
suggested whereby such a policy might be implemented. It is suggested, 
however,· that market uncertainty and the vast amount of information 
necessary make such an ambitious programme of market control unworkable 
in practice. 
The policies followed by some of the major marketing boards are examined. 
Three possibilities are identified: 
i) Revenue maximisation 
ii) Revenue stabilisation 
iii) Price/quantity stabilisation 
In view 6f the wide differences between the boards in respect of type 
of product handled and export possibilities, it is to be expected that 
they will follow divergent policies. The evidence presented suggests, 
however, that the boards have not used their monopoly powers in the 
manner predicted by conventional economic theory. In the case of 
several of the boards, price policy seems to have been neutral. 
The reason for this disparity between theory and empirical obsel'.lvat:ion 
is discussed. The behaviour of South African agricultural marketing 
boards is related to evidence on regulatory authorities in the United 
States. It is suggested that close parallels exist. Due to different 
property rjghts arrangements, the conventional monopoly profit max-
imisation mode.I is inapplicable. Instead, marketing boards follow a 
variety of other policies. Whilst the objectives of the marketing 
(v) 
boards may not always be clear, it can be concluded that in certain 
significant cases, the results have been little different from those 
g~nerated by the free market. It is stressed, however, that marketing ·;;. 
boards are political rather than economic organisations and political 
constraints are likely to be overriding. 
This view is further confirmed by an examination of agricultural policy 
over the last fifty years. It is argued that policy has been dictated 
by political reality rather than economic rationality. The role of 
the economist has been to offer evidence in support of predetermined 
policies. 
(vi) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROBLEM STATED ..... 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. 1 Forty years ago the Marketing Act ( l) was passed in an 
atmosphere of acrimony and ambiguity. It became law on 8th May, 1937. 
l .. 1 • 2 Its passage through the legislative procedures of 
Parliament was characterised by clear and fundemental differences 
of opinion on issues as basic as the functions of the free enterprise 
system and the role of the State in influencing economic decision 
oc• 
making. The debate in the House of Assembly was both heated and 
acrimonious and this in many ways reflected the response which the 
issue of.controlled marketing evoked amongst the economic profession 
in South Africa as a whole - a controversy which now appears as 
history in the pages of the South.African Journal of Economics.(2) 
1. 1. 3 This seems to be a suitable time to consider and attempt 
to evaluate the agricultural policies which have been followed for 
the past forty years. Recent evidence (3) suggests that the problems 
of agricultural marketing were not solved by the Marketing Act. Thus 
an examination of marketing policies is of more than historical 
interest. It may provide us with certain information of a pre-
scriptive kind indicating policies that should be followed in the 
future. No comprehensive study has been carried out of marketicg 
board policies in South Africa over the last forty years, despite 
( 1) Act No. 26, 193 7. 
(2) See various issues of the South African Journal of Economics, 
1936 - 1938. 
(3) See, for example, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Agricul-
ture, Third (Final) Report, RP 19/1972. 
2 
the influence of this sector on labour markets, (l) foreign exchange 
markets and commodity markets. Most discussions of marketing policy 
have been descriptive rather than analytical. 
I • 1 • 4 In returing to the debate of the 1930s, there are two 
major objectives: 
1 • 1 • 5 
I • I • 6 
1. l. 7 
a) To review the activities of the. marketing boards 
and to evaluate them. We are concerned not only to pass 
judgement on the boards. In the course of .the Economists' 
Protest debate, the participants made fairly precise 
predictions. We are, therefore, entitled to pose·the 
question: Have these predictions proved correct? 
In effect, we are putting economic theory to the test. 
b) To attempt to answer larger and more fundemental 
questions about the nature of State intervention in the 
economy and how it works. The questions to be asked 
about agriculture and the control and functioning of 
agricultural markets are in an important sense part of 
a wider debate. It is widely observed fact that 
government interests and organisations are spreading -
social welfa~e, defence, health, pensions, education, 
full-employment policies. For better or worse, the 
State takes a direct interest in and responsibility for 
all of these and as the degree of autonomy of the 
bureaucrat (resulting from his rapidly expanding 
responsibilities) increases and his powers of discretion 
widen, so it becomes more necessary to understand the 
constraints on and determinants of his behaviour. 
These are questions at an empirical level. At a 
norraative level, we may ask \vhether government intervention has 
(I) See J Nattrass, 'Migration Flows in and out of Capitalist Agriculture, 1 
in Francis Wilson, Alide Kooy and Delia Hendrie (eds) Farm.Labour 




proved to be a Good Thing. Returning to the debate of the 1930s, 
of course, we do so with the benefit of hindsight. We live in 
a different world now and we should be careful to judge participants 
in the debate too harshly. Nevertheless, it is something of a 
puzzle that an issue which was regarded as being of such importance 
to so many of the economists of the 1930s should have attracted 
little attention afterwards. It is unfortunate that this should 
be so, because the questions raised at the time were important ones, 
and, if anything, the ~ssues are more pressing ~ow than they were 
then. The debate did not close on a note of agreement - the 
opposing parties did not even agree to differ: "When an interchange 
of opinions has reached a certain stage, it begins to verge upon 
the tedious and the futile." (I) 
l. l .8 Though one of the objectives in this thesis is to 
evaluate the actions of marketing boards, we face an obvious and 
fundamental difficulty. Evaluation is only possible against some 
~well·defined criterion, but we cannot easily judge the marketing 
boards in this way.for the simple reason that we do not know 
precisely what they are supposed to be doing. At no point in the 
Marketing Act is there a statement of the objectives of the Act, 
nor are the objectives of the boards defined. The first statement 
of objectives appears in the report of the Cabinet Committee as: 
l • I • 9 '(a) One more to foster the spirit of independence 
amongst farmers by enabling them to help themselves instead of 
continually applying to the government for assistance; 
1.1.10 (b) The proper organisation of marketing and the 
efficient and economic distribution and stabilisation of prices; 
the ultimate aim being to reduce the margin between the price to __________________ ..._ __ , _______________________________ _...... ________________ _ 
(1) CS Richards, 1 Planning and Control in Agriculture: A Rejoinder,' 
. 'SAJE 6 ( 1938) ,pp .. 427 - 4-28, p.427. 
( 
4 
the consumer and the price to the producer.' ( 1) 
This was clearly an afterthought, however, and whatever these 
extremely vague policy objectives may mean, it is clear that they 
·i,' 
do not constitute a binding commitment. Consequently, marketing 
boards cannot be held accountable to them. They are free to operate 
in terms of other objectives if they wish. 
1.1.11 Conventional economic theory prescribes State intervention 
in cases of market failure, but clearly, these institutions go far 
beyond that. 
I.1.12 In South Africa in 1977, government spendihg amounted 
to; 19, 4% of GNP,. an increase of 221% over the last 7 years., ( 2) But 
this figure alone does not give a true indication of the role and 
influence of the State. Public corporations and marketing boards, 
for example, issue their own budget statements. Their behaviour 
is crucially important in understanding how the South African 
economy works. These bodies are endowed with apparently high 
degrees of monopoly power, but are not directly publically 
accountable. Can we predict how they will behave? Specifically, 
how does it behave if an organisation is established, endowed with 
monopoly powers and if subject to very few constraints except for 
admonitions of good behaviour, a system of very general surveillance 
and vaguely defined goals? Does the conventional monopoly model 
yield accurate predictions in this situation? The question is 
becoming more important as organisations of this type proliferate. 
1.1. 13 We need to not only explain the behaviour of these 
bureaucratic organisations. A satisfactory theory should be able 
to show why growth of the government sector has been a featui::-e of 
' free enterprise systems. Though the e2>.1Jansion of the public sector 
has become apparent in the last thirty years, 'the growth of 
--·------------------------------------------------------------------------------
( l) Committee of the Ca.binet appointed to deal with matters concerning 
the .cost of living. Report No. 1, Agricultural Prices and Control 
Boards (1938), p. 7. 
(2) SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 1978. 
5 
government is neither a postwar nor a post-Keynesian experience. 
It developed over many decades and stretches over the history of 
the United States. I conjecture that this pattern extends beyond 
the United States.' (l) It is not our task here to explain the 
growth of these organisations. But in examining their behaviour, 
it is necessary that this enquiry should be seen against the 
broad issues of institutional behaviour. In general, what theory 
best explains the actions of these large public bodies - conflict, 
compromise or conspiracy? 
1.1.14 Are we to view them as being fundamentally foreign 
importation into the free enterprise economy - a drag on efficiency 
and an inhibiting factor to economic growth? In short, an aberration 
from the normal run of things; because it must be admitted, this 
is how conventional economic theory must view them •. Or are they a 
necessary part of the market system, either to hold the ring for 
private enterprise or to provide the necessary stability for the 
operation of a capitalist economy? 
r 
1.1.15 In the past, the theory of monopoly has been invoked to 
illustrate the operations of the marketing boards. The theory 
would seem to be a reasonable explanatory tool. One of our tasks 
will be to analyse the predictive power of the. monopoly model in 
the context of marketing board operations. I~ the monopoly model J-
does not work, then we need another.framework to explain behaviour. 
We need to explain how these organisations arise and how they will 
behave. 
1.1.16 Clearly, these are general questions which have application 
beyond the sphere of agricultural control policies; There are 
various reasons, however, for choosing to investigate agriculture. 
The boards have been functioning for long enough to enable us to 
pass general judgements on their performance. There is also 
(I) K Brunner, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Government,' 
Carnegie-Mellon Uni ve·rs i ty (rnimeo) p. 5. 
6 
evidence that all is not well with the present structure of 
. 1 1 . . (I) B dl k. h . agr1cu tura marKet1ng. roa y spea ing, t e current policy 
is to encourage a greater degree of centralisation. This may, of 
course, be wise. No one can really seriously dispute the 
desirability of 'co-ordination' as a general principle~ No 
reasonable man is in favour of chaos. But to what end is there 
to be co-ordination and to what cost? 
1.1.17 We cannot attempt to deal with all these problems in 
this thesis. Instead, specific problems are defined and the tools 
of orthodox economics applied in an attempt to understand the 
nature of the forces at work in these areas. Few solutions are 
offered, though it may be that the analysis offered here will 
serve to clarify certain areas of debate in South Africa. 
1 • 2 THESIS OUTLINE 
1 • 2. 1 Chapter 2 provides a brief factual outline of agriculture 
in South Africa and the form of marketing boards in operation. 
Chapter 3 discusses subsidies. Distributional effects of the present 
subsidy arrangements are examined. Chapter 4 discusses the question 
of market stabilisation from a theoretical standpoint. It is 
frequently argued that State intervention is justified in the case 
of agricultural markets be~ause of their inherent instability. 
The case for stabilisation is investigated. Difficulties~ both 
theoretical and practical, stand in the way of such market 
intervention being successful. 
1. 2. 2 In Chapter 5, an empirical examination of mar·~eting 
board policies is rerorted. Four marketing boards were chosen, 
with output representing about 50% by value <;>f total agricultural 
outout in South Africa. The results of the study are not con-
clusive, but seen effectively to refute the argument that marketing 
boards have responded only to the i~terests of producers. Chapter 6 
sets out a further empirical study, The possibility of co-
ordination is discussed. A method for specifying price response 
models is suggested and estimation for various crops carried out. 
---------------~---~----------------~----~---------------------------·--------
( 1) See for example the Report of the Commission of Enquiry ini:o the 
Marketing Act, (Act No. 59 of 1968), RP39/1976. 
,,., 
7 
The results throw some doubt on the possibility of centralised 
price co-ordination as a realistic policy option. 
1.2.3 In Chapter 7, official policies are reviewed, particularly 
in respect of subsidisation arid centralisation. It is argued that 
the advice offered to policy makers by a variety of cormnissions 
has been misguided. 
1.2.4 Chapter 8 attempts to reconcile the various findings. 
The Theory of Regulation is introduced in an attempt to explain 
the constant pressure towards greater centralisation together with 
the apparent failure of the marketing boards to use their powers 
in the interests of producer members. Agricultural policy in 
South Africa, it is argued, is a function of overriding political 




) CHAPTER TWO 
SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE - THE PRESENT STRUCTURE 
2. I INTRODUCTION 
2. 1 • J The structure of the agricultural industry in South Africa 
is the outcome of a complex interaction of political, economic and 
historical forces. Combined with the wide climatic variations 
which exist in different areas of the country, these forces explain 
the remarkable heterogenity of South African agriculture. Diversity 
1s, perhaps, the most outstanding feature of farming enterprises· 
in South Africa. Variations in land ownership arrangements and 
in techniques of production are among the most obvious manifestations 
.·./ of this diversity. In addition, varying distance from markets has· 
also been an important influence in determining the types of 
fanning operations carried out in different parts of the country. 
2. L2 In analysing South African agriculture a distinctic)n is 
usually dratm between the subsistence sector and the market-oriented 
sector; between those farmers whose production is .planned to meet 
their own consumption rteeds and those who market their pro~uce~ 
In practice, the di\dsion between subsfstence agriculture and market 
agriculture occurs almost exclusively along racial lines,. with 
approximately 1,1 million Black farmers engaged in mainly subsistence 
far.ming in the Homelands while the White commercial farmers, who 
number approximately 80 000, produce about 95 per cent by value of 
total recorded agricultural output. On analytical grounds the 
distinction between subsistence and market ... oriented agriculture 1s 
important because the economic forces and constraints operating in 
the two sectors (such as availability of credit and responsiveness 
to price changes) may be different. Land tenure systems are 
different and this alone must be counted as a major variable in 
explaining the differing economic performance of the farmers 1n the 
two sectors. Furthermore, since Blacks and Whites do not enter 
urban labour markets on the same terms, it follows that the opportunity 
10 
advantageous to form central organisations to bargain in areas of 
common interest. Under conditions where complementary production 
factors or consumers are relatively immobile, such orga~~sations 
confer on producers, as a group, greater bargaining power than they 
would have had as individuals. For example, by negotiating as a 
unit, farmers may, under restricted conditions, achieve a degree 
of monopoly power in the sale of their produce, or monopsony power 
in the factor markets. 
2.2.2 Whether this is a practical possibility is, in most 
situations, very questionable. The requirement that factors of 
production or customers be immobile is seldom met in practice, 
especially in the long run. 
2.2.3 
'Taken by and large co-operators are long on 
practice and short on theory. The contrast 
is marked as against such inveterate theorists 
as the socialist and the single taxer. The 
latter are well drilled in the reasons for 
the faith that is in them, albeit they have 
been able to produce scanty actual achievements 
against the organised opposition of con-
. stituted governments. On the other hand, any 
small group of persons may enter on business 
ventures after the co-operative pattern long 
before they are in a position to answer the 
highest catechism of co-operative doctrine.' (1) 
There is no doubt, however, that by providing information 
regarding market conditions as well as centralised marketing 
' facilities, co-operative organisations are able to reduce transaction 
costs, whilst a pooling of risks provides a more stable ·basis 
for obtaining credit and entering into long-term contracts. 
2.2.4 This was the basis for the agricultural co-operative 
movement which was initiated in Natal in 190!~ and in the Cape 
Province a year later. The rapid development of the co-operative 
movement, however, commenced after the passing of the Co-operative 
Societies Act of 1922, which repealed all previous legislation and 
became the basis for future policies. Apart from establishing 
uniformity across all four provinces, the Act included the important 
(J) E GNourse, 'Economic Philosophy of Co-operation,' AE R 12 (i922). 
l l 
provision for limited liability. By 1924, 105 of these limited 
liability co-operatives had been established. (l) 
2.2.5 An important amendment to the 1922 legislation was the 
introduction in 1925 of the principle of 'compulsory co-operation,' 
which involved something more than mere protection of the joint 
interests of co-operative members. As summed up by the 1934 
Connnission to enquire into co-operation and agricultural credit: 
'The object of compulsory co-operation is 
.•.. to gai~ control of the.produ2~ion so 
as to attain control of price.' ( 
In other words, comprehensive monopoly power was aimed at. It 
was not, however, achieved. The co-operatives were never able to 
achieve· the total control necessary for monopoly power, nor were 
they able to insulate the agricultural sector against the economic 
and natural disasters of the 1930s. 
2.2.6 This was hardly surprising. 
'Remember, the aim of co-operative marketing 
is not to fix prices - that can't be done 
unless you have absolute control of an 
industry. The aim is to control flow of 
supply as to time, place and quantity so that 
you have something to say about conditions 
that affect price values.' (3) · \ 
----------·~--------------------------------------~---------------------------
(1) D S Schmidt, 'Ko-operasiewese,' Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Marketing, 'Die Staat se Bydrae tot Landbou-ekonorniese Dienste 
en Navorsing in Suid-Afrika 1925 - 75.' Symposium held in Pretoria, 
17 October 1975. 
(2) Commission to Enquire into Co-operation and Agricultural Credit, 
UG 16/1934, p.14. 
(3) A Sapiro, An Analysis of Marketing, Fundamental Prirtciples of Co-
operation, Chicago, A.rn. Farm .. Bur. Fed. Address delivered 11 
December 1923, Fifth Annual Meeting, Am. Farm. Bur. Fed. Reprinted 
in .F V Waugh, Readings on Agricultural H~rketing, (Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State College Pr~ss, 1954), ~P· 384-386, p.385. 
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·The conditions necessary for co-operatives to manipulate markets 
are, in general, absent: Customers generally do have choices and 
factors of production are relatively mobile in agriculture, especially 
in the long run. It was, therefore, entirely predictable that ''· 
co-operatives should have failed in their monopolistic objectives. 
2.2.7 The decade before the Second World War proved to be a 
difficult period for agricuiture. Drought a,nd disease combined with 
low world prices to produce a slump both prolonged and indiscriminat.e 
in its effects. Many White farmers were forced off the land and 
the system of co-operatives was shown to be quite unable to cope 
with so great an economic dislocation. In response to this state 
of affairs, the 1934 Commission to Enquire into Co-operation and 
Agricultural Credit, set up to examine the situation, had little 
comfort to offer •. An examination of the failures of co-operatives· 
suggested to the Commission no weakness in the principle of 
co-operatives, but rather the natural consequences of business 
I 
risks, a conclusion which seems ·rather complacent in view of the 
fact that 233 of the 639 co-operatives r\gistered up.to .June 1933 
had, l.n fact, suffered liquidation. Despite these failures the 
Connnission supported the principle of co-operation though not the 
principle of 'compulsory co-operation' embodied in the 1925 
Amendment. The Report of the Connnission was also categorical 
.in its objection to producer-dominated marketing organisatinns. 
2.2.8 The Marketing Act of 1937, though passed as a result of 
what was perceived to be the failure of the co-operative system 
t~ stabilise and maintain agricultural incomes, did not, in fact, 
weaken or replace the co-operatives. In fact,,, co-operative 
. . . . 1 d
0 







(1) Co-operatives benefit;.ed from the Control Board system in. two ways; Y-
'In the first place, ~eluding the case of export products, it was 
relieved of the worries caused by price levels and price fluctuations. 
A large section of the farmers erroneously thought, and still think, 
that the movement is capable of controlling p~ices fully; and the 
fact that it proved, and must needs prove, incapable of doing.this ~s 
a voluntary movement, retarded its growth. . . , 
In the second place, the co-operatives came to occupy the princip~e 
position aJnong the agents of the Control Boards .•.•. it afforded them 
2.3. 
14 
2.2.12 The economic costs arising from the activities of co-
operatives would be difficult to measure. To the extent that 
business is discouraged from entering fields where co-operatives 
are already established and (very importantly) where they might 
be established in the future, economic costs are high. To the 
extent that co-operatives reduce transport and information costs ~ 
and perform an insurance function by bearing risks, economic 
efficiency is encouraged. But even in this role it is not justifiable 
that that they receive favourable tax treatment. (l) 
THE STRUCTURE AT PRESENT 
2. 3. 1 a) The Ministry of Agriculture is divided into 
three departments: 
i) Agricultural Technical Services 
ii) Agricultural Economics and Marketing 
iii) Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure 
The Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing is of, 
particular interest to us. It is responsible for the determination 
of agricultural policy, the maintenance of the sys~em of organised 
marketing and the stabilisation of prices through the system of 
control boards. (Z) Advice on these matters is furnished by the 
National Marketing Board. In addition, the department is expected 
to provide services to co-operatives, assistance to farmers during 
emergencies and varlous other functions. 
2.3.2 The department consists of a Secretariat, the Economic 
Services Branch, the National Marketing Board, the office of the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the Divisions of Administrative 
• 
Services, Inspection Services, Agricultural Production Economics and 
Agricultural Marketing Research. The administration of the Marketing 
Act is, however, probably its most important function. 
.. 
' 
---------------------------------·~-------____________________ ,..,.. ___ ...,. __________ _ 
(1) In addition, co-operatives have other advantages. 
'If both a co-op and an ordinary firm operate in a given area, the 
position of the forrnet" is further strengthened by the fact the..t it 
may receive the .produce of non'members, whereas .the ordinary- firm 
cannot collect that of members of the co-operative..' · 
RP 78/1967, p.42. 
(2) This section· is taken substantially from Agriculture in South Africa 1976~ 
(Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publicatfons, 1976) and the SOU:tn 
African Yearbook. 
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2.3.3 b) The National Marketing Council, consisting of 
a Chairman and four members appointed by the State President, 
concerns itself with all aspects associated with the implementation 
of the Marketing Act. It is required to supervise the activities 
of existing Marketing Boards and in particular, to offer advice 
on the implementation of new marketing schemes. 
2.3.4 c) The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) is 
a federation of the various farmers' associations. At the base of 
the structure are the farmers' associations and above that, various 
levels of administrative bodies at provincial and national level, 
in each case consisting of an executive committee, advisory 
connnittees and connnodity connnittees. At both provincial and national 
level there is a congress and a general council which functions 
as an extension of congress. As the only national body, the SAAU 
claims to be the spokesman for the farming connnunity. The SAAU has 
no individual farmer members. It consists of 19 affiliated bodies. 
These are the four provincial agricultur?l unions and the South 
West African agricultural union, nine central connnodity co-operatives, 
a union of the three wool co-ooperatives, the Federated Agricultural 
Co-operative of SA Ltd and three specialist associations - the 
Wool Growers' Association, the Sugar Growers' Association and the 
Poultry Association of South Africa. 
2.3.5 There are more than 2 000 farmers' associations. Over 
75% of all farmers are members of these associations.· The regional 
and district agricultural unions form the link between the farmers' 
associations and the provincial agricultural union. 
2. 3. 6 d) The Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa was 
established in 1912. It functions in .te~ms cf Act No. 13, 1944 as 
amended. It is, an autor.cmous institution, responsible to Parliament 
through the Minister of Fi.oance. The Board and the General Manager 
are appointed by the State President. The Bank was established 
specifically to provide credit for farmers in South Africa. (and later, 
South West Africa). It advances money to farmers and, in particular, 
provides credit to agricultural co-operatives, to control boards 
and statutory agricultural institutions. However, loans of various 
. I 
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types are granted both to individual farmers and to agricultural 
co-operatives. 
c) Co-operative Societies can be divided into two 
groups: 
i) Agricultural Co-operatives 
ii) Trading Co-operatives 
i) · Agricultural co-operatives are restricted by law(l) to 
specific objectives, viz the marketing of agricultural produce 
and livestock in processed and unprocessed form, the manufacture 
and supply of farming requisites, the rendering of certain services 
such as ploughing and spraying and the provision of insurance to 
farmers. In addition, agricultural co-ops act as agents for 
control boards in handling, distributing and storing various 
agricultural products~ They are estimated to handle about 75% of 
all agricultural products and livestock offered for sale. 
Co-operatives function as interme.diaries between farmers and the 
Land Bank in extending credit to farmers. 
2.3.8 There are 331 agricultural co-ops. These include two 
federal and 29 central co-operatives. 
2.3.9 1 ii) · In addition, there are 200 trading co-operatives. 
" Of ·these,.\ 122 are 'consumer' co-ops and 52 are 'home industry' 
'/ 
·co-ops. Unlike the agricultural co-ops, they are not restricted 
-. 
to specific objectives and they do not have the authority to dispose 
of agricultural produce to their members. 
2.3.10 £) Marketing Control Boards - South African marketing 
policy is characterised by a system of control boards. The 1937 
Marketing Act (Act No. 26, '. 1937) laid down the procedures by 
which marketing boards could be established and the legal framework \ 
(l) The Co:-operative Societies Act No.29, 1939, as amended. 
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within which they would operate. A comprehensive array of powers 
is', listed in the Act which might be made available to individual 
marketing boards. To represent specific interest groups, 
Producers' Advisory and Consumers' Advisory Councils were set 
up, while the National Marketing Council was given both investigative 
and advisory functions to control the whole operation. Provision 
was made in the Act for members of marketing boards to represent 
a variety of interests, but a producer majority was a legal requirement. 
2.3.11 In 1968, the original Marketing Act was repealed and 
replaced by Act No, 59, 1968. The principle provisions, .however, 
remain the same. In terms of this Act, about 82% by value of 
total agricultural output is handled by the various boards. 
Bearing in mind the other important crops such as sugar and which 
dl d . f h . . f . 1 . 1 . ( 
1 ) · are han e in terms o t eir own speci ic egis ation in 
closely controlled organisations, it is clear that agriculture in 
South Africa is dominated by central controlling bodies. Certain 
categories of vegetables are virtually the only products sold on 
a free market. 
2.3.12 Though all function in terms of the same legislation, 
the powers and methods of operation of the boards differ considerably. 
2.3.13 These differences are primarily a function of the nature 
of the product. Maize, for example, is an annual crop which is 
relatively cheap to store and transport. It is, therefore~ bought 
by the Board, at a predetermined price from farmers through a 
system of agents (mainly co-operatives) and either sold locally, 
exported or channeled into a buffer stock. In the case of meat, 
the situation is different. Storage and transport are relatively 
costly, whilst the flow of cattle to abattoirs is continuous 
throughout the year, though with seasonal variations. After a 
brief attempt to operate a fixed price scheme, the attempt was 




TABLE l .1: THE SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL CONTRO!... SYSTEM ACCORDING 
TO TYPE OF SCHEME (a) 
Department of Agricultural 
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- Wool Board 
(a) As at ~July 1972 
Minister 
I
. Consumers'. Advisor)! 
__ -!,__ ----C~o_i_nrn_i_t_t_e_e ___ [ 
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- Potato Board 
- Dry Bean Board 
Canning , - Karakul Board 
Fruit 
Board 
- Egg Board 













(b) Including: buckwheat (pool scheme) and grain sorghum 
(surplus disposal scheme) 
( c) Including soya beans (surplus disposal scheme). 
Source: · C M du Tait, "·Agricultural Marketing Management under the 
Control Board System, 1 Agrekon, 11 (1975), pp. 14 - 19. 
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was abandoned in favour of a floor price scheme, whereby the 
Meat Board intervenes in the market if the floor falls below a 
fli~redetermined level. The form of market intervention practised by the Meat Board is slightly more sophisticated than 
this account would suggest. The Board operates a system of 'floor 
prices' accompanied b'y; 'support prices'. The floor price establishes 
an absolute level below which prices are not allowed to fall. 
·/ Above. this, prices may fluctuate freely, but may not fall by more 
than a certain rate per day or per week. · Should this occur, the 
. h d 1 · (l) support price becomes operative to damp t e ec ine. 
2.3.14 In addition to these technical differences in control, 
it is important to note that products differ in other respects. 
In the case of wool, for example, South Africa is a relatively 
small exporter by world standards, and hence, the Wool Board has 
no real influence over the average price received for its product. 
In addition, only a small fraction of the output is purchased for 
local processing, so that no matter what policies the Wool Board 
chooses to follow, it is a price taker. The Maize Board is, in 
principle, in a better position to influence average.price since 
a significant proportion of the crop is consumed locally. By 
restricting imports and manipulating the quantity of its product 
available locally, it has, at least in theory, the ability to 
d 
. . . h. l" . . (Z) . 
etermine its own revenue wit in imits. 
2.4 ASPECTS OF MARKETING POLICY 
2.4.1 Because of the immense variety of forms of agricultural 
enterprise to be found in South Africa and the variety of different 
marketing arrangements, it is difficult to make·general statements 
or to formulate general rules. It does seem, however, that there 
are three topics that merit attention at this stage: 
-------------------------~---------------------------------------------------
(I) See 'Tha Meat Board' issued by the Meat Board. 1974, p.10. 






Agriculture in South Africa, in connnon with trends in 
other countries, reflects a growing tendency towards 
specialisation. This trend should not be over-emphasised. 
Nevertheless, a number of factors can be suggested which 
reinforce this trend towards specialisatio~. 
i) Technological change, represented by availability 
of specialised equipment which allows farmers to reap 
the benefits of economies of scale. 
ii) Cheaper transportation has probably played a role 
here as well. Whereas a small isolated community will 
not be specialised in production, with improved trans-
portation and communication it is profitable to specialise. 
Improved transport, in fact, widens the market and, of 
course, division of labour is determined by the extent 
of the market. 
( 1) 
2.4.5 iii) Marketing boards also serve to encourage specialisation. 
2.4.6 
Mixed farming can be seen as a response to risk, ie -
the farmer is faced with the possibility of drought, 
disease, fluctuating prices, etc. It is, therefore, 
rational for him to spread his risks to the extent that 
he is a risk averter, by farming different crops. 
Disease may destroy his crops, but it will not affect 
his cattle. 
iv) Price variation is one form of uncertainty. If 
the farmer does not know what the price will be the 
following year, he may spread the risk by planting a 
If the price of one falls, the other 
( 1) An indication of the extent of specialisation in South African 
agriculture can be obtained from the matrix in Appendix I. It 
would appear that though there is a relatively high degree of 




may not. Marketing boards, insofar as they stabilise 
prices and remove a certain amount of risk, will lead 
to increased specialisation. There are two forces 
operating here: 
In South Africa where some prices are guaranteed 
but others are not, there will be a tendency for output 
to shift in favour of those crops whose prices are 
guaranteed. Even if on average prices remain the same 
over time, output will nevertheless rise in the case of 
those crops whose prices are guaranteed. Equivalently, 
output of non-controlled crops is likely to fall and. 
prices in consequence rise. 
Even if all prices are guaranteed, there will still 
be a shift in production towards specialisation. Farmers 
would then tend to become more specialised in those 
products in which they had a comparative advantage. 
2.4.9 It is clear that, per se, increased specialisation has 
advantages. These are to be explained in terms of economies .of . 
scale and comparative advantage, both of which constitute a net gain 
to society. It is equally clear, however, that increased specialisation 
may impose costs on society which may not be reflected in the 
calculations of the individual farmer. In the first place, it is 
important to stress that all that has happened by guaranteeing 
prices is that risks have been transferred from the farmer to the 
marketing board and, ultimately, the consumer or tax payer. 
2.4.10 Also, there is the environmental argument. For example, 
Jisease may spread more rapidly in an area where only one crop is rown. In many cases, also,· the risk is being transferred from the 
farmer to the tax payer in the form of government support and to 
the consumer in the form of hi'gher prices. These two groups, in 
effect, may be underwriting the risks of the farming sector. 
' .. 
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2.4.11 The exent to which government intervention in agriculture 
has encouraged the tendency towards specialisation can only be 
guessed at, but it would seem that the trend towards specialisation, 
with its associated costs and benefits, has been given further 
impetus by government actions. 
b) Quality Control 
2.4.12 Grading and quality control has been a feature of 
control board activity. This they were entitled to do in terms of 
1937 Marketing Act, "with the approval of the Minister from time 
f~,time,~o pro~ibit any producer from selling the regulated product 
in question which he has produced, exc2pt such classes, grade, 
quantity or percentage thereof as the Board has determined or except 
for such purposes as the Board has defined." (I) The effect has 
been that in the case of many products, standards have been established 
and often been rigidly enforced. This has often been welcomed. ' 
For example, 11 •••••• the institution of compulsory grading for many 
of our farm products can be regarded as the most constructive 
achievement of the system of regulated marketing." (2) 
2.4.13 Yet these sentiments cannot be wholeheartedly endorsed. 
During the Marketing Act debate in 1937, precisely this question 
was raised• 
2.4.14 Grading involves costs - costs which are borne by both 
consumers and by producers. By enforcing high quality standards,· 
the·quari.tity of goods reaching the market is reduced and higher 
prices are required to enable farmers to cover their costs. The 
meat on sale may be of a relatively.high quality, but there may be 
little of it. It is clear that it is likely to be the poorer 
consumer who is most affected by this. 
2.4.15 Also, by enforcing quality standards, producers may be 
kept out of the market. Products may have to be destroyed, simply 
because they do not reach the required standards. Again, it may 
( l ) Act No . 2 6 , 1 9 3 7 , 2 0 ( e). 
(2) Van Biljon (1974) p.24. 
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often be the Black subsistence farmer or smallholder who 1s most 
affected by this. 
2.4.16 Despite this, there is a com.~on tendency to regard high 
quality as desirable, per se. Thus the fact that South Africa's 
(1) . . 
sugar is rated the best in the world. is not necessarily 
a good thing. It may have been achieved at high cost. 
2 .4.] 7 Grading, of course, provides customers with information. 
In this respect, it reduces information costs and may be justified. 
But it may also be used as a means of reducing competition, with 
heavy costs on marginal producers and marginal consumers. For these 
reasons it should be viewed with suspicion. 
c) Costs of the Boards 
2.4.18 During financial year 1973/74; the operating costs of the 
boards were about RlOm. (2) This amounts to approximately 0,3% 
of the value of products handled by the boards. Employment was 
slightly below 3 000, 
2.4.19 In evaluating these figures, one should obviously not 
interpret these figures as being the net cost to the society of 
the Marketing Boards. Many of these costs (distribution, grading, etc.) 
would be borne under a free market system. Indeed, the possibility 
must be noted that costs under a free market system would be 
greater than under the marketing board system. It would certainly 
'be more difficult to calculate these costs 1..!.nder a free market system. 
2.4.20 Nor should these figures be interpreted as the total 
direct costs of the marketing board system. Major costs such as 
factor subsidies and price supports cannot be ignored. These are 
considered in Chapter 4. 
(I) Financial Mail, special supplement on Sugar, 14 June 1974, p.37. 
(2) See Appendix 2. 
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2.5 MAJOR PRODUCTS 
2.5.l Inforrnation'concerning major agricultural field crops 
production is included below. These products are analysed in more ·~ 
detail in Chapter 5. 
2.5.2 a) Maize is South Africa's most important field crop. 
It represents approximately 22 % by value of total 
agricultural output and is the largest single agricultural 
export product. It is produced over a wide area, 
principally in the Southern Transvaal and Northern Orange 
Free State. Under the influence of better production 
techniques, increased mechanisation and new hybrids, 
production has increased rapidly since the the early 
1950s. The Maize Board consists of 21 members, comprising 
I ' 
producers of maize and grain sorghum. (12), consumers (2), 
maize and grain sorghum dealers (2), maize and grain 
sorghum millers (2), stockfeeders (1), exporters (1) and 
a representative of the Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing. 
2 .5. 3 The producer pn.ce of maize is fixed annually by the Board 
with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture. The Board also 
determines the selling price (ie - the price paid to the Board 
by millers and other users further down the production chain). In 
determining these prices, it is intended that the Board will take 
account of the volume of the current harvest in relation to local 
demand, changes in production, handling and storage eosts, export 
possibilities and prices, the level of the stabilisation fund and 
other relevant economic conditions. In 1960, the Board ceased to 
exercise control on prices charged by mercha..TltS for maize and maize 
products and since May 1971, has not controlled milling prices 
for naize, though it has the right to reintroduce price control 
at any.t\me. In addition, the Board enforces grading regulations 
and is responsible for handling export arrangements. Exports are 
usually sold by a tender arra.."lgement, al though the Board does not 
consider itself bound to follow this procedure. 
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2.5.4 The Maize Board operates a single-channel fixed price 
scheme. The country is divided into three areas. (l) In area A, 
where about 95% of output is produced, farmers are required to sell 
~ to agents of the Board at prices fixed by the Board. In area B, 
producers are similarly required to sell to agents of the Board, 
at a price at least as high as the price fixed in area A. The Board 
appoints its mm agents (usually co-operatives) and requires the 
registration of all millers and other maize processors. In area C, 
producers are, free to sell the produce as they choose. 
2.5.5 An important feature of the Board's activity is the 
management of the stabilisation fund. This is maintained by a 
levy on producers and consumers and contributions from the State. 
2.5.6 The evidence in Figure 7 (
3) suggests the 
importance of the link between world and local prices. During the 
late 1960s, when a divergence appeared between local and world 
prices, the stabilisation fund shows a rapid decline. The later 
recovery in the early 1970s can be attributed to the rapid rise in 
world prices above local prices. Thus the stabilisation fund 
may be seen to provide the mechanism which links world and local 




2.5.7 As exports increase as a proportion of the local output, 
this l'ink with world prices can be expected to become increasingly 
important. lmy attempt to hold local producer prices at a level 
significantly different from world prices is likely to induce great 
(1) ',For a comprehensive account of maize marketing arrangements, see 
RN Brits, 'The Marketing of South African Maize', SAJE 37(1969),ppl98-218. 
(2) The question of State subsidies is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
(3) See p.198. 
(4) The reason for the close link. between world and .local prices is 
discussed in more det~iL in Chapter_8. 
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instability in the stabilisation fund. 
2.5.8 
2.5.9 
b) Wheat. Until recently, wheat cultivation was 
confined to the Southwestern Cape region. However, with 
the introduction of new cultivars, production has expanded 
rapidly in the Orange Free State. Smaller quantities 
are produced in the Transvaal and Natal. 
Following World War II, South Africa became a net importer 
of wheat, mainly as a result of increased demand. In most years 
of the last decade, however, local production has exceeded consumption. 
A certain amount of imports still occur, however, due to quality 
differences between local and foreign wheat. South Africa's self-
sufficiency in wheat cannot be attributed only to technological 
advances. Production has, in addition, been encouraged by the policy 
of maintaining relatively high producer prices. (l) 
2.5.10 In addition to wheat, the Wheat Board is responsible for 
the purchase and distributfon of other winter cereals (barley, oats 
and rye). Like the Ma1ze Board, the Wheat Board operates on a 
single-channel, fixed price basis, using co-operatives principally 
as handling agents. In addition, through a system of registration 
the Board is able to exert a high measure of control over the 
milling and baking sectors of the industry. Winter cereals may 
only be imported by the Board or upon the Board's authority. 
Recently, .the method of handling imports has changed, but the Board 
is still able to exert full control over the quantity of cereals 
reaching the local market. It cannot, however, con~rol amounts 
held back by farmers for seed, feed or household use. 
2 .5. 11 The wheat industry is character-ised by a high level 
of control. It was one of the earliest boards to be established 
( 1938) and in l 9Lf9, its powers were extended to include the three 
other crops. In addition to fixing producer and consumer prices 
(~ith ministerial approval) the Board enforces a network of other 
(1) See Fig.6a, p.197. 
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regulations relatingto quality and the number of bakers and 
millers. Further down the production line, the various grades 
of flour and bread, as well as prices, are controlled. In addition, 
the selling price of bread (a politically sensitive item) is 
subsidised and subject to price control. 
2 .5. 12 
2.5.13 
c) Oil seeds .. Following a shortage during the Second 
World War, a government sponsored campaign was launched 
in 1946 to encourage local production. As a result, 
South Africa is now self-sufficient in vegetable oil 
products and is, in fact, a net exporter. This change 
was achieved by a combination of financial inducements 
and technological improvements, despite the fact that 
climatically South Africa is not obviously a suitable 
country for the cultivation of these crops. 
An Oil Seeds Control Board, consisting. of 16 members 
(members represent consumers and oil seed processors, plus two 
advisory members) was established in 1952. As with most other 
boards, grading regulations were established and enforced by the 
Board. The Board operates on a pool system. All groundnuts and 
sunflower seeds are sold via the Board through a system of agents 
appointed by the Board. These agents are responsible for handling, 
grading and storing the products. Producers receive an initial 
payment (a 'voorskot') on delivery and the remainder (an 'agterskot') 
after products have been sold. Almost all sunflower seeds are 
sold locally. In contrast, a significant proportion of groundnuts 
are exported, either as hand selected eating.or unselected as oil 
or oilcake. Sales are handled either by the Board or through 
local or overseas dealers. 
2.5.14 Production, which occurs mainly in the Southern 
and Western Transvaal regions, is highly mechanised. Increased 
ptod~ction of sunflower seed has been particularly marked in 
the 1970s. Since the price of sunflower seeds received by producers 
does not seem to have risen faster than the price of its close 
substitute in production, maize, the increased production may be 
~ 
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attributable to technological changes. A new variety of foreign 
cul ti vars was introduced in 1965 and by 1970/71 was responsible 
for 60% of entire sunflower production. Nevertheless, production 
of both groundnuts and sunflower seeds is characterised by a 
degree of instability. Since the area planted has been growing 
steadily, the output variations are due probably to climatic 
factors. 
2.5.15 These products are in some way typical of South African 
·~ 
agriculture. Production is encouraged for reasons of self-sufficiency. 
They are tightly controlled in both the economic and technical 
sphere and.grading regulations are strictly enforced. The contra:-
diction between self-sufficiency (which would require maximum 
production at least cost) and high quality (which reduces production) 
has not been officially considered or discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STABILISATION - THEORY AND PRACTICE 
3. I INTRODUCTION 
3. I • I The problem of market stabilisation policy is central 
to most debates in the area of agricultural economics. The issue 
is complex, inv(f.~ing as it does, technical questions of market 
dynamics and the conditions necessary for stability on the theor-
etical side; it is also of practical importance because of its 
obvious and immediate relevance to real world policy makers. 
3. I. 2 It is the object of this chapter to consider aspects 
of stabilisation policy - theoretical as well as practical - both 
in a general ~ramework and with particular reference to South Africa. 
Many of the topics discussed here are not new, but are worthy of 
careful consideration because, it will be argued, many of the 
cormnonly held beliefs in this area are open to serious question. 
Many of the models which are used to 'explain' problems or 'justify' 
policies of market intervention are based on such a narrow range of 
assumptions and exist in such a peculiar world of partial 
equilibrium that, in fact, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn 
from them about the real world. The 'cobweb' theorem which we discuss 
in some detail below is an example of· this. Equally, some of the 
recent work in the field of stabilisation theory, though more 
sophisticated, is subject to much the same objections as earlier . 
work. 
3. 1.3 As a first step, we shall consider the theory of 
agricultural market instability in general and, in pc.rticular, 
the cobweb theorem in its simple form as well as more sophisticated 
versions. We shall consider whether these arguments provide 
satisfactory explanations for the behaviour of agricultural markets. 
We shall then consider the more fundamental question of whether 
market instability is, in fact, undesirable. Finally, some of the 
practical problems of income and price stabilisation policy will be 
discussed. 
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3.2 CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL MARKET INSTABILITY 
3. 2. 1 A characteristic of agriculture is that prices and incomes 
tend to fluctuate over wide ranges within fairly short periods of 
time. This is not to suggest that price fluctuations do not occur 
in other sectors, but, it is argued, price instability 'tends to be 
greater and less predictable in the case of agriculture. In part, 
this is due to the seasonal nature of the industry. In the case 
of vegetables and meat in South Africa, clear evidence exists of 
1 . . . . (1) T h . h h . . seasona variations in price. o t e extent t .at t ese variations 
can be predicted with some degree of certainty, they do not con-
stitute a serious problem, since both consumer and producer can 
make plans accordingly. More serious, however, are those fluctuations 
in price which are not readily predictable. There is no .. single 
explanation for these fluctuations, but the most important caus.es 
are considered to be: 
3.2.2 a) Weather and Natural Hazards. The importance of 
this factor can be gauged from the observation that in 
the period 1960 - 74, yield per acre in :the .South 
African maize industry fluctuated from trend by an 
average of 16% per annum and whea~ by 11% per annum. <2> 
This variation is attributable almost entirely to 
unpredicted factors such as weather variability, 
although other influences such as variations in the· 
use of fertilizer may also have played a part. The fact 
that these variations cannot generally be forecast at 
the time when the production decision is made, means 
that the farmer operates in a situation of uncertainty. 
(1) J Ardendorf, Eknomiese Neigings,·die Produksie, Verbruik en Pryse 
van Vleis in die U11i2 van Suid-Afrika (D.Conun. Thesis, Univers:Cty y_ 
of Pretoria, 1958), describes this behaviour in the case of meat. 
See also Figs. l & 3, pp. 191 and 193. 
(2) Similar behaviour is reported by W L Niewoudt, 'Risk and Uncertainty 




In the absence of speculation, buffer stocks held by 
producers or storage by consumers, these unplanned 
variations of output are likely to be directly reflected 
in variations in price. 
b) Speculation. Fluctuations in commodity markets, 
particularly in international markets, are often 
attributed to the activities of speculators. In fact, 
speculative behaviour may influence markets in two ways: 
i) Stabilising - when the price falls, speculators 
buy stocks anticipating a future rise in price. 
This action itself tends to push the price up. 
As the price rises, speculators sell, forcing the 
price down again. It is equally possible, however, 
to advance an alternative scenario: 
ii) Destabilising - as price falls, speculators sell, 
anticipating that it may fall even faster. The 
same type of behaviour may be observed in an 
upward direction. As prices rise, speculators 
may buy stock anticipating a further rise in 
price, which is likely to follow as a natural 
consequence of their own actions. 
c) Low price elasticities of demand and supply. In 
part, price and income fluctuations in agriculture may 
be the result of low elasticities of supply and demand 
for agricultural products. It is argued that although 
in the long run price elasticities of supply may be 
fairly high in agriculture (ie - given time, farmers 
will respond to changes in price by changing output), 
in the short run this is not so. Once a crop has been 
harvested it may be regarded as fixed and supply is 
unresponsive to price changes. Furthermore, food being 
a necessity, demand for agricultural products is likely 
to be price inelastic. It is this combination of a 
steep demand cul·ve and· a steep supply curve (which 
shifts considero.bly and unpredictably due to variations 
in -weather, etr::.) which is said to cause wide price and 
accompanying income variations. 
l 
32 
3.2.5 Al though these arguments are frequently advanced to explain 
behaviour in the agricultural sector,· they do not form a satisfactory 
' basis for a discussion of real world agricultural marketing· 
policy. In dealing with the question of price variability, there 
are essentially two problems to discuss. 
3 .2 .. 6 The first, and the easiest, concerns the occurence of 
two separate prices for the s&ue product in different markets at 
the same point in time. Economic theory has two explanations to 
of for here. The first is the discriminating monopolist model. (1) 
It pays a monopolist, if he can separate his markets, to charge 
different prices in each market if the price elasticities of demand 
are different. Technically speaking, he will maximise profit by 
charging a higher price in the market where demand is less elastic. 
The seaond explanation is more relevant to agriculture and can be 
explained in terms of the 'crankhandle' model, (Z) whereby differences 
in price are to be explained in terms of transport cos ts •. (J) A 
comparison of prices between the Bloemfontein and Kimberley markets, 
for example, reveals occasional large differences in prices for the 
same commodity. Transport costs would appear to be the most 
satisfactory explanation for the phenomenon. The monopolistic 
argument is not tenable, since vendors in these markets are, 
generally, price takers. 
(4) 
----------·------------------~--------------------------·~-----------------~---
(I) See George J Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York: MacMillan, 
1952), pp.214 - 218. 
(2) See Kenneth E Boulding, Economic Analysis Vol. I, 4th ed. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1955), p.211. 
(3) Different prices at the same point in time may also be explained by 
a lack of information. This really reduces to a special case of 
the transport cost arglmen t and in any event is of little importance 
in this context because information on agricultural market prices 
is normally readily available at minimal cost. 
(4) It has been suggested that the price behaviour of municipal markets 
is significantly affected by actions of 'rings' of purchasers. 
There is, it seems, no evidence of a similar level of organisation 
on the part of producers. See Report of the Corrnnission of Enquiry 
into Agriculture, Third (Final) Report, RP 19/1972, p.15i. 
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3.2.7 The second problem requires more careful attention. 
It relates to the problem of.the existence of different prices 
for the same commodity, or group of cormnodities, in the same 
market at two different points in time. The market for vegetables · 
provides an appropriate example of this behaviour. These variations 
may be due, theoretically, either to shifts in supply or in demand 
schedules. Since the demand for vegetables as a whole is likely 
to be reasonably stable, it would appear that shifts in supply 
are the most likely cause. (l) Much of the price variability in 
Figures and 2 can be attributed to the seasonal nature of 
vegetable product ion.·· It would seem that there is a cyclical 
regularity in the price cycle which repeats itself every growing 
season •. The period of the cycle will be a reflection of the 
growing period or, in the case of meat, of the growing period of 
the fodder inputs~ compounded with the growing period of cattle, 
while the amplitude of the cycle can be expected to reflect 
numerous factors - the possibility of imports from markets in a 
different seasonal cycle, the elasticity of demand and the costs 
of storage of the commodity. The more elastic the demand, the 
lower the costs of storage, the less the amplitude in price 
fluctuations. The lower the costs of imports, also, the less 
will be the amplitude of the cycle. Technic.al progress, while 
reducing storage and transport costs and thereby extending the 
market, can be expected to reduce price variability over an extended 
time period. 
3.2.8 Secondly, we are concerned with a cycle which has a 
frequency of more than one growing period. The most commonly 
used model of instability in agriculture is the cobweb model,-
which is often cited as an explanation of price instability in 
the agric.ul tu.ral sec tor. (2) We then consider whether it does, 
in fact, constitute a satisfactory explanation. 
(1) See Figs. 1 & 2, pp. 191 and 192. 
(2) For an explanation of the simple cobweb model, see Appendix 5. 
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3.3 THE TI:ME-LAG EXPLANATION 
3. 3. 1 Although Ezekeil is often given credit as the originator 
of the cobweb theorem, the roots of this concept can be traced back 
a good deal earlier into economic literature. Jn a general sense, 
Robertson ( 1) pointed out that time provides a..""l important explantion 
of economic cycles. Moore, (2) forecasting the yield and price of 
cotton, produced evidence that, though the current price of cotton 
was determined by the current crop, the volume of the current crop 
was influenced by the previous year's price. He did not place 
this idea in an analytical framework, however. Nevertheless, 
these two writers highlighted what are, in fact, the two most 
important elements in the theory of market dynamics: 
i) Time, which combined with production inflexibilities 
ensures that the flow of supply onto the market is not a constant 
one, and 
ii) Expectations, whereby farmers adjust their production 
decisions according to what they expect the price to be. 
3.3.2 Other contributors to the theory which predate Ezekeil 
are Ricci, C3) Tinbergen, C4) Leontief (S) and Kaldor.( 6) Ezekeil's 
.article is important more for the clarity of p'resentation than 
for the originality of its contents. A comprehensive presentation 
of the cobweb, complete with accompany.ing graphs, appears in Kaldor, 
who apparently first suggested the name and who attributes the 
theory to Ricci. 
( 1) See D H Robertson; A Study of Industrial Fluctuations, (London 
School of Economics, 1915.) 
(2) H L Moore, Forecasting the Yield and the Price of Cotton (New York: 
Mac.Millan, l 917) • 
(3) U Ricci, 'Die Synthetische Okonomie van Henry Ludwell Moore,' 
Zeitschrift fur Nationalokortomie, April 1930. 
(4) J Tinbergen, 'Best-imming und Deutung van Angebotscurven 
Zeitschrift fiir Na tionalokdnomie, Apri 1 1930. 
Ein Biespiel,' 
(5) W Leontief, 'Verzogerte Angebotsanpassung und Partielles Gleichgewicht,' 
Zeitschrift fi.ir i~ationalokonomie, December· 1934. 
(6) N Kaldor, 'A Classificatory Note on the Determinateness of Equilibrium, 1 




Kaldor showed that : 
i) "Where the adjustments are completely discontinuous, 
stability •••.. of equilibrium will depend on the relative 
elasticities of demand and supply •11 This is well known, 
though not strictly correct. More accurately, it is 
the relative slopes of the curves which determine the 
behaviour of price, but also, 
ii) "In the case of continuous adj us tmen ts, the 
question of stability will depend not on the relative 
elasticities, but on the relative velocities of demand 
and supply," so that, 
iii) "If the velocities of adj ustinent are greater· on 
the demand side than on the supply side, movements will 
lead towards an equilibrium •••••. 
iv) If the velocities of adjustment are greater on 
the supply side than on the demand side, movements will 
lead away from equilibrium ••••• " (l) 
This second set of conditions is interesting because 
it seems to have been overlooked in much of the subsequent discussion 
on the cobweb theorem, though analytically and practically, it is 
at least as important as the first set. From the point of view of 
agriculture, it may be that the first set of conditions (the 
discontinuous case) is most applicable, at least in those sectors 
where, for reasons of cost, stockholdings are small or non-existent, ~ 
Where there exist speculators and buffer stocks, though, it is 
likely that velocities of adjustment are equally important. 
3.3.5 The.cobweb theorem is important, as Ezekeil shows, 
because it puts into a convenient analytical fra::nework the fact 
. . 
that once the ·time dimension is introduced, economic fluctuations 
are possible. Equilibrium is not a necessary outcome of economic 
activity. Ezekeil restates the theorem and extends it to the case 
'/- of a three ... year lag where essentially the same behaviour is 
________ ;_:_'----------------------·----------------------------------------------·--
(1) N Kaldor, (1933/34), p.135. 
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observed .. He also discusses the limitations of the cobweb theorem. 
Firstly, it is clear that the theorem can apply only in certain 
.specific cases: 
i) .Where production is~~ely determined by the 
'1--produce;s response to price under conditions of pure 
competition. 
ii) Where the time needed for production requires 
(1) 
at least one full period before production can be changed, 
once plans are made. 
iii) Where the price is set by the supply available. 
There are other difficulties, Ezekeil explains, in relation to the 
simplicity·of the expectations functions which require that: 
3.3.6 
.... 
p,. . = p 
t+l t 
ie. observed price at time t 
time t + I 
expected price at 
The fact is that in practice there may well be considerable 
downward flexibility of production :Cone can always destroy one's 
own crop) and in addition, unpredictable weather may disrupt the 
smooth working of the cobweb. There are in addition production 
rigidities. 
_/l 
"Analyses of acreage response for various crops shows 
that there is a limit to the percent farmers will 
increase their acreage in a single year, so that even 
with a oneLyear response period, several years of 
successive increases in acreage may be required before 
very high prices are reflected in high production." (2) 
------------------------~----------------------------------------------------~ 
(I) M.Ezekeil, 'The Cobweb·Theorem,' QJE 52 (1938), pp.255-280, 
pp.272 - 274. 
(2) M Ezekeil (1938) p.257. 
37 
This is an important practical point which Nerlove discusses at 
some length. ( l) 
3.3.7 In addition, as Ezekeil'clearly saw, there is a strong 
assu.~ption that the product is isolated - supply alone sets the 
price.which raises the question of substitutes and complements -
the ceteris paribus assumption must be strictly applied. 
3.3.8 Perhaps the most perceptive insight in Ezekeil's 
article appears right at the end: 
11 
•••••• it appears that even on those areas of the 
economic system where reasonably effective pure 
competition still prevails, cobweb cycles may prevent 
the system from reaching its most effective utilisation 
of resources. Where competition is absent or 
monopolistic, we must study the other ways in which 
production and price are controlled; where pure 
competition is present, we must examine the mechanism 
and sequence of price and production reactions to 
determine whether they do work effectively towards 
an optimum adjustment." (2) 
It is on these problems that a good deal of the most recent work 
ha& been focussed. (J) 
3.3.9 In practical terms, although some empirical evidence 
has been found to support the cobweb theorem, (4) the attacks on 
the realism of the theorem·have been devastating. Lachman 
discussed the question of the cobweb theorem in relation to the 
holding of stocks. He argues that for the cobweb to operate as. 




(I) M Nerlove, 'Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena,' QJE 72, 
(1958), pp.227 - 240 .• 11~ more sophisticated model of farmers' 
response to note has recently been developed by R E Just. 
(Giannini Foundation Paper No. 458). 
(2) M Ezekeil. (1938) p.280. 
(3) See for example J M Wolgin, ' Resource Allocation and Risk: A Case 
Study of Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya,' AJAE 5 7 (197 5) and 
D Blandford and J M Currie, 'Price Uncertainty - The Case for 
Government Intervention,' J of Agric. Econ. 26 (1975~ pp.37 - 51. 
(4) See G W Dean arid E 0 Heady, 'Changes in Supply Response and 
Elasticity for Hogs' JFE 40 (1958), pp.845 - 860. 
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willing to sell their products at any price." (I) If there is 
at any point a preference for holding goods then supply is not 
totally inelastic. Lachman' s argument, though he denies it, 
appears to revolve around the question of foresight and expectations. 
For unless some assumption is made about foresight, the motives 
for holding goods become·obscure. Thus his criticism seems to 
amount, ultimately, to a criticism of the naive forecasting 
assumptions implied by the cobweb theorem. 
,3.3.10 Buchanan (
2) sets out to consider the necessary 
assumptions for the cobweb theorem to operate ~ particularly in 
relation to the supply curve - and uncovers further difficulties. 
The cobweb theorem involves the assumption that the supply curve 
is completely reversible along its whole length. This implies 
that for each firm, cost outlays in any one period are incapable 
of yielding valuable services in production beyond that period. 
This, in turn, implies that each entrepeneur must re-combine 
factors of production completely afresh in planning his next 
f--'year~' output on the assumption that the present price will hold. 
Arguing that in fact price = average cost for each producer, 
(ie - on the assumption of normal profits) in a competitive 
situation he then shows that producers will always lose more in 
per:lods of low prices than they would gain in periods of high 
prices. Over time they will, in other words, never succeed in 
breaking even except, under certain circumstances, in the convergent 
case. Thus the possibility of perpetual oscillation rests ultimately 
on the additional assumption that there is always a group of new 
producers willing to venture and lose their capital in each pair 
of periods. In practice, it seems that neither perpetual oscillation 
nor divergence could_ long persist. 
(I) D Lachman, 'Commodity Prices and Equilibrium,' Review of Economic 
Studies 3, (1935/36), pp. 230 - 234, p.232. 
(2) N S Buchanan, 'A Reconsideration of the Cobweb Theorem,' JPE 47, 
(1939~, pp.150 - 173. 
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3.3.11 Akerman, (l) using a rather more complicated graphical 
analysis, argues that in practice there is likely to be a relatively 
inelastic supply curve in the short run, becoming more elastic in 
the long run. Utilising the concept of stock holdings~he shows 
that the divergent case though possible, is much less likely 
than the naive cobweb theorem would lead one to expect. 
3.3.12 In another graphical analysis, Waugh{?) considers the 
case where supply and demand schedules are not straight lines 
'f-but 'S'-shaped and shows that market stability is more likely in 
-!~this case than in the straight~line case. He also considers the 
effects of price floors and ceilings and develops a simple model 
showing that when exports are possible, the cobweb can always be 
stable, the export market functioning as a 'safety valve' for the 
internal market - an example of considerable interest to South 
African agriculture where it would seem to be.applicable in certain 
cases, eg - maize. Despite its obvious weaknesses, the naive 
cobweb model:;has focussed attention on two important aspects of 
market dynamics. 
3 .4 STOCKS, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 
3. 4 .-1 The naive price expectation model: 
* pt = Pt+l 
would seem to embody certain assumptions regarding stocks. 
Producers act as though the price next year were known with 
certainty. Stock holding does not seem to be rational 1n this 
situation since given the expectation that price received next 
year will be the same as price received this year, holding stocks 
-/l becomes a lossLmaking activity if we allow for storage costs. (3) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) 
( ?' -J 
( 3) 
G Akerman, 'The Cobweb Theorem: A Reconsideration,' QJE 71 ( 1957), 
pp. 15 l - 160. -
F V Waugh, 'Cobweb :Models,' Journal of Farm Economics 46 ( 1964), 
pp.732 -50. 
"In general, future trading can be unde:cstood only as a response 
to the trading problem of a heterogenous cash market 1vith soci<Ll 
and individuaJ. uncertainty, where specialisation is necessary 
to keep the cost of making transactions and of holding inventories 
to a minimum, 11 h S Houthakker, 'The Scope and Limits of Futures 
Trading,' ,in M Abramovits, et al. (eds) The Allocation of Economic 






3.4.2 Hooten (l) explicitly introduces the question of risk. 
The effect of risk is to make the supply schedule steeper, he 
argues, because even with the same weighted average price, more 
would he produced if price fluctuations had been smaller in the 
past (or if price were guaranteed) than would be produced if 
price fluctuations (taken as indicative of risk) had been greater. 
This is due to supposed risk aversion on the part of producers. 
Similarly, he argues, speculation causes the demand curve to be 
flatter due to the existence of stocks. A rise in price can 
cause demand to fall rapidly as consumers draw on their stocks. (2) 
In the case of a falling price, demand increases quickly in antici-
pation of a price rise - the normal behaviour of speculators, 
in fact. Cochran (3) makes the same point regarding the effect of 
risk on the supply schedule, as do Blandford and Currie. (4) 
These two forces, tending to make the S schedule steeper and the 
D schedule flatter, make the possibility of a stable system 
more likely. 
3 .4 .3 Hooten does not succeed in his rather sensational 
claim of refuting the cobweb theorem, though he does make the 
case strongly that in practice the divergent case is unlikely 
due to inbuilt equilibrating mechanisms in the economic system -
an obvious deduction, in fact. He does conclude, however, with 
an interesting connnent about price guarantees in agriculture. 
See .also L Telser, 'Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton 
and Wheat,' JPE 66 (1958)1 pp.233 - 255. 
"In a competitive industry in an uncertain world, a firm maximising 
expected net revenue holds an amount of stock such that the net 
marginal cost of holding these stocks equals the expected change 
in their price during the time they are held." (p. 233). 
J Hooten, 'Ri.sk and i:he Cobweb,' EJ 60 ( 1950), pp. 69-80. 
1 
This would seem to imply simply that stocks are held by the 
ultimate consumer rath2r than by speculators or producers. 
WW Cochran, 'Conceptualising the Supply Relation in Agriculture,' 
AJAE 57 (1955), pp.1161-1176. 
D Blandford and J 11 Currie. (1975). 
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"By reducing risk, the cost of production is decreased 
and the supply schedule is inevitably shifted\/to the 
right (ie - it gets flatter)f This makes the divergent 
case, of course, more likely to occur." (l) 
3 .S EXPECTATIONS 
3 .5. I A feature of the cobweb theorem is that price expectations 
on the part of both producers and consumers are always wrong and 
neither party learns from the experience. As one might expect, 
this behaviour does not appear to approximate reality. Heady and 
Kaldor (2) conducted an empirical investigation of price expectations 
among farmers and found them to be remarkably accurate on average, 
though substantial differences did exist between farmers. Also, 
significantly, price expectations did affect output decisions. 
This empirical evidence fails to support the assumption of the 
cobweb model which requires that production decisions are related 
to current price. 
3 .5. 2 It is in the area of expectations that the most sophisticated 
mathematical models have been developed. Grunberg and Nodigliani C3) 
approach the cobweb model from an unhsual perspective, using it 
to discuss a more general problem of economic dynamics. 
"The fact that human beings react to the expectations 
of future events seems to create difficulties for the 
social scientist. It has been claimed that, in reacting 
to the published prediction of future events, individuals 
influence the course of events and thereby falsify the 
prediction." (4) 
--~---------_ ..... _____ .. _______________________________________________________ _ 
( 1) It depends, however, on whether increased risk can be portrayed 
as a parallel shift or whether the curve actually gets flatter - in 
which case, the divergent case certainly is more likely. 
There does not seem to be any reason to favour the latter prediction. 
(2) E 0 Heady and D R Kaldor, 'Expectations and Errors in Forecasting 
Agricultural Prices,' JPE 62 (1954), pp.34 - 47. 
(3) E Grunberg and. F Modigliani, 'The Predictability of Social Events,' 
JPE 62 (1954), pp.465 - 478. 
(4) E Grunberg and F Modigliani, (1954) p.465. 
\ 
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Using a cobweb type model, Grunberg and Modigliani show that 
accurate public forecasting is indeed possible "under conditions 
normally fulfilled in the ~eal world." (l) In fact, they show that: 
3.5.3 
"The response of agents to the publication of a prediction 
may actually increase predictive ability. The fore-
caster may, for instance, have knowledge of how agents 
react to given expectations but have little information 
on the determination of those expectations. To the 
extent that expectations are determined by public 
prediction, such prediction then supplies the forecaster 
with the missing information." (2) 
Devletoglou (3) identifies three related problems 
relating to the stability of equilibrium: 
i) Is correct public forecasting possible? 
ii) Is correct public forecasting desirable? 
iii) Can adequate information for correct public 
forecasting be secured? 
Devletoglou focuses on the second problem and using a simple 
cobweb model with the added assumption that "supply at any period 
is a function of a weighted average of the public forecast and the 
price of the previous period," he shows that convergent price 
trends are far more likely to occur. Thus accurate public ~o~e­
casting, while it does not necessarily "change an unstable situation 
into a stable one, reduces considerably the divergence from the 
equilibrium position at any point in time." <4) 
3.5.4 Devletoglou argues that Buchanan, Hooten, Akerman and 
Nerlove criticise not the inherent logic of the cobweb theorem, 
but rather try to show the existence of some stabilising mechanism 
(1) E Grunberg and F :Modigliani (1954), p.475. 
(2) E Grunberg arid F Modigliani ( 1954)
1 
p .4 76. 
( 'J' .J) 
(4) 
E A Devletoglou, 'Correct Public Prediction and the Stability of 
Equilibrium,' JPE 69 (1961~ pp.142 - 161. 
E A Devletoglou (1961~ p.149. 
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inherent in the cobweb model that makes that makes the convergent 
case, if not certain, at least much more plausible. He gives a 
useful summary and concludes that public forecasting, if accurate, 
is desirable as a damping factor. 
3.5.5 Rothschild (l) carries this discussion further in the 
direction of greater realism and considers what will happen if 
forecasts are not perfectly accurate. He shows very simply that, 
3.5.6 
"Even if forecasts are not quite correct they will 
exert an equally strong damping effect on the original 
cobweb cycle as correct forecasts - so that ..•• less 
than perfect forecasting stabilises extreme situations 
just as efficiently as correct forecasting. But 
when the equilibrium zone is approached, its effects 
are slightly destabilising." (2) 
Kemp 
(3) 
sets out to show that: 
i) The announcement of a forecast does not necessarily 
validate or tend to validate the forecast. 
ii) Accurate forecasting may be impossible. 
iii) Even perfectly accurate forecasting, if it were 
possible, may add to the instability of the economy, 
( His article.z.. drew comment from Chiang,. Grunberg and Modigliani, C4) 
but'his conclusions appear to stand despite their criticism. His 
conclusions, like those of.others, however, appear to be closely 
linked to the model he has chosen to specify. 
(I) KW Rothschild, 'Cobweb Cycles and Partially Correct Forecasting,' 
JPE 72 (1964) , pp. 300-305., 
(2) KW Rothschild (1964), p.302. 
(3) M C Kemp, 'Economic Forecasting when the Subject of the Forecast 
is Influenced by the Forecast,' AER 52 (1962) ,- pp.492-496. 
(4) See AER 53 (1963), pp.730-740. 
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3.5.7 Nerlove (l) also considers expectations. He introduces 
the concept of adaptive expectations into the cobweb model. (Z) 
Devised from a formulation by Hicks, ( 3) Nerlove specifies an 
expectations function: 
* p t p t - 1 * * (3 (Pt-1 - P t-1) 
where P t is the expected price in 
period t 
f3 is the coefficient of expectation 
o <B < 1 
He shows that under the expectations assumption, stability is 
much more likely than in the case of the naive model. Examination 
of empirical evidence by Nerlove suggests that the markets for 
cotton and corn appear to be stable while the market for wheat is 
unstable though, as Nerlove points out, this instability may only 
occur over a certain range of prices. 
3.5.8 Shepherd <4 ~ highlights the important fact of the cross 
elasticities of demand as a crucial variable in agriculture. It 
may be worth noting that the cobweb model can be extended comparatively 
. h . . <5) d easily from t e case of one price to two prices - a mo el 
which is rather more relevant to the real world. 
3.5.9 It is clear from this survey of the relevant literature 
that the cobweb does not emerge as a very satisfactory model. The 
expectations hypothesis on which it is based is extremely naive, 
the supply function needs to be drawn on strong assumptions to 
operate as predicted and we must have a closed economy. (It is 
also based on the strange assumption that, in agriculture, intended 
-----------·----------------------------------------------:.-_____________________ _ 
( 1) M Ner-love, 'Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena,' QJE 72 
(1958), pp.227-240. 
(2) See Appendix 7. 
(3) J Hicks, Value and Capital (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), p.205. 
(4) G S Shepherd, Agricultural Price Analysis (Ames, Iowa, 4th ed.) 
1957. 
(5) See Appendix 5. 
\ 
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output = actual output, which is certainly not the case in practice, 
particula.rly in agriculture). Significantly, apart from the 
. --
theoretical weaknesses and the strict assumption associated with 
the cobweb model itself, almost every development of the model 
suggests that the stable case is more likely than the simple 
model would suggest. It is purely an illustrative device which 
can serve to show the importance of time and expectations on 
economic decision making. 
3.5. 10 There is a tendency in economic literature to use the 
cobweb theorem as indicative of instability in the agricultural 
sector. This creates the impression that the agricultural sector 
is in some sense unique - yet time and expectations are equally 
important features in other sectors of the economy. Also because 
of the fact that intended output usually is not equal to actual 
output in agriculture, it is peculiarly inappropriate when applied 
to this sector. It is also, as a matter of simple observation, 
not true. Neither agricultural markets, nor any others, fluctuate 
over infinitely wide price ranges. Nor do they tend to stability 
and stay there. An understanding of their behaviour requires a 
far more sophisticated approach to the problem than the cobweb 
offers. ( 1) 
(1) For recent steps in this direction, see DJ Smythe, 'Effect of 
Public Price Forecasts on Market Price Variation: A Stochastic 
Cobweb Example,' AJAE 55 (1973), pp.83 - 88. 
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3 .5. 11 As further illustration of the argument that the 
cobweb theorem is a special case, the following 'decision tree' 







Does instability apply to 
single commodity or group 
of commodities? 
No - equilibrium 
l Single - examine behaviour of .·substitutes and complements 
Class·· 
" Due to shifts in demand or supply? 
I ~ 
Tastes, incomes, 
etc. have changed 
Have costs of variable 









Are fluctuations of 
period less or more 




Is there a possibility 










3.5.12 It would seem to be a fair conclusion, therefore, that 
the cobweb theorem can provide, at best, a limited understanding 
of the behaviour of agricultural markets. It should also be noted 
that it is inconsistent with most of the other explanations of 
agricultural instability. The assumption that intended output 
equals actual output is clearly not consistent with the argument 
that weather causes output variation. Similarly, the divergent 
case of the cobweb depends on the assumption of a relatively 
elastic supply curve - an assumption contradicted both by the 
'inelastic explanation' and by the allegedly destablising activities 
of speculators. Indeed, the existence of speculators calls into 
question the possibility of defining stable supply and demand 
schedules at all. A further weakness of the model is that 
producers and consumers are depicted as passive participants 
in the market - an assumption contradicted by empirical evidence. 
3 .6 /PRICE STABILISATION SCHEMES 
3.6. 1 In the previous section it was argued that agricultural 
markets are not unique. Much of our reasoning regarding the 
behaviour of these markets is based on arguments which are either 
generalisations to the real world of partial equilibrium models 
or else arguments which, on examination, prove to be mutually 
contradictory. It must, nevertheless, be accepted that the arguments 
in favour of price stabilisation schemes are perceived by some 
economists to carry weight. In this section we shall consider 
the application of a certain type of price stabilisation scheme. 
The discussion will again be carried out at a theoretical level, 
but it is suggested that, as in the cobweb case, certain general 
principles may be deduced. It is contended that the successful 
operation of a price stabilisation scheme is likely to prove 
mo re difficult than may be imagined. 
3.6.2 Numerous attempts have been made at stabilisation, 
particularly in underdeveloped countries, where the effect of 
market fluctuations have, possibly, more serious consequences 
than for Western nations owing to the dependence of some of these. 
cou.ntries on primary export commodities subject to world prices. 
.. 
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As McBean (I) has pointed out, however, one of the main problems 
of stabili~ation policy is to decide what should be the object 
of stabilisation - export prices, producer prices, money incomes, 
real incomes, outputs, etc. At the simplest possible level this 
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Fig. 3~ 1 
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Assume the long run equilibrium price of OA and the quantity 
supplied OG. A bad harvest may push the supply curve leftward 
to S' so that producer incomes change from OADG to OBCF, ie - the 
fall in income EDGF is compensated by the rise in price, leading 
to an increase in income BCEA (in parenthesis we note the automatic 
income stabilisation mechanism of. the price system, whereby a 
reduction in supply 'automatically' compensates producers by a 
rise in price. It is not perfect, however, since the compensation 
BCEF may be more than enough or less than enough to compens~te for 
the loss of income EDGF, depending on the elasticity of demand). 
A rigid price fixing marketing scheme, however, would maintain the 
price at the long run level, ie - OA and income would fall to 
OAEF. Price stability, in other words, is achieved at the cost 
of increased income instability. The reverse, of course, may also 
hold true. 
3.6.3 Bauer and Paish 
(2) 
list numerous stabilisation schemes 
which have been attempted, usually without much success. Many of 
these attempts may be criticised on theoretical grounds (3) or 
----------------------------·--------- ... -----------------------------------.----~ 
(I) A I McBean, Export Instability and Economic Development, (Allen and 
Unwin, 1966) -. --
(2) P T Bauer ;:ind F W Paish, 'The Reduction of Fluctuations in the Incomes 
of Primar.y Producers,' EJ 62 (1952)
1 
pp.750 - 780. 
(3) For example, it has been argued that the International Wheat Agreement 
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have proved unworkable in practice - as illustrated by attempts 
to stabilise the price of coarse wool in New Zealand. (l) 
3.6.4 Even after the objectives of the scheme have been 
agreed, practical problems arise. As Bauer and Paish have pointed 
out, the major problem relates to the difficulty of maintaining 
contact with trend - the implementation of the scheme becomes, 
in other words, a forecasting problem. As a solution to this 
problem, they devised a smoothing formula which would, in certain 
circumstances, provide a relatively stable producers' price. 
This formula has recently engaged the attention of Anderson who 
has suggested that the use of the formula may, in practice, 
increase the degree of instability.(Z) 
3. 7 A. FLOOR/CEILING PRICE SCHEME 
3.7.1 The price stabilisation scheme considered here is the 
conventional and often proposed one (3) in which a national or 
international 'controlling body' acts to stabilise price through 
the market mechanism. Under buffer stocks and financial reserves, 
the 'controlling body' enters the market as a buyer to maintain 
-·-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of 1949 tended to destabilise the free market price. See H G 
Johnson, 'The Destabilising Effect of International Commodity 
Agreements on the Price of Primary Products, 1 EJ 60. ( 1950)
1 
pp.626 - 629. 
(1) See New Zealand Wool Board and New Zealand Wool Commission. First 
Report of the Wool Marketing Study Group, Wellington, 1967. 
(2) G H Anderson, 'Income Stabilisation for Primary Producers: An 
Empirical Evaluation of the Bauer - Paish Proposal,' SAJE 38 
(1970),pp.35 - 49. 
(3) See, for example, International Monetary Fund and International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Joint Staff Study on 
Price Stabilisation; 1969, pp.157 - 158. 
I 
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a floor, or as a seller t6 protect a ceiling price level.Cl) 
In certain cases, the object may simply be to reduce the ampli-
tude of cyclical price swings. In others (the 'full stability' case) 
it may be to maintain definite floor and ceiling boundaries to the 
. (2) 
market price. 
3.7.2 The 'full stability' sch0 m0 is illustrated below: 
·'t ,.fl 0; 





Ceiling and floor prices are set at P' and P" respectively by 
the 'controlling body.' We avoid the difficult question of how 
these levels are arrived at, but assume they represent a balanced 
-ll medium"-term view of future price trends. Problems associated with 
the setting of floor and ceiling levels are considered later. 
At pi the 'controlling body' enters the market as a seller with 
infinite stocks and the supply curve becomes perfectly elastic 
at this price. Similarly, at P" the 'controlling body' enters 
the market as a buyer with infinite financial resources and the 
demand curve is perfectly elastic at this lower price. 
(1) This appears to be similar to the scheme which van Waasdijk is 
advocating when he argues for the use of price ranges rather 
than fixed prices as a basis for marketing policy. See 
T van Waasdijk, 'Agricultural Pric~s and Price Policy,' SAJE 22 
(1954),, pp.160 - 173. 
(2) The Joint Staff Study on Price Stabilisation, op. cit. makes 
a distinction that is important between stablisation relative to 
some.external price and stabilisation that is 'internal'~ i.e. 
designed merely to even out fluctuations over time, with the 
average price taken as given. 
/ 
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practical terms, of course, it may be difficult to find a suitable 
price as a basis for stabilisation. The problems of commodity 
price forecasting are well known - and even if one could determine 
and measure the relevant parameters, as Brown has warned, (I) the 
mere fact of the imposition of a market control system may alter 
these parameters. The schemes simply suggest a subsidy i.n on.e i: 
of the farmer's costs - that of risk. They offer nothing more 
than that.· The ctirrent state of the debate has been well 
expressed by Stabler: 
3.8.7 
"One observation, however, can be made with certainty: 
the economic rationale for instituting agricultural 
1 
policies is very difficult to establish if one subscribes 
-lb to a free~market view of the industry. Indeed, very 
few, if any, economists have taken such a purist 
·approach; but even allowing for a modified view which 
sees agriculture as being parallel to that for assisting 
certain regions, some of the arguments of an economic 
nature appear to be very dubious." (2) 
There appear to be no economic grounds for believing 
that agriculture is a special case. Many of the models and arguments 
advanced in support of this contention are inadequate or mutually C :i e c '.~-
contradictory. It is not obvious that stable prices are a satisfactory 
poli~y objective, and even if they were, theoretical reasons can 
be advanced to suggest that such a policy would be difficult to 
implement. Practical experience seems to support this view. 
(1) C P Brown, Primary Commodity Control (OUP1 1975), p.74 .. and RE Just 
et al, 'The Distribution of Welfare Gains from International 
Price Stabilisation under Distortions,' AJAE 59 ( 1977), pp.652 - 661 
make ·a similar point. 
(2) M J Stabler, Agricultural Economics and Rural Land Use (London: 
Haci.'1illan, 1975)1 p.51. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SUBSIDIES IN AGRICULTURE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 The question of government subsidisation of corrnnercial 
agriculture has been an area of continuous debate and controversy 
in South Africa. In part, this is because of a failure to maintain 
a clear distinction between the objectives of stabilisation and 
subsidisation. It is as well to reiterate the importance of this 
distinction. 
4.1.2 Perhaps a more fundamental reason,· though, lies in the 
nature of the problem itself. Aside from the fact that the issue 
of subsidies frequently generates emotional responses, and it is 
difficult to approach the problem of agricultural subsidies from 
an entirely disinterested standpoint (at some time or another we all 
buy food), it is a fact that considerable analytical and empirical 
difficulties are involved in any discussion of this area. These 
hazards have been described by Prest who, after considerable research 
reports:· 
"Before reading this mass of literature, I was under 
the delusion that I knrf)what a subsidy was; now I 
am no longer so sure." 
In addition to the simple problem of defintion, Prest's discussion 
illustrates the practical difficulties involved in measurement of 
subsidies. If economists encounter these difficulties at such a 
fundamental level, it is only to be expected that within the 
politica~ arena, subsidies should be a fertile minefield of mis-
information, confusion and half-truths. 
4 .1.3 The objective of this chapter is to consider the 
question of subsidies as rigorously as possible within a conven-
tional analytical·framework. As usual, it will prove easier 
(1) AR Prest, How Mu~h Subsidy? Institute of Economic Affairs, 
Occasional Papers, p.11. 
4.2 
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to criticise other people's contributions than to advance 
original ideas of one's own. 
MEASUREMENT 
4.2.1 To reduce confusion to a minimum, it seems best to 
define, as precisely as possible, what is meant by the term 
subsidy: A subsidy is "a payment to individuals or business 
by a government for which it receives no products or services 
in return." (l). 
4.2.2 Despite the problems alluded to above.regarding the 
difficulty of measuring the costs of subsidies, various attempts 
have been made in the case of South African agriculture.(
2
) 
C S Richards, after a thorough examination of the data arrived 
at a figure of about Rl5m, made up as in Table4.l.<
3
) 
4.2.3 Another estimate appears in a Report of the Industry 
d A · 1 1 R · C · · <
4)'wh1"ch est1'mates an gricu tura equirements omm1ss1on 















(1) Dictionary of Economics, McGraw Hill, 2nd ed. 
(2). It should not be imagined that South Africa is unique in its 
policy of subsidising the corrm1ercial agricultural sP-ctor. 
Similar pcJlicies are followed in all developed countries. For 
example in 1969 the U S government paid out R2,85 billion in 
subsidies to United States farmers under the price support 
progr~~e alone. 
(3) See p. 61. C s, Richards, 1 Tariffs, quotas an.d the excess 
cost of agricultuie in South Africa,' SA J E 3, (1935), pp.365-403, 
(4) Third lnterim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural P· 
381 
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Requirements Commission, U G 40il941,p.35. 
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TABLE 4.1 
SUMMARY OF EXCESS NATIONAL COSTS FOR 1933 
Amount of 
contribution Amount of 
by Govern- Excess Amount 
ment to write Costs to of 
off (a) excess Consumers Loss 
Amount advance on on Inter- on 
Commo- of Maize Pool in nal Con- Exports Total 
dity Subsidy 1931-32, sumption (Quota). 
including of 
interest, locally 
etc., and (b) produced 
deficit on commodity. 
Wheat Pool, 
1931/32. 
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO 
Eggs 62 62 
Wool 2 250 2 250 
Ho hair 132 132 
Citrus 244 244 
-Grapes 




Maize 86 1 120 204 428 1 838 
Wheat 240 3 530 .:... 3 770 
Sugar 2 408 1 424 3 832 




Cheese 10 356 66 432 
Heat 100 100 
:Misc. 









TOTAL 3 558 1 360 7 386 _2 328 14 946 
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4.2.4 Of this total it was estimated that approximately 
RlOm went to farmers, the rest to manufacturers. In addition, 
"direct government assistance" accounted for an additional 
income transfer of RSm, giving a total of RlSm accruing to 
farmers. In addition, allowance should be made for special 
railway rates applying to farm produce and requisites. 
4.2.5. The methods employed to calculate the total cost of 
subsidies differ between the two sources. The fact that they 
both arrive at a figure of RlSm is largely coincidental. As 
will be emphasised below, the concept of "excess cost" is quite 
different from the "burden on consumers", so there is no reason 
why the estimates should be at all similar. Nevertheless, 
these exercises have served, perhaps, to illustrate the formi-
dable d1ifficulties associated with this type of quantification 
exercise if we are to attempt to arrive at some hard figures 
to illustrate relative benefits and burdens. How does one, for 
example, incorporate the fact that "agriculturalists have to 
. purchase many manufactured products at prices increased conside-
rably above world levels because of industrial tariff protection."(!) 
Even the most favourable conclusion must be that these exercises 
are, at best, a partial analysis. 
4.2.6. Even if we could arrive at some agreed figures, more-
over, it is unlikely that differences of opinion would vanish. 
In contrast to Richards' strongly worded article,(2): we note that 
on the basis of the same total cost figure of Rl5m, "The Council 
..•. is not critical of the total amount of assistance granted 
to farmers." (3) There is little possibility however, of agree-
(1) Social and Economic Planning Council, 1 The Future of Farming in 
South Africa,' U G 10/1945, p. 6. 
(2) .· C S Richards, (1935). 
(3) U G 10/1945, p.6. 
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3.7.3 If the price level. is accurately set, the stocks built up 
over a period of abnormally low prices will be sold on the market 
in a period of abnormally high prices. Ideally, a small profit 
margin should be made to cover administration, storage and interest 
costs. Immediately, however, certain practical problems arise: 
3.7.4 Stock and Price Levels - The availability of financial 
resources, the size of buffer stocks' held and the choice of floor 
and ceiling price levels are, in fact, inextricably linked to-
gether. This problem is worth pursuing further since it will 
lead to the conclusion that the imposition of floor and ceiling 
levels is more complex than might be supposed. The actual situation 




Resources (financial or 
stocks) 
In the extreme case, with infinite financial resources, the 
'controlling body' can reduce price variability to zero. Conversely, 
with small resources, the degree of control that can be exercised, 
is correspondingly small. The choice is clearly between a greater 
or lesser degree of stability. This can be taken a step further 
as follows: 
Suppose price boundaries are set at P' and P". Then should the 
equilibrium price rise to P ,.,, sufficient stocks must be available 
to se.11 Q~~on the market. (Figure 3.4). If the 'controlling body' 
wish to be 99% sure of avoiding a stock-out, they must be 99% 
sure that price will not rise above P' given stocks of Q*. Clearly, 
the closer P is to P' the greater the stocks that must be held. (l) 
_.:. ___ ....;....;._.:.....:.. ___ _:_ _ _:._;,. _ _:....:.~...:....:.....:..-...:.---~-------------------~---.-------------------------
(1) The practical problems associated with determining the appropriate 
difference P' - P" are discussed by Law: 
"If floors and ceilings are set, they rnus t be set (a) 
















! I .___ ______ ;:...__~·~-------------------
? Q .<: 
Fig. 3.4 
Quantity 
We now examine the statement made above that stocks 
bought = stocks sold. It appears that, in general, the forec·ast 
price is the arithmetic mean of free market prices and if the 
scheme successfully maintains price between P' and P", this 
requirement will not be met. 
Consider the simple model: 




Suppose that equilibrium price falls below the floor price P" to 
PL. (Fig. 3.5) • 
Then a+bPL = c+dPL 
So PL (c-a) I (b-d) 
It is necessary to buy sufficient stock until price has risen by 
.6 Pl to P". 
So P"= PL +AP 
1 
- (c-a) /(b-d) + t..P 
1 
( c-a) I (b-d) + 1 /b AQ 
prevent excessive acctL~ulation or shortages, (c) flexible 
enough to keep in touch with realistic equilibrium 
levels." ,' 
A D Law, International Cormnodity Agreements., (Lexington: D C Heath, 1975), 
p.71 .Law argues that only scanty evidence is available to suggest 
that international commodity agreements have improved price 
stability. In some cases they have increased price fluctuations. 
(p.75). 
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To maintain the ceiling level P', it is necessary to sell stock, 
so P' ==PH -ti.P
2 





(Since we have assumed that the price forecasting is on average 
correct and price variation is systematically. distributed about P), 
it follows that the requirement that amount bought = amount sold 
is that -b = d, ie, that the absolute value of the slopes of the 
supply and demand schedules be the same. Unless this unique 
condition holds, it will be necessary to set asyrrnnetrical floor 
and ceiling limits. If the D curve is more elastic than the S curve, 











It can also be shown ( 1) that even· though 
price P is the arithmetic average PH and PL, farmers might 
well have to acce.pt a reduction in revenue under the 
floor/ceiling price scheme proposed here. Because under a free 
market arrangement, total revenue over two periods would be 
OPHZK + OPLWB. There is no guarantee that the revenue received 
under the scheme (OP'RK + OP"TP) · is as large. It may well be 
smaller. 
(I) Following G Hallett, The Economics of Agricultural Policy (Oxford, 
1971) pp.198-199. 
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3.7~7 The success of the scheme thus depends on a fairly 
accurate knowledge of the parameters involved. For example: 
Say a= -8, c = 10, b = 2, d = -1 and xs f (Pt_1) 
then P = 6 (= average long term price level) 
Assuming an initial price of 4, then the free market price will 
be 4,10,-2,22,-26,70
1 
••••• in successive periods, ie - the price 
will deviate by successively greater amounts about the mean value 
of 6. The 'controlling body' can stabilise·-prices quite easily 
about this long term mean. A floor price of 4 and a ceiling 
price of 8 can be maintained indefintely provided the 'controlling 
body' is prepared to. buy and sell two· units in successive periods. 
Similarly, floor and ceiling prices of 3 and 9 respectively can 
be maintained provided the 'controlling body' is prepared to buy 
and sell three units in successive periods. 
3.7.8 The problem arises, however, if P, the intended or 
imagined long term price, differs from P, the actual long term 
price, ie P # P. This could arise if, for example, for political 
reasons or ignorance of the actual: values of a, b, c and d and the 
'controlling body' attempted to stabilise price at a level greater 
than P. 
3.7.9 Say P = 7,5 and floor and ceiling prices of 5 and 10 
respectively are set. Then, using the parameter values above, 
the free market price would be the same, viz: 4,10,-2,22 •.•.• etc., 
assuming an initial price of 4. However, in this case, the 
'controlling body' could maintain the price within the chosen limits 
only by buying l,0,8,0,8,0,8 ...... in successive periods. Stocks, 
in other words, would grow continuously unless the 'controlling 
I d 
( 1) 
body ran out of fun s. · 
3.7.10 The introduction of the scheme, therefore, implies an 
ability to provide accurate price forecast"s· - a condition which 
in the case of a wide variety of commodities is not likely to 
be met. 
------~----------------------------------------------------------------------
( 1) Clearly, this is a closed economy model. 
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3.8 IS MARKET INSTABILITY UNDESIRABLE? 
3.8.I Even if one accepts the argument that agricultural 
markets are 1miquely unstable, the question must nevertheless be 
posed whether or not this instability is undesirable, because 
although freely moving prices are in theory the rationing and 
allocating mechanism of the economy, it can be argued that 
extreme fluctuations may, in practice, lead to higher costs 
to bothProducers a~d consumers. ( 1) At the intui tiv:le-;e-1-, 
therefore, it is generally agreed that stable prices are desirable, 
al th.ough Caine (2 ) has expressed doubts that this is a general 
rule and Friedman <3) has argued, in connection with the well-known 
Bauer-Paish price stabilisation formula, against interference in 
the free market mechanism. The majority viewpoint, however, is : 1~ 
that stable prices are desirable as a goal. With the exception 
of Friedman, this reasoning remains essentially pragmatic rather 
than analytical, however. It has proved to be remarkably difficult 
to show that price stabilisation, even if possible in practice, 
constitutes a net gain for society. The topic continues to generate 
discussion. The real question, however, is not whether or not 
stable prices are desirable. It is more important to ask: How 
much are we prepared to pay to achieve a certain level of price 
stability? It. is only in this context that the issue can be 
meaningfully discussed. 
3.8.2 In a well known article, Waugh argued that price 
instability can, in fact, constitute a net gain to consumers. C4) 
·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) J K Galbraith, A Theory of Price Control (Harvard University 
Press, i 952). -
(2) S Caine, 'Instability of Producer Incomes: A Protest and a Proposal,' 
EJ 6L~ (1954)Jpp.610 - 614. 
(3) M Friedmdn, 1 A Reduction of Fluctuations in the Incomes of Primary 
Producers: A Critical Comment, 1 EJ 64 (1954),pp.698 - 703. 
(4) F V Waugh, 'Does the Consumer Benefit from Price Instability?' 
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Consider straight line demand curve dd. The triangular area 
above· the price line is consumers' surplus. Now suppose the 
price is stabilised at D which is the arithmetic mean of the 
actual prices in two periods, which would have been B and F 
respectively. Now under the price stabilisation scheme, total 
consumer surplus would be 2 x6ADE. If, on the other hand, there 
had been no stabilisation scheme, total consumer surplus over the 
two periods of the analysis would have been.AABC +AAFG which is 
larger. Hence, the stabilisation scheme causes a net loss of 
consumer surplus. 
3.8.3 The argument, however, is inconclusive. It may equally 
well be argued that the area ·under the demand curve constitutes 
total utility. If this area is sliced vertically instead of 
horizontally, a comparison of triangles leads to the: reverse 
conclusion - price stability leads to an increase in total 
utility. (I) This simple illustration serves to indicate the 
rather unsatisfactory nature of the debate on the price stabilisation 
question. 
3.8.4 The recent literature on the subject has, however, 
presented an apparently strong case for price stabilisation. ( 2) 
We will consider this below and argue that, in fact, the case for 
stabilisation remains as inconclusive as before. The recent articles, 
-----------------------------~-------------------~--·------------------- .. ----
(1) See KL Robinson, 1 Unstable Farm Prices: Economic Consequences and 
Policy Options,' AJAE 57 (1975) , pp. 769-777. 
(2) See for example J H Wolgin (1975), D Blandford and JM Currie (1975), 
S J Turrwvsky, 'Price Expectations and the Helfare Gains from 
Price Stabilisation,' AJPE 56 (1974). 
' . 
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while using a mathematical presentation,can be explained simply, 1 
though less rigo~ously, as follows: 
3.8.5 The farmer acts in a world of less than perfect information. 
This lack of information is, in fact, a constraint on his activities. 
One area in which this lack of information is particularly noticeable 
is the question of product price - a variable of considerable 
importance in his production decisions. Because of this, he may 
choose not to maximise expected profits but, being a risk averter, 
may choose some way to allocate his scarce resources to ensure himself 
greater security, though at the expense of profits. This constitutes 
a net loss to society since resources are not being used in the 
'optimum' way. (l) As a practical example, consider a farmer in 
a prime maize growing area in an imaginary country where price is 
subject to considerable fluctuation. The resources at his disposal 
are (by definition) technically most suited to growing maize. 
However, he fears that the maize price may be very low next year. 
He, therefore, decides to spread his risk. Instead of maximising 
his output of maize, he allocates certain of his resources in other 
directions - he may choose to save or to allocate his limited 
resources to the production of wheat ot cattle. Mixed farming, in 
other words, may be a response to risk. A guaranteed price would 
remo~e this risk, lead to greater specialisation, economies of 
e/t scale and, con1'.quently, greater output. 
3.8.6 The argument is superficially convincing. In fact it 
is fallacious. In practic·e, of course, output pYice is only one 
of a variety of prices which the farmer is concerned about -
although admittedly an important one. Stabilising one price will 
not necessarily le.ad to a significant change in his production 
decisions. More damagingly, price variability is only one of a 
variety of risks - disease, drought, etc. So again, a stable 
price may not have much effect on his decisions. Further, in 





. ( 1) 
ment on tota figures. 
4.2.7 It is worth noting that both C S Richards and the 
Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission use world 
prices as a basis for comparison to determine the excess burden 
to consumers and benefit to producers. NowJ_Vorld prices are an 
important bencbroa-rk, especiilly_iL.we accept the assulllP_!ign_th.:it 
'?~~------ ~ 
Sbuth Africa is_g~nerally_a_piic~_take;r::_i-n-we:r-1d-ma±-ke..t.s. Indeed, 
~-· 
world prices are used in Chapter 6 as a basis for determining 
how marketing boards were using their monopolistic powers. This, 
I j 
\ 
it seems, is a valid use of world prices and while world prices \ 
may be a useful basis to measure wealth transfers, they do not 
provide a satisfactory basis to measure net social burdens.--"(2) 
Richards does not confine his concept of 'excess national cost' 
very clearly, but there does appear to be a fundamental confusion 
here between the two sets of figures provided above and what is 
generally considered to be the social cost arising from a subsidy. 
4.2.8 In fact, as will be suggested below, (
3) both sets of 
figures substantially ~-estimate the net social burden or 
' subsidies. It is doubtful whether accurate estimates of relative 
burdens can be computed, (4) but even if one could obtain satisfactory 
measures in terms of 'consumer surplus,' it would not tell us a 
great deal about the net welfare effects of a subsidy policy. 
. " 'b . 1 ff . . <5) Distri utiona e ects are important. 
(1) For example, the Third Interim Report of the Industrial and 
Agricultural Requirements Commission (UG40/1941, p.34) records 
a sum of over R2m spent on research, precautionary measures, 
administration and the dissemination of information. This is a 
clear example of government assistance to agriculture, but clearly, 
the benefits are more widely spread. How are we to apportion 
this sum? R Horwitz,. Political Economy of South Africa (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 196 7) has placed considerable emphasis 
on the advantages accruing ·t.::o commercial agriculture from the · 
South African Railways rating policy. 
(2) The reason for this is set out on pp.67-68. 
(3) See p.68. 
(4) " .... tariffs, import quotas and special preferences for domestic 
producers have important price increasing impacts which are only 
partly measurable." International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, XV, p.365. 
(5) Distributional effects are discussed on pp.69-80. 
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TABLE 4.2 
TOTAL STATE FINANCIAL AID TO THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
Rl 000 
Nature of 




















6 625,4 6 044,i 7 402,1 7 109,9 8 889,2 7 214,2 
26 961,8 28 087,S 35 134,11· 36 369,6 37 377,6 32 986,2 
857,0 882,C 6 250,4
1 
3 665,7 4 840,0 3 299,0 












herds & flocks 
Total 38 688,3 42 670,7 52 809,4 49 375,8 53 008,9 47 310,6 




Grand Total 76 466, 7 93 959,S 107 882, 7 105 468,3 108 243,0 98 ·404,1 
4.2.9 The Report of the Connnission of Inquiry into Agricul-
. b . . ( 1) . ture provides more up to date data on su sidies. Again, they 
are calculated on a different basis from Richards' and include 
only direct payments. Richards1 'loss on export' category for 
example is not included. It is clear that of the various cate-
gories of subsidy described, only three are large enough to be 
important, viz. fertiliser subsidies, price stabilisation and 
customs and excise duties. It is worth noting that the first 
and third of these relate to input prices, the second to the prices 
of outputs - an'. important distinction from an analytical and prac-
• 1 . f . h 11 d. h . (Z) tica point o view. We s a return to iscuss t ese issues later. 
4.2.1 Having established some of the rather limited informa-
tion on subsidies as they relate to South African agriculture, we 
turn to consider the theory of subsidies, and the predictions 
which the theory yields. 
(I) Third (Final) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture, 
RP19/1972, p. 119. A useful summary of this Report is contained in 
J P O'Donnell and F J van Eeden, 'Staatsondersteuning aan die 
Landboubedryf,' Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 
1971. 
(2) See pp.65-68. 
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4.3 THE THEORY OF SUBSIDIES 
4.3.1 While the principle o.f subsidies may be clear enough, and 
h d f . . . {l) d h h t e e 1n1t1on · generally accepte , t e t eory very soon runs into 
difficulties. 
"Subsidies exist in the shadowland of economics, where 
transactions are decided by government decree rather 
than by free choice of buyers and sellers in the market 
place. Their forms and objectives vary greatly •.• 
There is no developed theory of subsidies ••• The trans-
fers ar{2jffected through the coercive powers of the state." 
Nevertheless, the theory does yield useful predictions. (3) 
4.3.2 
(1) See p. 60. 
(i) Input subsidies. Nieuwoudt ha~ presented the classic 
case for subsidies on the input side as follows:(4) 
" social prosperity can be raised if a factor, the 
value of which is not realised by farmers, is subsidised 
On the other hand, prosperity can be reduced by a 
subsidy if the farmer already realises the value of the 
production factor and uses it at more or less the optimum 
levels." 
:Nieuwbudt- quotes, as an example, the case of a fertiliser 
subsidy. 
(2) ,·s~1bsidi~s' International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XV, p.365. 
(3) A thorough treatment of subsidies is contained in Carden (1974). 
He shows that theoretically a subsidy is the first best method 
of correcting marginal divergences. However, often, in 
practice" .. one must compare a tariff, which is certainly second 
best or worse, with a subsidy financial inc:. second best way," 
pp. 54-55. In practice therefore, tariffs are often imposed in 
preference to subsidies because "explicit taxation imposes psychic 
costs which implicit taxation does not," p.55. 
WM Carden, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1974), p.55). 
(4) W L Nieuwou<lt, 'Factor subsidies and certain policy implications', 
Agrekon, 11 (3), July 1972, pp. 5-8. 
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4.3.3 The argument appears to be quite sound it is after 
all simply a way of arriving at the optimum point of marginal 
equivalences. It can be compared with the example given by 
Carden (l) of a subsidy in a dual economy where a subsidy is 
used to divert labour from the subsistence sector to the 
modern sector. In the subsistence sector, marginal product is 
assumed to be low or zero. Workers however remain there because 
in a tribal situation they receive not the marginal but the 
average product due to communal sharing arrangements. A subsidy, 
which increases wages in the modern sector and thereby attracts 
workers from the subsistence sector, therefore leads to an 
increase in net output. 
4.3.4. Superficially, these arguments both app.ear to be the 
same, and in a technical sense they are - in both cases the 
price of one of the inputs is reduced to the employer with a 
resulting increase in use of that factor. In actual fact, 
the examples are quite different. Corden's example is 
theoretically sound, since it is based on the prime assumption 
of rational human behaviour. Nieuwoudt's is not and is conse-
quently unsatisfactory. The reason is as follows: In Corden's 
example, the worker is assumed to be receiving the average 
product in the subsistence sector. It is rational for him to 
stay there unless the returns in the manufacturing sector are 
higher to him, ·i.e. underlying this argument is the assumption 
of rational response to economic incentives. 
4.3.5. In Nieuwoudt's case, the situation is rather different. 
If the farmer were to use more fertiliser, the marginal returns 
would exceed the marginal cost. Why does he not do so? Because 
he does not realise the value of the input - and presumably the 
govern..rnent does. There is here a case for information or 
(1) WM Carden (1974), pp. 123-129. 
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education. There is no case for a subsidy which would simply 
reward the farmer for his ignorance. (l) 
1
1f Nieuwoudt' s 
subsidy were applied, the farmer would gain twice. Not only 
would he gain because at the old price the extra returns would 
exceed the extra cost - but all the fertiliser he buys would 
be cheaper than before. A further disturbing aspect to this 
argument in favour of a subsidy is that wellf..informed farmers 
(in the fertiliser sense) would rationally use more than the 
social optimum as defined by market prices. The du Plessis 
Committee appears to appreciate this problem. 
"The subsidy on fertilisers mighthave the dis-
advantage of encouraging farmers to plough marginal 
land and raise crops on them (sic) ••• the subsidy 
might also lead to crops bein~)grown outside their 
natural cultivation areas." ( 
Thus it appears that a divergence of marginal relations is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the appropriate use 
of an input subsidy. 
4.3.6 (ii) Output subsidies. The classic model in this 
area is usually attributed to Wallace.<3>· 
Price 
F · E Quantity 
Fig.4.1. 
s 
(1) See Appendix 4. 
(2) , R P 19/1972, PP• 111-112. 
to the use (~nd misuse) of 
PP· 77-79. 
The suggestion that subsidies rr.ay lead 
original land is discussed below, 
(3) TD Wallace, 'Measures of Social Cost of Agricultural Programs,' 




4.3.7 It relates to the subsidisation not of factor inputs 
but of output prices. Instead of a price of FB in Fig4.l and 
quantity OF, which is the free market equilibrium position, 
producers are paid a higher price, OJ, and in consequence 
produce a larger quantity, OE, absorbing more productive 
resources, and the amount OE sells at the lower price of OH. 
Thus, producers receive a higher price than they would under a 
free market arrangement and consumers pay less. There is, 
however, a net social loss, BCD, because resources are being 
drawn away from more productive uses. It can then be shown 
that the social cost triangle can be derived as 
where P1Q1 = equilibrium under competition 
'iz, = absolute value of elasticity of demand 
E absolute value of elasticity of supply 
2 T· = square of the percentage increase in the 
"fair" price (OJ) over the price that 
(1) 
would exist in the absence of the programme 
4.3.8. Though the net social cost is given by BCD, the total 
transfer of income is given by JCDH, which is the wealth transfer 
from taxpayers to producers. Whether there is a valid case for 
a subsidy or not, the fact is that the amount paid out in the 
subsidy, though it does accurately reflect wealth transfer, does 
not provide a satisfactory measure of social cost. To measure 
this requires, at least, a knowledge of demand and supply elasti-
. . .. • f . . ( 2) 
cities - a ar more stringent requirement. 
(1) See Appendix 7 · 
(2) It should be noted that in South Africa this argument applies to 
the "price stabilisation'' subsidies which account for 52% of total 
government expenditure on subsidies. In the case of input sub-
sidies, similarly, total expenditure does not provide a satisfac-
tory measure of net social cost. In the absence of State assis-
tence presumably private enterprise would provide at least some 
.of these services (e.g. loans for pasture improvement). The net 
cost of the subsidy is then·the difference between the cost to 
the State and what the farmer would have to pay private enterprise 





4.4 DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS - THEORY 
4.4.1 Subsidisation involves giving preferential treatment 
to a certain factor (e.g. labour), a certain product (e.g. 
maize) or a certain sector (e.g. agriculture). Very often the 
effects are subtle and difficult to measure. For example, an 
increase in land rates in urban areas amounts, in broad terms, 
to a subsidisation of agriculture since it attracts capital to 
agriculture where returns are now (slightly) relatively higher 
than before. It is clear, however, that to compute the magni-
tude of this effect would be an enormously complicated task. 
4.4.2 In other cases, it may not even be clear where in 
principle the burden lies. For example, it might be argued that 
in a case where the Chamber of Mines recruits black workers in 
white farming areas, the farmers lose their ablelbodied workers, 
but continue to support the families who remain on the farms. 
Influx control presumably prevents the families from joining 
the breadwinner in town. In this case, it might be argued, 
the State is imposing a- negative subsidy (a tax) on white agri-
culture. On the other hand, it can be argued that the presence 
of the,families ensures that the worker returns to work on the 
same farm, so that in fact the farmer is merely paying a low 
price for the guarantee of a future labour supply. It simply 
depends on how one chooses to present the situation. It is clear, 
however, that the imposition of subsidies will generally alter 
the relative returns of the various factor inputs. This may, in 
fact, be the primary objective of the policy. Alternatively, it 
b . d . d ff (l) may e an unexpecte si e e· ect. 
4.t+.3 The most import.ant prediction of theory as regards 
returns to factors of production is that, if the price of a 
(1) We are concerned with distribution as between factors of pro-
duction. The question of the distributive effects between 
different groups of consumers will be considered in a later 
section, pp.81-83. 
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product is raised by a subsidy: 
" Oae would expect that the prices with the 
least elastic supplies would rise most. Since 
labour is more elastic in supply than is land, 
land val'-les would be increased more than the 
price of labour. If the supply of farm labour 
were perfectti)elastic the farm wage would remain 
unchanged." 
Thus it 1s clear that a product subsidy is not neutral as regards 
returns to factors. It is worth noting however that if we make 
the rather extreme assumption that the supply of land (and hence 
the supply of aggregate agricultural output) is perfectly price 
inelastic, we find that net social costs are reduced to zero. 
Wallace's triangle disappears and we have simply a transfer of 





0 1-------- . F Quantity 
Fig. 4.2. 
4.4.4 In this case, therefore, a subsidy becomes merely a 
means of achieving a different distribution of wealth. It has 
no effect on output. (Z) ' 
4.4.5 If the object of the subsidy is to affect the dis-
tribution of earnings by factors: 
----------------------------------------------~-~-~~-------------------
(1) J F Floyd, 'The effects of farm price supports on the returns 
to land and labour in agriculture,' JFE 173(1965), p.153. 
This has implications for the method--Of cost-plus pricing 
commonly.used to set the price of agricultural products in 
South Africa. See Appendix 3. . 




"A subsidy intended to increase factor rewards in 
a certain industry, enacted because the industry is 
depressed or enjoys unusual political influence, will ~ 
be the more effective, the less the industry responds 
to the subsidy by increasing out_put . . . The required 
inelasticity of the supply curve need exist only for 
output in excess of the amount being produced before 
the subsidy was granted. But this condition is the 
more likely to be fulfilled, the more inelastic is 
the supply immediately below the initial output, 
since no prior reason exists for a sudden change in 
slope at that point. The subsidy will therefore be 
most useful in an industry that employs specialised 
factors that cannot be easily increased in number 
when demand rises owing to the subsidy. Even such 
an industry will employ certain kinds of factors 
that are in fairly elastic supply to the industry· c· ) 
they will not gain appreciably by the subsidy." 1 
Shoup continues: 
"If the industry's supply curve is very elastic in a 
free market, the subsidy can be made helpful for 
factors (and not helpful to consumers) by government 
control of output. The supply curve beyond-the initial, 
no-subsidy equilibrium point can thus be made artifi-
ci_§l~~-~{:. _i_r:=la~H~· Farm programs commonly employ this 
technique." 
It is worth noting that whether the motivation for 
the-subsidy is to increase output or whether it is to alter rela-
tive returns to factors, these distribution effects occur irre-
spective. It is also clear that if we are to examine in any 
detail the effect of subsidies in South Africa, we need to know 
something about the elasticities of supply, both on the output 
as well as the input side. 
4.5 DISTRIBUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.5.1 It is clear that one of the primary motivations for 
(1) C S Shoup, op. cit., p .161. Empirical evidence of this is given 
on pp. 73-80. 
(2) CS Shoup, op. cit., p.161. 
72 
a subsidy pblicy in South Africa has been the desire to be 
self-sufficient in food!l) even at a cost to other sectors of 
the economy. In order to achieve this output, "The Council 
believes that it must be the aim of State policy to see that 
farmers and workers receive a fair and reasonable share of the 
national income.'' (2) As will be explained below (pp.75-76), 
the implications of this statement are rather disturbing. The 
Report makes clear that the main method of achieving this was 
to be by price-fixing. There is no suggestion in the Report of 
a conflict of inter.est between farmers and farm workers, although 
of course increased returns to one group does not necessarily 
imply increased returns to the other group. Thus it is suggested 
that the objective of higher prices is to increase output by 
increasing returns to factors of production. But let us disen-
tangle these influences. Will increasing prices lead to increased 
output? 
4.5.2 If we are discussing aggregate agricultural output, 
which seems to be what we ~ discussing when we talk about the 
nation feeding itself, then the relevant concept to consider is 
the aggregate agricultural supply function. 
4.5.3 Empirical evidence. suggests that in many countries 
. (3) ·, 
the aggregate agricultural supply function is price inelastic 
and attempts have been made to explain way this should be so. C4) 
Griliches notes that elasticity appears to have been Tising with 
the passage· of time ·and 1 'Moreover, I believe that if we were to 
measure our· prices better, we would find that there is much more 






(1) See for example U G 10/1945, p.4. 
(2) U G 10/1945, p.17. 
(3) See Z Griliches, 'Estimates of the aggregate United States supply 
function,' ":'._J E 42(1960), pp.282-93. 
(4) See for exarr.ple Gale D Johnson, 'The nature of the supply function 
for agricultural products,' A E~ 140(1950), pp.539-64. 
(5) Z Griliches (1960), p.293. 
-( 
73 
Nieuwoudt has found that in the case of the South African aggre-
gate agricultural supply function, elasticity is rather high 
(0,38 in the short term and 1,34 in the long term) (l) which 
suggests that increasing overall agricultural prices are, in 
the long run, lead to a more than proportional rise in agricul-
tural output, as resources are drawn from other sectors of the 
economy into agriculture. Agricultural output rises whereas 
output in other sectors of the economy falls. 
4.5.4 Two problems worthy of consideration follow from 
this: 
(i) What happens if the prices of some products are 
increased but not others; 
(ii) What is the effect on returns to factors of 
production? 
The first of these problems is dealt with in Chapter 6. We 
turn now to consider the returns to factors of production. 
4.5.5 Returns to Factors. (a} Land. It is fairly clear 
that the price of land in South Africa has responded in the 
direction predicted by theory. <2> ~ • 
TABLE 4.1. 
Comparison of land prices and product prices 
(1958/9 - 1960/l = 100) 
Surrnner cereals Winter cereals Beef Wool 
LP pp LP PP LP pp LP pp 
338 186 290 161 355 339 170 181 
Note; Threelyear average 1973/4 - 1975/6 LP Land prices pp = Product 
Source: Department of Agricultural Economics 
.prices 
and Marketing, Abstract 
of Agricultural Statistics, 1977, Pretoria. 
----------------------~--------------------------·----------------------
(1) W L Nieuwoudt, iDie Aanbodelastisiteit van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Landbou,' SA J E, 40(1972), pp. 249-253. 
(2) See CS Shoup, op. cit., p.155~ 
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There appears to be a correlation between the price of the 
product and the value of the land producing it, which also 
suggests that land is not highly substitutable between these 
. d (1) maJor en uses. 
4.5.6 The question of land prices and rural land use has 
been a frequent topic for discussion, and while there appears to 
be general agreement that the price of land is closely related 
to the price of the product, it is the results of this increase 
in price that arouse controversy. While it is clear that existing 
landholders benefit" ... Higher land values induced by high output 
prices are of no value to the individual who enters agriculture { 
after the adjustment in land values has occurred." (Z) 11 In the 
abstract," argues Johnson, "there is neither more nor less justi-
fication for increases in the return to land than to any other 
· t " (3) . Thus not 1 · t · 1 d th 1 inpu ••• on y are exis ing an owners eon y 
ones to benefit, but, it can be argued that: 
"Distribution of farm subsidies and price support 
payments by income class have presumably been regres-
sive, analogous to progressive taxation, if the income 
classes taken are those that existed before the farm 
programs were enacted. The farm owners in that period 
of distress were probably disproportionately in the 
low income classes of the entire population in those 
countries that adopted farm programs. Within the 
-Ii farmi.,owning group, however, the subsidies and payments 
have probably always been progressive by income. At 
the present time, a measurement of regressivity or 
progressivity has limited meaning, insofar as present 
farm owners have had to pay for the farm benefits· in 
the price of land they have purchased." (4) 
(1) This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, 
(2) Gale D Johnson, World Agriculture in Disarray, (St. Martin,1973). 
(3) Gale D Johnson, op. cit., p.183. 
(4) C S Shoup, op. cit., p.196. See also Floyd (1965), p.158 and D 
Paarlberg, "Contributions to the new frontier to agricultural reform,' 
J £' E 44(5)(1962)pp29-37.B C Swerling, 'Income protection for farmers: 
a possible approach,' JP E 67 (1959), pp.173-186 has also argued 
that in the U S A at least, price supports probably involve an 
essentially regressive redistribution of. income: 
"It is frequently assumed that to move from high4_1evel -/ 
price ·supports to freer market prices is to sacrifice 
social equity for economic efficiency, and therefore 
price supports are favoured by those whose inclination 
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4.5.7 Apart from the probable regressive effect of price 
subsidies, there are two further aspects to this rise in land 
prices which deserve consideration. The first is the argument 
that the price of land is somehow above its "true production 
value." The second is the question of marginal land use resulting 
from high product prices. 
4.5.8 (i) The "true value" of land. Various unsatisfactory 
explanations have been advanced for high land prices. As was 
shown in the Table 4.1, not all land prices appear to have 
.risen faster than the prices of the output from that land. But 
where they have, it is quite consistent with the explanation 
that the price of land is a function of the price of the output 
of that land. The argument would go as follows: 
4.5.9 The effect of a subsidy on consumer prices is to 
widen the gap between returns and variable costs, thus providing 
. . . d b h (l) a stimulus to production. As pointe out a ove, owever, 
most of this increase is internalised as economic rent on the 
-//.; land (which is the least price(elastic factor input). Thus the 
rate of return in the industry instantly returns to its competi- / 
tive level. The price of the output may be higher than it was 
before, but now the price of those resources specific to that 
product has risen to take up the slack. It must therefore be 
concluded that a one-off subsidy for a particular crop, though 
it may have an effect on output, will not in the long term 
cause output to increase, except at the margin, at the expense of 
something else. The relatively high elasticity of aggregate 
(2) 
supply gives a measure of the transfer of resources and loss 
of output in other sectors resulting from the policy of subsidy. 
(1) See p. 71. 
is to favour the disadvantaged ..• (but) it is 
certainly not the poor in agriculture who · 
benefit from the present programs,' (p. 175). 
(2) Nieuwoudt (1972). 
( 1 \ ~1 
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4.5.10 The same argument follows in the case of a subsidy 
on agricultural prices in general, though of course here the 
substitution effect within agriculture is absent if the ratios 
of product prices are held constant. In the long run, there- i 
fore, output is re-established at slightly more than the old 
output levels, though the costs of inputs have risen. It is here 
that an important distinction must be drawn between a policy 
designed to increase agricultural output and one designed to 
increase returns to factors of production. In the former case, 
. a one-off subsidy may be sufficient to achieve the objective. 
If however the· intention is to increase returns to factors, a 
policy of continuously increasing subsidies will be necessary. 
c... 
Increased returns to factors are only possible if price increases 
are unexpected. Otherwise increased returns are simply 
internalised in the rent on the least elastic factors. The only 
way to ensure that the effect of subsidisation is not dissipated 
in the form of higher fixed costs, and that factor returns 
continue to be artificially raised, is necessary for the sub-
sidy to increase by larger and larger amounts so that, like a 
drug addict, the agricultural sector needs continually larger 
shots to keep going. Even this is not enough, though, since \ 
once these regular increases of subsidy are expected and a~ti- !~ 
cipated, they are discounted by the market. Land prices rise 
more rapidly than product prices. To have a stimulating effect 
on output, in the long run, therefore, subsidies must always be 
larger than anticipated - a rather explosive requirement. (l) 
4.5.11 Note that a rise in the price of wheat (for example) 
will cause an increase in wheat output, but a net increase in 
output is possible only if there were unemployed resources 
(e.g. unused land) that could be brought under cultivation. 
Though it is postulated here that output prices are the 
primary determinant of land prices, they are clearly not the 
only influence. During the 1960's for example, land was per-
ceived by some to be a satisfactory long term hedge against 
inflation. As a consequence, demand and so prices increased. 
; V' 
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Otherwise resources already employed are simply transferred from 
other uses, where they were earning a higher return. 
4.5.12 Thus it seems that returns to land can adequately 
be accounted for as a derived demand for the product of the land, 
even though we may have to use expected rather than present or 
past product prices as the explanatory variable. 
4.5.13 (ii) The use of marginal land. It was suggested in 
the previous section that an output price subsidy might result in 
previously unused (or underlutilised) land being brought under ~/Iv 
cultivation. It has been argued that South African agricultural 
prices : 
"are out of alignment with those in most other 
important agricultural exporting countries, as a 
result of control and tariff protection •• Thus 
cereal production has been extended to marginal 
areas with ruinous effect on the soi1.••{l) 
This argument seems to have gained some currency though it is 
difficult to determine when this particular explanation of land 
misuse was first advanced. The Drought Investigation Commission, 
f 1 <
2) ' k . f . 1 . or examp e, ma es no mention o prices as an exp anation 
for soil erosion, but stresses rather bad farming methods. The 
Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission reports: 
"At present improper pasture management is resulting in an almost 
general deterioration of natural grazing, culminating in further 
denudation and moisture loss. " (J) Again there is no mention of 
price as an important variable. 
4.5.14 Richards made the fairly obvious point that as a result 
of artificially high prices 11Cultivation of land for unwanted 
products ... is being extended to more and more marginal land with 
(1) U G 10/1945, p.26. 
(2) Interim Report of the Drought Investigation Commission, 
U G 20/1922. 
(3) U G 40/19L~l, p.11. 
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h . h. . "(l) b '. d ·1 ig er costs of production ut tnis oes not necessari y cause 
erosion, while the Reconstruction Committee puts the 
following interesting argument: 
4.5.15 
"The whole question of land abuse is closely 
linked up with economic consideratiorts. The 
farmer is the active and direct agent respon-
sible for the maltreatment of our agricultural 
resources, but it would be most unfair to 
charge him with sole responsibility ••... a 
fundamental difficulty is the fact that the man 
on the land has been caught in the vortex of an 
economic system not of his making, which in a 
large degree compels him to exploit the agricul-
tural resources in order to enable him to meet 
his commitments and at the same time to maintain 
a reasonable standard of living •.• " (2) 
It is not clear what this 'vortex' is, nor why 
agriculture should be unique in this regard, but the argument 
is nevertheless interesting, because in contradiction to ----Richards, it suggests that times of economic hardship encourage 
the farmer to overutilise his resources. Thus it would appear 
that when prices are too high, land abuse results because 
farmers are encouraged to misuse their land. When prices are 
too low, also, to "maintain a reasonable standard of living" 
abuse of the land also results. Now it may be that periods of 
both high prices and low prices are associated with different 
types of land abuse. In other word.s, both explanations are 
correct, but for different reasons. It also seems quite plausible 
that in times of hardship, given the pressing need to provide 
·, 
for his family and other commitments, the farmer's time perspective 
may be sufficiently foreshortened for him to delay.investment and 
live off his capital (i.e. to 'run down' his land). 
4.5.16 It is more difficult, though 1 to sustain the argument 
(1) C S Richards (1935), p. 402. 
(2) Reconstruction of Agriculture 1944-45, Report of the Reconstruction 
Committee of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1943, p.7. 
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Yl.:, 
that high product prices lead to land abuse. In a business 
envir~~t, rising prices generally lead to increased 
investment, not the reverse. It would be strange if farmers 
were any less rational. Since, as has been argued above, the 
value of land is a function of the value of the output of that 
land, it follows that when prices rise the value of land also 
rises. It therefore becomes even less sensible to misuse one's 
land. (l) The exception to this would appear to be the case where 
prices are high but expected to fall in the future. Then it may 
be considered rational to increase output considerably, the extra 
return being more than sufficient to compensate for the reduction 
in quality of the soil. Rowever, this would appear to be only a 
~short~term possibility~ 
4.5.17 The other plausible explanation for the coincidence of 
land abuse and high prices is simply lack of education and lack of 
information on good farming techniques. If this is the case, then 
high prices cannot be advanced as a cause of unsatisfactory farming 
methods. Ignorance is independent of price level. 
4.5.18 Returns to Factors. (b) Labour. It is clear that 
elasticities of supply are an important determinant in establishing 
variations in factor rewards in response to a subsidy. It is also 
clear that rewards in the form of cash wages of unskilled labour 
have been very low in South Africa; certainly much lower than 
urban wages. The obvious explanation for this is to be found in 
the barriers to mobility of rural black labour. (2 ) Nevertheless 
(1) 1 Investment in irrigation schemes ·when prices rise is an example of 
a response to rising land values. It becomes sensible to use onecs 
land more intensively. 
(2) , Two qualifications shou-ld be noted here. Farm· wor.:kers receive a 
high proportion of their wages in the form 0£ payments in kind, 
which are difficult to quantify; and it is as well to note the 
point made by Stabler: 
'It could be argued that agricultural incomes are 
low, not because the rate of migration is too slow 
but because the earnings accurately reflect the ' 
level of skill and ability of these human resources 
in ·agriculture. 1 
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low wages and barriers to out-migration tell us nothing 
unfortunately about the elasticity of supply of labour in commer-
cial agriculture. Intuitively, one would imagine that elasticity 
has been fairly high, but more definite evidence is needed. The ·' 
difficulty, of course, is the paucity of satisfactory data in 
this area. In the case of the sugar industry, however, we have 
something like a test case. The evidence (l) appears to be 
reasonably conclusive that even a large recruiter such as the 
sugar industry is a price taker in the labour market. It seems 
therefore safe to argue that, at least for most sectors of South 
African commercial agriculture, supply elasticity has been very 
high. 
4.5.19 If this is so, then it can be concluded that the 
benefit from price subsidies to output has in no way served to 
raise the level of wages of agricultural labourers. The benefits 
have accrued largely to owners of other factor inputs (principally 
land, but also manufacturers of capital equipment). The du Plessis 
Commission was correct to argue that price policy offers no solution 
to the problem of the uneven distribution of agricultural incomes. (2) 
4.6 CONCLUSION. ARE THE SUBSIDIES JUSTIFIED? 
4.6.1 We discussed (3), above the rather limited conditions under 
which a subsidy is technically justified. Since subsidies are 
frequently employed as policy tools in the real world, not only in 
agriculture, it is clear that politicians find other justifications 
for applying them. Howarth has outlined four broad arguments for 
. l' l' . 1 . . 1 d . <4 ) agricu tural support as po itica , strategic, socia an . economic. 
(M J Stabler, Agricultural Economics and Rural Land Use, (London: 
Macmillan, 1975), p.36.) 
(1) See Tony Ardington, 'Factors affecting wages and emplo)rment in 
sugar farming' in Farm Labour in South Africa, ed. bj Francis 
Wilson, Alide Kooy and Delia Hendrie (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1977), pp. 154-165. 
(2) RP 19/1972, p.32. 
(3) · See p. 66. 
( 4) R W Howarth, 1 Nark.et Pricing in Agric.u1 ture' in Essays in the 
Theory and Practice of Pricing, Institute of Economic Affairs . 
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Virtually any kind of policy can be subsumed under these 
headings, however. Prest's list of categories is rather more 
useful. "Economic theory offers five main, if very general, 
justifications for subsidies: externality correction, 'merit' 
wants, increasing returns, growth promotion, and income redis-
tribution." In addition. he argues "one may have to counte-
nance subsidies for second best reasons (for example, commuter 
rail subsidies, because of failure to impose urban congestion 
taxes on road traffic). 11 (l) 
4.6.2 To add to this list of supposed justifications for 




"(a) to fight inflation; 
(b) to assist an industry to e~able it to hold 
its own in a certain economic structure; and 
(c) to assist the consumers to enable them to 
obtain the products concerned at prices lower -~ 
than they would have H"qder the free operati"on 
of economic factors." \Z) 
As further food for thought, another list may be 
"(i) national security considerations, including 
preparedness for future wars; · 
(ii) government corrnnitments to aid industry or local 
groups that cannot cope with difficulties they 
have encountered; 
(iii) responses to pressures created by lobbying and 
othe~ political activities of self-seeking 
groups." (3) . 
Whether all of these last categories can be classified 
(1) Prest, op. cit., p.35. 
(2) Report of the National .Marketing Council on the Control Boards 
under the Market_ing Act 1950/l-1963/ 4, RP 40/1965, p. 32. 
(3) 'Subsidies', International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
XV, p.365. 
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as 'justifications' is perhaps open to question. It would be a 
brave (or foolish) politician who would publicly justify his 
decisions on grounds of lobbying. It is also clear that many of 
these reasons for subsidy go far be.yond the rigorous economic 
specification. Prest's listing in particular requires conside-
ration. 
4.6.5 Externality correction, though not providing a suffi-
cient case for a subsidy, as we have shown above, is nevertheless 
often used as justification. It does not seem to have much 
application to South African agricultural subsidies, however. 
It is clear that farmers are seen as a special case by policy 
makers, (l) so the merit wants argument is perhaps applicable. 
It is difficult to reconcile an 'increasing returns' justification 
with a policy of maintaining a substantial rural population. It 
is clear that policy has been to encourage the growth of commer-
cial agriculture (as it has been in other sectors of the economy) 
and it is also clear that a certain amount of income redistribu-
tion has taken place. 
4.6.6 This form of watertight categorisation is of course 
essentially a naive exercise, however. Policies usually encompass 






a simple one of benefiting white farmers, one must conclude that it 
has been badly designed for the purpose. While a subsidy on the 
price of the product gives a one-off gain to existing land owners 
(and at the same time causes considerable pain to new farmers 
attempting to acquire land unless capital markets are perfect) it 
nevertheless represents a continuing benefit to consumers in the 
form of lower prices for that product. In the case of the major 
crops, there have been no o~tput restrictions so it cannot be argued 
that government subsidies have been designed to benefit only producers.· 
Subsidies can at best offer short term benefit to farmers. 
(1) / See p.125. 
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4.6.7 \vhile it can be shown with some degree of precision 
,...., 
that farm labourers have not benefitted from the agricultural )! 
·,.--
subsidisation policy (except insofar as more jobs may have been 
created in agriculture), it is difficult to see how they could 
possibly have been harmed by it. After considering a variety 
of subsidisation schemes, Floyd has concluded that "the greatest 
gain to the person who owns only labour would occur when prices 
are supported and output is not controlled'' (l) as is 
broadly the case rn South Africa. Merle Lipton's argument (2) 
that the absence of job reservation in agriculture shows the 
political influence of agricultural employers (which is, of 
course, correct) can equally b~ well presented as representing 
an advantage to agricultural workers. 
4.6.8 If it is to be argued (as it was after the 1977 
budget) that the reduction of certain food subsidies represents 
a burden to consumers (in particular black consumers) then the 
other side of .the coin must be accepted as well; that the remaining 
subsidies represent a benefit to them. 
4.6.9 As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, we 
have here an endless area for debate with little prospect of a 
fruitful outcome. In the absence of a sound economic case, agri-
cultural subsidies must be seen purely as a political response. 
Whilst the motivations of politicians in doing so can be understood, 
·their actions cannot be applauded. Perhaps the most helpful advice 
ah economist can offer is to utter a warning against extending 
them any further. c3) 
(1). Floyd (1965), p.157. 
(2) Merle Lipton, 'White Farming in South Africa,' Jourrial of Common-
wealth and Comparative Politics, XII(I)(l974), p.44. 
(3) ·Prest, op. cit., p.36 explains why subsidies, once imposed, are 




MARKETING BOARD PERFORMANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
(1) ,• 
5 .1.1 Marketing Boards, their structure and activities, 
are a highly controversial feature of the South African 
economy. An examination of their performance would seem to 
be a necessary precondition for an evaluation of their policies. 
5 .1. 2 It is connnonly believed that marketing boards function 
almost entirely in the interests of the producer. (l) This 
opinion is given added weight by the fact that producers have 
a voting majority on all the boards, so that there is poten-
tially an opportunity for producers to further their own 
interests at the expense of the consumer. This chapter cannot 
attempt to analyse the behaviour of all marketing boards, but 
focuses instead on the actions of some of the larger ones. In 
addition, interest is centered on the pricing policies of 
these boards. Other activities, such as market promotion and 
scientific research are ignored. Probably the most important 
decisions which the control boards make relate to the price 
to be paid to the producer for his product and the price which 
the consumer must pay. The first of these because it determines 
revenue of farmers and, in the long run, future output. The latter 
because the determination of price also fixes the quantity 
consumed locally, and thus the volume available for export (if 
any), or how much must be imported to satisfy market demand. 
5.1..3 It is worth noting that these decisio-;:is are r;:iade in a 
. situation of some uncertainty. Though, for example, maize and, 
more recently, wheat prices are determined shortly before har-
"In the industries in which it is applied, the 
Marketing Act gives rise to monopolistic con-
ditions. This is especially so where there is 
one-channel marketing or where the control board 
regulates the processing of a comrnodi ty or where 
both these things apply." 
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vest when estimates are fairly accurate. The possibility of, 
for example, bad weather cannot be ruled out. Alsci, of 
course, the activities of farmers are determined by many 
other prices and structural constraints. Of these, the 
board only has direct control over one, though possibly the 
most important, namely product price. It seems worthwhile 
to note the distinction between: 
5.1.4 
(i) the policies which boards announce themselves 
to be following; 
(ii) the policies which they actually intend to 
follow; 
(iii) the policies which they actually do follow. 
For example: A board may claim to be acting in the 
interests of both consumers and producers. In fact, it may 
intend to raise producer prices as high as possible. In the 
end, however, it may achieve neither of these objectives. A 
high price may lead to increased production which would neces-
sitate a future reduction in price or export at a 'loss'. 
5.1. 5 It is question (iii) which we shall be concerned to 
answer in this chapter. We want to know what policies the 
boards have in fact followed because this is after all basic 
to any attempt to justify or criticise their behaviour. In 
this respect, we are in the position of attempting to decipher 
a code. We know what public decisions have been made by the 
boards, though we cannot be sure what motives or objectives 
led to those decisions. The problem is to examine these out-
put sigµals and decide what policies have actually been followed. 
This may be a complex task because the signals coming from the 
boards are likely to be fuzzy. 
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Co-operative 
Affairs, RP 78/1967, p.41. 
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Government policy for, say, maximising exports to relieve 
balance of payments problems may conflict with marketing 
board policies to maximise producer revenue. Compromises 
are likely. 
5.1. 6 Analytically, however, it is helpful to identify 
three major policy options open to marketing boards in general: 
(i) total revenue maximisation; 
stab\i~·~ation · 
/ f._ (ii) total revenue '/ " ' ' v .....-' ~.1 
(iii) price/quantity stabilisation on the local \/ 
market (to protect producers and consumers against market 
fluctuations). 
5.1. 7 These three policies are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, though often they will conflict. In practice, it 
is unlikely that all three policies will coincide. 
5.1.8 The models below are intended to illustrate these 
three policy options. They refer particularly to a situation, 
which commonly occurs in South Africa, where the local market 
absorbs a reasonable proportion of output and a world market 
exists. They do not therefore have great relevance to the wool 
industry', for example, since most of this product' is exported~. 
5.2 POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
5.2~1 Belo~ we consider each of these possible policie~ 
separately. 
5.2.2 (a) Total revenue maximisation: Consider the case 
of a product (eg. maize) where output is large and the board 
has the power to control exports and limit imports. Given the 
objective of revenue maximisation, how would the board behave? 
In this situation, the board is in the position of a discri-
minating monopolist. It will usually be optimal to sell in 
both markets, but at a higher price in the Jess elastic market. 
Demand 
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In practice, South Africa may be regarded as a price taker 
in most international markets, though the model which follows 
does not depend on this assumption. The situation can be 
illustrated as follows:(l) 
Figure 5.1 







Let D2 be the international price line. It is hori-
zontal because the board is assumed to be a price taker on 




be the local demand and marginal 
revenue curves respectively. The board is required to dispose 
of its stock Q, where Q is greater than Q
1
. It will pay the 
board to sell Q
1 
locally at price P
1 
and sell. the rest abroad. 1 
In other words, the local price will always be above the world 
price. The board will never sell more than Q
1 
on the local 
market. 
Local Market World Market 
Pl = a + bQl b < o, a > o constant,> o 
Total revenue 
TR 
1 TR2·= P2Q2 
where Q1 + Q2 = Q 
= total stocks 
(1) · Note: We are not concerned with profit maximisation here 
since the board is not concerned in the production decision. 
The board receives the crop and is then responsible for its 
distribution, locally and abroad, in such a way that revenue 
to producers is maximised. 
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TR = TR1 + TR2 
P2Q - P2Ql + aQl + bQ12 
Maximising total revenue: 
= 
= 0 (for extremum) 
so = p -a 
2 I a I > IP I I 2 
21) 
5.2.4 Thus as P2 rises, Q1 must fall, other things constant. 
It will never be rational for the board to import under these 
circumstances. Instead of straight line demand curves, we may 
consider the constant elasticity case. 
Local Market World Market 
Demand curve P
1 




TR = P2Q2 = aQl 2 
where Ql + Q2 0 
= total stock 
TR = TR1 + TR2 
b+l = P2Q2 + aQl 
b+l = P2Q - P2Ql + aQl 
dTR -P + a (b+l) 
b 
dQl 2 Ql 
o for extremum 
so Ql = ( p2 )11 lb I < 1 
a(b+l) b 
5.2.5 Again, as P2 rises, Q1 must fall if a revenu2 maxi-
mising policy is to be preserved. However, relations are more 
complicated than in the case of a linear demand curve. If 
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b > 1, none will be sold locally. If demand is relatively 
inelastic, the relation between quantity sold and elasticity 
of demand on the local market is as follows: 
b 
1.0 ---------------
a< .P 2 
------------------a> P2 
5.2.6 . % It will never be rational for the board to impor.... In 
both cases, therefore, an increase in world prices is associated D i, 
with an increase in the proportion of the crop exported. In the <.. · 
case of straight line demand curves, then, the following behaviour 
is indicative of total revenue maximisation: Local price above 
world price; local price increases as world price increases; 
quantity exported increases as world price increases; total 
revenue increases as world price increases; volume of exports 
varies directly with local output and world price. (l) 
5.2.7 In the case of constant elasticity demand curves, a 
policy consistent with total revenue maximisation is: 
nothing sold locally at all if demand is relatively elastic; 
quantity sold locally inversely related to world price if demand 
is relatively inelastic, hence local price will increase as world 
price increases; total revenue increases as world price increases. 
In both cases, world price = marginal revenue on local market. (l) 
\_,,..' 
5.2.8 (b) Total revenue stablisation: The rectangular hyper:--
bola model is the device usually used to illustrate revenue stabi-
lisation policies in agriculture. It is a rather futile device. 
To operate this particular scheme effectively requires knowledge of 
~long-term average revenue in any particular sector, otherwise ho~• 
can one know where to draw the hyperbola'? But if this kriowledge 
(1) See Table 5.2, P·lOO. 
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was available there would be no need to use the model. It 
would be possible to stabilise price (and revenue) at that 
point where the supply schedule intersects demand. The use of f 
the rectangular model therefore presupposes a good deal of 
knowledge about market conditions. But if we had sufficient 
knowledge to operate this scheme, we would probably have 
sufficient knowledge to operate a better one. This model 
should therefore be dispensed with except as an expository 
device at the undergraduate level. 
5.2.9 A further shortcoming of the rectangular hyperbola 
model is that it assumes a closed economy. Fortunately, we do 
not live in a closed economy and therefore need to consider 
the matter further. We consider only the case of stra1ght line 
demand curves. Graphically, we have the following situation: 
Local Market 
Ql 







5.2.10 There are thus two possible levels of Q
1 
consistent 
with a certain level of total revenue. An increase in world 
price (which implies a steeper TR
2 
line) may then be accompanied 
by either an increase or a decrease in q
1
. If the initial point 
is at A, an increase in world price LS associated with a decrease 
Ln Q
1 
and vice versa. Similarly, an increase in output (which is 
shovm by a lateral expansion of the 'box' diagram) may be accom-
panied by an increase or a decrease in Q
1






to expect a particular relationship between local and world 
prices. (1) 
' 5.2.11 Local price/quantity stablisation. This final case 
is the simplest. Both local price and quantity sold remain 
fairly stable. Local price will be unrelated to world price. 
Quantity sold on the local market will be unrelated to total 
output. Total revenue will be directly related to world price 
and will vary with local output. Volume of exports will vary 
directly with local output and will be unrelated to world price. 
5.2.12 These criteria for evaluating marketing board policies 
are summarised in Table 5 • 2. (2) 
5.3 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
(1) 
5.3.1 Which of the various possible policies have the marketing 
boards followed? While the theoretical models discussed in the 
previous section are interesting exercises, they are of course 
simplifications of the real world. Though they provide a useful 
background for examining real world policies, they are partial 
analyses. In this section, however, we are concerned with the real 
world. We shall examine a graphical presentation(J) of certain 
evidence and then consider more conclusive quantitative data. 
5.3.2 Figure 1 : It is clear that there is a strong suggestion 
that prices in different categories of products behave in different 
In the case of the constant 
is rather more complicated. 
be represented as f9llows: 
elasticity demand curve, the situation 
Mathematically, the situation can 
Again, there would seem to be no readily predictable relationship 
between local price and world price or .between output and local 
price. 
(2) See p. 100. 
(3) See pp. 191-200. 
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ways. The price index for vegetables behaves in a consistently 
less stable manner than is the case with sum.-Tier cereals. 
A similar pattern is observed in the case of consumer 
prices. Figures 2 & 3 These illustrate seasonal trends. 
There are clear differences in behaviour between the various 
product categories. Surmner cereals are extremely stable due to / 
the fixed price scheme, whilst meat and particularly vegetables 
follow a less stable seasonal path. (l) 
5.3.3 There exist clear differences in beh;iviour between the 
various product categories. It could be argued that this vali-
dates the argument that the market for agricultural commodities 
is subject to inherent instabilities. Vegetables, where.control 
is least, show the greatest price fluctuations. Grains, where 
control is greatest, fluctuate the least. It might therefore be 
argued very superficially that the case which can be substantiated 
is that control reduces price fluctuations and stabt~ises inherently 
" 
unstable markets. 
5.3.4 '-This reasoning is unsatisfactory, however, because it 
fails to take account of the different characteristics of the 
various products. It is significant that those markets which show 
the most instability are also those where the crop is most perishable. 
As far as vegetables are concerned, they are highly seasonal, expen-
sive to store and expensive to transport. Grains are easily stored 
and can be relatively cheaply transported in bulk. Because of. 
this, large-scale transportation is feasible between hemispheres, 
further reducing seasonal fluctuations. The ~Brket for meat has 
' features from both these extremes. Meat is both perishable and 
relatively expensive to transport. 1lqwever, the seasonal factor is 
reduced because animals can be slaughtered at any time of the year. 
Neat can be stored frozen or on the hoof. 
(1) This ,evidence accords with W L Nieuwoudt, rRisk and Uncertainty 





5.3.5 While it is true that the different products are 
subject to different marketing arrangements, it is not clear 
that the prices of field crops are more stable than vegetable 
prices because of the form of price fixing adopted. It may be 
that due to the nature of the products, this behaviour would 
be observed even under free market arrangements. 
5.3.6 A number of price comparison studies are available. 
Wilson, using wholesale prices, has suggested that Marketing 
Boards may have achieved some success in stab:l-ising prices. (l) 
Similarly, Nieuwoudt has shown that the production of grain crops 
has been more stable over the period 1946-67 than over the 
period 1918-39 and argues: "Apparently, the Marketing Act has 
achieved a greater stability not only in respect of prices but 
1 
. . 11(2) 
a so in respect of production. 
5.3.7 There can be little doubt that agricultural prices 
generally have been more stable in the post-war period and this 
may be reflected in production. The problem is to what extent 
this stability can be attributed to marketing boards. In comparing 
the decades before and after the Second World War, we are, after 
all, comparing very different worlds. We may note that the prices 
of input· factors, as Nieuwoudt shows, have been far more stable: 
in post-war years and also, as Nieuwoudt himself argues, the 
.prices of inputs are crucially important in determining production 
decisions. (3) This fact alone, therefore, could account in large 
measure for more stable production patterns and consequently 
prices. 
5.3.8 An alternative method to investigate the problem is to 
caupare grain narkets ~here price is rigidly controlled with grain 
rr;2rkets where pric2s are not controlled, but simply reflect the 
forces of supply and demand. 
(1) F Wilson, Farming 1866 - 1966, in The Oxford History of South 
Africi, ed. by Monica ~hlson & Leonard Thompson (Oxford: 
Ciarendon Press 1971, Ch. 3). 
(2) See W L Nieuwoudt (1972)t p.22. 
(3) See W L Nieuwoudt (1972), p.22. 
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5.3.9 Figures 5 - 9 illustrate this comparison. South 
African producer prices are compared with United States'whole-
sale prices which are taken as proxy for 'world prices' for 
various crops. In the case of most products during the post-
war period, it would seem that the world price behaves in very 
much the same way as the local producer price .. In the case 
of grain sorghum, the South African producer price shows consi-
derably more fluctuation than the world price. This visual 
impression is confirmed by quantitative evidence below. 
5.4 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BOARDS 
5.4.1 The behaviour of 10 products is considered. Together 
these account for about 50 per cent by value of total agricul-
tural output in South Africa. The relationship between different 
variables associated with the three suggested policies are 
examined.(l) It is assumed that South African agriculture is a 
price taker in world markets. Transport costs and quality dif-
ferences are assumed away. It is also assumed (though this does 
not affect subsequent conclusions) that the local market is 
ruled by straight line rather than constant elasticity demand 
curves. The performance of the boards is sumrr.arised in Table 5.3~ 2 ) 
5.4.2 A policy of total revenue maximisation requires that local 
price (P
1
) should be above world price (P
2
). This occurs signi-
ficantly often in the case of wheat, grain sorghum, lamb, oats and 
rye. With the exception of grain sorghum, however, these products 
are all imported, which is not consistent with revenue maximisation 
behaviour. (J) As further evidence, Col. 3, indicates that there is no 
product where local price has consistently moved with world price 
(not eve.n grain sorghum). It seems therefore that total revenue 
maximisation must be rejected as an explanation of Marketing Board 
policy. Similarly, total revenue stabilisation can be rejected~ 
-----------------~---------------------------------------------------------
(l) See Table 5.2,p.JOO. 
sion, pp .86-91. 
(2) See p.101. 
This Table surrimarises the earlier discus-
(3) Unless the products are imported and sold by the Boards themselves. 
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Total revenue has not been stable. In most years, for most 
products, total revenue moved in sympathy with total output, 
Q. (Col. 6), a behavioural pattern consistent with price 
stabilisation. 
5.4.3 It would seem therefore. that we are obliged to accept 
the third alternative. The evidence in favour of this conclu-
sion is reasonably persuasive. It is the only one of the three 
policy options which allows imports and five of the ten products 




as required, Col. 3. Col. 7 which shows 
P
1 
deflated by the South African consumer price index suggests 
that real prices on the local market have been extraordinarily 
stable for most products. Further evidence can be presented in 
support of this. 
5.4.4 TABLE 5.1 
ANNUAL DEVIATIONS FROM TIME TREND 
(average % error of residuals) 
Product Prices Total Revenue 
Maize 3,21 21,61 
Grain sorghum 12;6o 40,51 
Groundnuts 3;25 21,61 
Sunflowers 6,53 30,40 
Lucerne 7,53 23,14 
Wheat 3,24 17,31 
Oats 4,06 16 ,30 
Rye 2,50 24~66 
Barley 3,50 28 ,.61 
5.4.5 Producer prices of the various c~ops were divid~d 
by the producer price index of all field crops. This ratio 
was set against a time trend. Table 5.1 seU; c_;:it the 
resulting residuais. It is clear that total revenue shows 
,· 
coI>siderable deviations '.)r:I a year ..... to-year basis. It would seerr:,x 
therefore, that we are obliged to accept thP price/q~antity 
e:,planation of marketing board behaviour as the most satisfactory 
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of the three. The weight of evidence seems therefore to 
point to the conclusion that, by and large, the effect of 
the marketing boards has been to stabilise local price. 
5.4.6 It is, however, open to an alternative interpreta-
tion. In the case of the two most important products in 
Table 5.3,-beef and maize, which together account for one 
third by value of total agricultural output, local prices 
have been remarkably close to world prices. (Table 5.3, 
Col. 5). Comparisons of local and world prices are also set 
out in Figures 5 - 9. Had these marketing boards not 
existed, it is reasonable to argue that local prices would 
have been little different. This argument can be pressed 
a little harder. Barley prices have been remarkably close 
to world prices, whilst port and groundnut prices have 
been consistently below world prices. In the case of three 
winter cereals, grain sorghum and lamb local prices have 
been consistently below world prices. In the case of three 
winter cereals, grain sorghum and lamb local prices have 
been consistently above world prices. Quality differences 
may be invoked to explain lamb price differentials, but 
this does not seem satisfactory in the case of the other 
products. 
5.4.7 Clearly there is something to be explained here. 
Is it coincidental that for a quarter of a century the meat 
and maize control boards have deviated by less than 10% 
from world prices? It is necessary to pose the question: 
Why did these boards choose not to use the impressive array 






5.4.8 A possible explanation in the case of maize may be 
that, though the Maize Board reflects the interests of pro-
ducers, on the consumption side customers have been equally 
~ell organised. Maize is usually sold either to processors 
or to other farmers as feed. This 'countervailing power' 
type explanation is not, however, satisfactory o~ closer 
analysis. It may explain· stable prices, but fails to explain 
the remarkably close coincidence between world price and local 
price. It cannot be applied readily to the beef market where 
consumers would appear to be far less well organised. Nor do 
we have any means to explain why, although equipped with simi-
lar powers, at least on paper, the Wheat Board has been able 
to maintain the prices of its products substantially above 
world pric·e. levels. 
5.4.9 The most plausible explanation for the success of the 
Wheat Board in achieving relatively high producer prices relates 
to specific factors of an·. extra-economic nature: "It is a 
'f- well ... known fact that South Africa is by no means suitable for 
the production of wheat and that it is impossible for the South 
African wheat farmer to compete on the basis of world wheat 
prices."(l) Yet wheat production has been encouraged, "From 
the purely economic point of view, therefore, it seems very doubt-
ful whether wheat farming is to be justified. From the national 
point of view, however, it is desirable that the country should be 
partly, if not entirely, self-supporting in r0spect of wheat.''(Z) 
This self-sufficiency argument underlies much official thinking on 
agricultural problems. 
5.4.10 This is a specific explanation for a specific crop, how-
ever, and brings us very little closer to an explanation of the 
behaviour of the boards in general. The answer to this wider 
question may lie in an area of literature not directly.related to 
agricultural economics - the theory of regulation. 
(1) W J Pretoriu~, An Economic Study of the Wheat Industry in the 
Union, Dept. of Agriculture & Forestry, Bulletin No 141, 1935, p.5. 
(2) Bulletin No. 141. p.5. 
,'\ 
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5.5 THE THEORY OF REGULATION(l) 
5.5.1 Downs( 2) has suggested that monopoly theory yields 
useful predictions only because of specific ownership arrange-
' ments. The conventional textbook theory needs to be more 
carefully spelled out. Implicit in the theory is the assumption 
that the decision maker also owns the fixed factors. The pro-
perty rights situation, in other words, is closely defined. 
5.5.2 In the case of marketing boards, however, we have an 
obvious case of the separation of ownership from control. The 
people who make the price decision are not the same as those 
who make the production decision and, crucially, there is no 
direct relationship between the decision and the rewards accruing 
to the decision maker. Although a high producer price may be 
important to producer board members, it is unlikely to be 
their only objective. Other factors are also important. As, for 
example, the desire to avoid adverse public criticism. 
5.5.3 If therefore, economic theory fails to provide a satis~ 
factory explanation !or the behaviour of marketing boards, it is 
because 'economic theories of government •• universally fail to 
assign any motives to the men in government.'(J) This is an 
important failing, increasingly recognised as government activity 
expands to oc-cupy an ever widening area of economic activity. 
What is needed is a theory to explain the behaviour of government 
regulatory agencies in a satisfactory and empirically r·efutable · 
way. 
5.5.4 To understand the behaviour of marketing boards better, 
it is necessary to consider the problems faced by each board in 
making its pricing decision. Output is a function of numerous 
-------~---------------------------------------------------~----------------
(1) The Theory of Regulation is discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
(2) A Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper & 
Row,' 1957) 
(3) A Downs, op. cit., p.283. 
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factors of which o?lY the price of that product is directly 
under the control of the board. Weather, costs, natural hazards 
and the decisions of individual farmers are not. Most importantly, 
the prices of substitutes (and even complements) in production 
are frequently beyond their control. Further, with the exception 
of vegetables, which significantly are not controlled, few agri-
cultural products are sold directly to the consumer. Most undergo 
further processing or are sold to other farmers (as cattle feed, 
etc.). Though consumers may be a diffuse, disorganised group, the 
food processing industry is probably reasonably powerful. This 
.means that if continuous clashes are to be avoided, some modus 
vivendi needs to be established. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
5.6.1 Given the complexities of the factors involved, costs of 
obtaining information and of reaching agreement on a suitable price 
are likely to be high. Some rule of thumb is necessary which is 
defensible both to various political interest groups on political 
and economic grounds. The world price fulfills this requirement 
and explains the behaviour of maize and beef markets. In the case 
._ . -Jr t 
of wheat, however, politicai· factors are overriding and monopoly 
power has been used to secure relatively high producer prices. 
The South African experience can therefore be interpreted as illus-
trative of the relative powerlessness of marketing boards to 
achieve significant variations in market prices unless supported by 
political interest groups. 
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TABLE 5.2. MARKETING BOARD POLICIES 
' P 0 L I C I E S 
Variables 
P1 ,Q1 Stabilisation 
TR Stabilisation TR Maximisation 





if p2 < MRl + pl 
Q2 Stable - p 
• r 
Pz > MRl Pz 1.J: ' \ -2 
+ p2 if p2 < MRl 
Q z pl' Ql + pl if Pz > MRl + Q2 
- p 
1 
if p2 < HR 1 
TR + Q Stable + p2 
\ 
+ p2 z· Ql 
+ Q 
" 
Imports . If'Q > Q Never Never 
Exports -1 If Q < Q Possible Possible 
_!<e~: pl' Ql Local price and quantity; 
V.R. Marginal revenue on local market; 
l 
p 2' Q2 World price and quantity sold overseas; 
Q, + Q2 -· Q Total local production; 
j_ 
+ Positively correlated; 
Negatively correlated; 
z Uncorrelated. 
Thus, for a policy of total revenue maximisation,. we would expect world price 
to be equal to marginal revenue on the local market, and less than local 
price but positively correlated with it. 
l 
1 0 l 









I ' Product Value as No. of No. 0£ 
1 Net im- Average jNo. of Real pl/S 
' % of porter deviation jyears years years Pl 
total Pl)P2 Pl+ p2 (M) or· of P1 from 
Q + TR 
agricul- ~xpor- p2 
tural ter (X) 




(7) ~ (1) (2) . (3) (4) (5) I (6) 
Lamb I 5,0 23/24* l3/ 23 I M + 41,7 16/23 86,99/14 30 I I 
i ' 
Beef 11,6 16/25 15/24 x + 4,7 ~ 20/ * 23 . 63,8/d 13,17 
Pork 2,6 1124 16/23 
x - 13,6 13/23 59,56/4 36 
' 
MaiZe 22,2 lO/ 25 ll/ 24 x - 7,5 .... , 23/ * 6,24/0,63 I 24 . 
Gr a, in 1,0 22/ * 12/24 x + 31,0 22/ * 8,24/2 36 
Sorgh. 
25 24 ' 
Wh~at 6,0 21/ * 25 71 25 M + 37,4 tJ 24/ .;~. 24 12,19/1,32 
Oats 2,7 20/ -1< 5124 M + 23,7 
2Lf I '!: 7,97/1,01 25 25 
I 
Rye 0,0 19/ -1< 25 7122 
M + 31,0 22/ -1: 23 7,86/0,45 
Barley 0,2 51 25 8124 
M - 9,3 21/ * 6,89/0,99 23 
Ground 1,7 31 25 91 24 




* Significant at the 99% level. 
In each ca~e P
2 
is export price of major trading partner or U S 
wholesale price. 




CENTRALISATION AND CONTROL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.1.1 The agricultural sector is considered to be uniquely 
unstable due to inelastic and highly variable supply functions 
resulting in extreme fluctuations in both agricultural prices 
and incomes. This instability, ·it is argued, leads to a wastage 
of reso~rces~l) while at the analytical level it has been sho\vn 
that under certain circumstances a net gain in welfare can 
f f k 
. . (2) 
accrue rom a program o - mar et intervention. 
6.1.2 Whether arguments of this type are sufficiently strong 
to justify government interventio!l in- prac0tice must remain an 
open·question~ For centralised intervention policies to result 
in a net welfare gain, a great deal of information is required 
about the market in question. Otherwise a likely outcome is an 
arbitrary redistribution of welfare rather than a net increase.· 
What is certain, however, is· that those factors which make for 
· instability in the agricultural sector (unpredictable weather, 
time lags, etc.) do not simply go away when the state takes over. 
Indeed, it is precisely those factors which contribute to and 
encourage government intervention in the agricultural sector that 
make the task of government planning so difficult. Also, govern-
ment intervention in the agricultural sector is not usually aimed 
at simply removing short term fluctuations but rather at achieving 
longer term pol icy objectives. This c!12.pter examines problems 
(l) D Blandford and J H Currie, 'Price uncertainty - the case for 
government intervention,' · J A$ric Econ 26 (197 5), pp. 3 7-51. 
(2) P B L Hazell and P L Scandizzo, 'Market intervention polici2s 
when production is risky, I A J A E 57 u~) (1975)' pp.641-6L;9. 
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associated with certain types of centralised price control 
operations such as are practised in South Africa. 
6 .1.3 Section 6.2 considers some practical problems asso-
ciated with the estimation of agricultural supply functions in 
a central planning situation. Section 6.3 considers these 
difficulties in relation to South African agriculture while 
Section 6.4 presents the results of an empirical study of 
certain crops in South Africa. A discussion of these results 
follows in Section 6.5. 
6.2 AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
6.2.1 The theoretical problems associated with agricultural 
suppply functions have been extensively discussed, at least in 
the United States(l) where there also exists a considerable 
body of published empirical work. 
6.2.2 In a formal sense, we can specify the supply relation-
ships for an individual firm for a product, i, as 
* Q. = f (P . , Pl • • . . P. l' P. +l . . . • P ,' C, T, W) 
i 1 i- 1 n 
where P. = price of that product 
1 
P1 •·•· P. 1 ,P. 1 ···• P =prices of other related 1- 1+ n 
products (substitutes or 
complements in production) 
C = costs 
· T technology 
W = weather 
* Q. intended output of product i which may differ 
i 
from actual output (Q.) due to drought, disease 
i 
or other unpredictable factors. 
----------~-------------------------------------------------------------
(1) See for example E 0 Heady et. al. (eds.), Agricultural Supply 
_!:unctions, (Ames, Iowa, 1961). 
6.2.3 This list does not, of course, exhaust the relevant 
variables. There are in addition specific problems relating 
to the estimaticin of agricultural supply functions whic~ cannot 
be ignored simply because they are difficult to quant:i.fy 
6.2.4 (a) Time has long been known to play an important 
-- fl) (2) . 
role in economic fluctuations.' The cobweb theorem is 
the most obvious illustration of this. 
6.2.5 (b) Yield variability. In many sectors of the 
economy, it is reasonable to suppose that intended output bears 
a close correspondence to actual output. Thus one can expect 
to find a significant relationship between price and measured 
output. However, in the case of agriculture, we are not so 
fortunate. Yield per hectare varies considerably from year to 
year due to unpredictable variations in weather, for example, 
so that the relationship between price and observed output is 
likely to be a tenuous one at best. This is actually a measure-
ment problem - how to determine the farmer's intentions. 
6.2.6 The most obvious solution is to use area planted rather 
than output as indicative of the supply relationship, on the 
grounds that area planted reflects the volume of output the 
farmer intends to produce. This method, while often a distinct 
improvement, can be criticised on both theoretical and practical 
grounds. Behrman(3) questions the use of land as an indicator 
of planned production because: 
(i) he points out that land is only one of many 
(1) See for example D H Robertson, A Stndy of Industrial Fluctuations, 
(London, 1915). 
(2) M Ezekiel, 'The cobweb theorem,' Q J E 52 (1938), pp.255-280, 
provides a clear exposition of this model. For a discussion of 
the cobweb theorem see Chapt:::r 3. 
(3) J L Behrman, Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture:· A 
Case Study of Four Major Crop.s in Thailand, 1937-62, (Amsterdam, 
1968). . 
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inputs into agriculture so that the decision to 
allocate a certain area of land to the production 
of a specific crop is consistent with a wide 
range of planned outputs; and 
(ii) furthermore, land is not necessarily homogeneous. 
It is preferable to use an index of all inputs to be devoted to 
the crop,.but this leads to further measurement and data avail-
ability problems. 
6.2.7 At the empirical level, Barker(l) suggests that while 
yield depends principally on technology and.weather, there is 
also sometimes a link between yield and price level. Thus area 
is not an ideal proxy for intended output, though it may in 
practice be the best available. 
. ( 
6.2.8 (c) Expectations. The familiar cobweb model postulates 
a simple expectations function. 
p 
~t 
where c~:) indicates expected or anticipated price. 
Thus price expected in the next period is equal to the current 
price. This formulation has been subject to extensive criticism 
and development.(2) Probably the most important contribution to 
agricultural supply estimation has come from Nerlove. (3) It can 
be expressed in one form as:(4) 
-1 
at = ABpt-l + A(I-B)A 
-1 
a + u - A(I-B)A u .
1 ~t-1 t t-~
(1) R Barker, 'The response of production to a change in rice price,r 
Phillippine Econo~1ic Journal 5 (2) (1966), .pp. 260-276. 
(2) .Among the numerous articles on this subject, see N S Buchanan, 
'A reconsideration of the cobweb theorem,' JP E 47(1939), pp.67-
81 and KW Rothsch:il.d, 'Cobweb cycles and partially correct fore-
.casting,' JP E 72(1964), pp.300-305. 
(3) M Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply: Estimation of Farmers Response 
to Price, (Baltimore, 1958). For an exposition of this model ,-see 
Appendix 8. 
(4) M Nerlove, op. cit., p.195. 
[l] 
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where at == a vector of the acreages of several crops 
during period t 
~-1 a vector of observed prices during period 
t 
t-1 
A a matrix of the coefficients of the expected 
11normal 11 prices in each of the acreage 
equations for the crops under consideration 
B a diagonal matrix of the coefficients of 
expectation 
If, however, only one price is considered to be relevant, the 
b 
. . . . (1) 
a ave expression can be written more simply as: 
a == a S + a1 f3 P 1 t 0 t- (2] 
us ing Nerlove's notation. 
+ (1-S)at-l 
In ( 2) only the price of that parti-
cular product is considered relevant whereas in [l] the prices 
of related products are included in the expression - an important 
consideration from the central planning point of view. 
6.3 SUPPLY FUNCTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.3.l Agricultural marketing in South Africa is highly centra-
lised at the individual product level. Twenty-two marketing boards 
have been established, which together handle some 80% of all agri-
cultural output. Each board handles a specific product, though 
there. are exceptions to this. The Wheat Board, for example, is 
also responsible for other winter cereals (barley, oats and rye), 
while the Maize Board handles both maize and grain sorghum. In 
addition, the modes of operation differ substantially between boards. 
Some operate floor price schemes, removing only the surplus from 
the market, while others 
(2) 
(e.g. the Wheat Board) operate one-·charE:.el 
fixed price schemes. Prices are therefore dete.rmined by the l·:heat 
Board for all four winter cereals, and ratified by the Minister of 
Agriculture, advised by the National Marketing Council, which is 
responsible for price co-ordination with all other controlled agri-
cultural products. 
(1) M Nerlove, op. cit., p.193. 
(2) The structure of South African agriculture is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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6.3.2 Each marketing board is therefore theoretically required 
to know the supply relationship for its own product, while the 
National Marketing Council has the more complex task of deter-
mining the interactive effects of each price determination on 
the output of all other products. 






is possible only on strict assu~ptions. In practice, the speci-
fication of a supply function is likely to be more complex than 
this and one is faced with the task of determining what the rele-
vant p~ices are which determine the output of a particular product. 
6.3.4 This may be done on the basis of institutional kno~ledge~ 
but using data published in the 1972/3 South African Agricultural 
Census(l) a somewhat more rigo:i:_<=ius approach to the problem can be 
devised. The Census provides a breakdo"tv"TI for each of 28 agricul-
"' tural products of the percentage of each product (number of trees, 
head of cattle, total production, etc.) reco~ded in each of the 
60 economic regions in South Africa. It is reasonable to hypothesise 
that those products cultivated in the same region are likely to be 
substitutes in production. Thus the matrix of correlation coeff i-
cients for each pair of products across each of the 60 regions 
provides a means of establishing which cross elasticities are likely 
d . (2) h to be relevant in specifying the supply function. Appen ix I · ;cs ows 
these correlations for 18 of the more interesting products. For 
example, the low correlation between wheat and sunflower seeds 
(r = ,01) is due to the fact that those economic regions where 
wheat is grown are quite distinct from sunflower growing regions. 
It is likely therefore that a change in the price of wheat will have 
a negligible effect on the output of sunflower seeds. On the other 
hand, the high correlation between maize and sunflower seed (r = ,74) 
(1) South African Department of Statistics, Agric.elturc:.l Census No. 46~ 
Report No. 06-01-10, 1972-3. 
(2) See p. 169. 
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suggests the reverse. A change in the price of one of these 
products is likely to affect the output of both of them to 
some degree. 
6.3.5 If each region of the country were crop-specific (i.e. ~ 
if only one crop were grown in each region) the matrix would be 
unit diagonal. Clearly this is not so, though there are certain 
products for \Ihich this condition is approached, for example, 
ostriches. This product shows a consistently low correlation 
with all other inputs, (r -,06, -,04, -,04, -,02 •... ), 
unsurprisingly since this industry is located almost entirely 
around the Oudtshoorn area. A supply equation 
* Qo f(P ) 0 
* where Qo anticipated output of ostrich products 
p = price of ostrich products 
0 
might therefore give a reasonably accurate indication of the 
supply response of this industry. By way of comparison, cattle 
appears to be related to numerous other outputs, 
(r = - ,55, 56, 21,- 06, ·,52, ,62 ... ) . Any expression of supply 
' ' , 
in the cattle sector (even ignoring the complicated relationship 
between dairy and beef cattle) would therefore have to include a 
large number of variables to be meaningful. 
6.3.6 Given the many inter-relationships suggested by the matrix, 
it is clear that the specification Q~ = f(P.) is satisfactory in 
1 1 v 
very few cases. Yet this is the specification implicit in the 
organisation of price control along individual product lirle3, as 
is corrunonly the case in South Africa. In practice, centralised 
price control requires a knowledge of the relevant cross-e:las tici·-
ties of supply, since any one price determination will affect the 
output not only of that product, but of others as well. This is 
the essence of the centralised price control problem. 
6.4 WINTER CEREALS 
• 
6.4.1 This section describes an ew.pirical investigation. It is 
I 09 
in t~e nature of a case study and the conclusions are tentative, 
but it does serve to illustrate the type of analysis which can 
be undertaken, in fact which must be undertaken, if agriculture 
is to be co-ordinated in a meaningful planned, as opposed to an '~· 
ad hoc, sense. 
6.4.2 The focus in this section is on winter cereals for the 
years 1951/2 - 1974/5. As Nerlove has pointed out, pastoral 
crops have an advantage as a subject of study in that output 
tends to be relatively homogeneous, thus reducing measurement 
probleras. 
cereals. 
There is a strong reason for the choice of winter 
f . h . (1) . b h Re erring to t e matrix, it can e seen t at 
apart from the high correlation between wheat and other winter 
cereals (oats, rye and barley) of ,74, the correlation with 
other products is relatively low. We can therefore expect that 
a specification of a supply function invoiving only these four 
crops will yield meaningful results. It should be noted here, 
however, that though the matrix is helpful as a guide to speci-
fication of supply relationships, it is not exhaustive. It is 
intended as an addition to rather than a replacement of institu-
tional knowledge. 
6.4.3 Yield: To arrive at an accurate measure of planned out-
put, area should be weighted by yield. Neriove(
2
) in fact did 
not apply a weight for yield changes, but over a period of some 
20 years it would appear that yield would change significantly 
and should be examined. Yield was therefore calculated for the 
four relevant crops over time, and the following expressions 
established: 
Wheat: y w -0 ;176 + 0 ,OlJT 
(4 ,52) 
(1) See Appendix 1, p. 169. 
(2) M Nerlove, op. cit., 
2 




Rye: y R 
o,357 
Barley: YB 1 ,294 
Key: 't' values 
'1 1 0 
- 0,004T 
(-3 ,02) R2 = o,26 DW 1,44 
- 0,004T 
(-3 ,15) R2 0,28 DW 0,92 
- 0 ,OllT 
(-3 ,64) R2 0 ,JS DW = 1 ,95 
given in parentheses 
yield (tons per hectare, wheat, 
oats, rye and barley) 
T time 
6.4.4 Trends in yields are by no means clear. 2 The low R 
is accounted for by wide variations in weather conditions from 
year to year. However, the low DW statistic is more difficult 
to explain. The apparent decline in yield for oats, barley and 
rye over time is equally puzzling. It may be that as the area 
cultivated has increased, farmers are being pushed, in Ricardian 
fashion, on to marginal land with a lower yield. It is more 
likely, however, that we simply have a data problem here. Quan-
tities of oats, for example, are perhaps being consumed in 
increasing quantities directly on farms as animal feed, without 
being recorded. 
6.4.5 In this exercise, therefore, yield has been ignored, not 
because it is unimportant, but simply because we do not know what 
the trends in yield have actually been on a national basis. In 
mitigation, it might be argued that if the trends in yield have 
been the same for all four crops, the effects tend to cancel 
out and yield can be ignored anyway. This is satisfactory if we 
are concerned to record output rather than volume handled by the 
Wheat Board. 
6.4.6 Prices: Clearly the absolute level of prices is not a 
suitable index, since it is affected directly by inflation. 
It is relative prices which are important. Nerlove has used the 
I I I 
Fisher Ideal Index(l) where prices are weighted by the size 
of crop. In this exercise, a similar procedure was adopted. 
The Fisher Index (Formula 353) was used weighted by area planted. 
6.4.7 Area: Given that wheat, oats, barley and rye are sub~ 
stitutes or complements in production and no other crops are 
relevant, which strictly speaking is how the model should be 
interpreted, it is logical to regard the total land allocated 
to winter cereals as given. The farmer is faced with the 
problem of how to allocate the area of land to each of the 




a +a +a +a 
Wt Ot ~t Bt 
a wt land area allocated to wheat production 
in year t, etc. and aWt .+ a0t + aRt + aBt = 1 
i.e. the proportion of land allocated to each winter cereal 
crop is determined by relative prices. The total area allocated 
to winter cereals is determined by exogenous factors beyond the 
scope of the model. 
6.4.8 Costs: Costs are ignored. There are various reasons for 
this, the weakest being that data on costs are not available on 
a national basis. There are, fortunately, better reasons. Since 
winter cereals have relatively similar production techniques, any 
change in costs will have, broadly speaking, similar effects on 
all. Also it should be stressed that the standpoint of this study 
is price.control by marketing boards. They .can normally manipulate 
prices directly but not costs, and consequently, we are concerned 
here with responsiveness to out.put price rather than costs. 
6.4.9 Calculating the variables as explained above, we obtain the 
following correlation matrix: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------~---
(1) I Fisher, .:!:he Making of: Index Numbers, (London, 1927). 
1 l 2 
a Wt aOt 
a\.Jt 1,0 
aOt -,94 1,0 
aRt ,02 -,32 1,0 
aBt -,29 -,08 ,13 1,0 
Pwt-1 ,39 -,21 -,46' -,28 1,0 
Pot-1 -,27 ,15 ,26 ,31 -,87 1,0 
PRt-1 ,07 -,20 ,60 -,20 -,44 ,03 1,0 
PBt-1 -,07 ,12 -,56 ,55 ,32 -,13 -,62 1,0 
As can be seen, the signs are generally, though not always, in 
the direction predicted by economic theory for substitutes in 
production, viz. positive own price elasticity and negative other 
price elasticity. All own price elasticities are of the correct 
sign. Since there is also evidence of correlation between the 
price variables, it could be expected that an attempt to estimate 
parameters of expression [.iJ would encounter difficulties due to 
multicollinearity. In most cases, es'timation was done by Standard 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques but to circumvent the 
. If', __ 
problem of multicollinearity, estimates for expressionL_lJ were 
also obtained by ridge regression.(l) 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
(2) 
6.5.1 Table 6.1 sets out estimates for 2ach of the four winte.c 
cereal crops, calculated by a variety of regression techniques. 
The parameter estimo.tes in equations (a), (d), (g) and (j) were· 
obtained by ridge regression. Equations (b), (e), (h) a'nd (k) 
are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results for the simple Nerlove 
model (equation [2], p, 106). Equations (c), (f), (i) and (1) 
were similarly calculated by OLS techniques but, following ·wold 
(1) Appendix 6. 
(2) See p.120._ 
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and Jureen (l) the s~m of the price elasticities was 
constrained to zero.(2) In the case of the latter group, the 
data was transformed into logarithmic form, so the price 
coefficients can be innnediately interpreted as elasticities. .·1. 
6.5.2 In all cases, in accordance with theory, own price 
elasticities are positive, though 't' values are generally 
non-significant. The explanatory power of the models is 
largely attributable to the lagged area term, though this 
effect is less marked in the case of rye. In general, the 
constrained OLS equations perform better than the ridge esti--
mates. In all cases, autocorrelation (as measured by the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic) C3)is reduced and the R2 value 
is higher. 
6.5.3 It is interesting therefore to try a brief simulation 
exercise using equations (c), (f), (i) and (1). We may imagine 
a scenario where, in a free trade situation, world prices for 
wheat, oats, rye and barley had been the effective producer 
prices in South Africa, instead of the prices actually main-
tained by the Wheat Board. C4) The results of this exercise 
are shown in each of the figures. C5) The model suggests that 
the output of wheat and barley would have been considerably 
larger than it was, the output of oats and rye a good deal 
smalle:i;. 
(1) H Wold & L Jureen, Demand Analysis (New York: John Wiley & ~ans, .1'953), 
(2) For the relevant procedure, see J Johnstone, Econometric Chap. 6 
Methods, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 155-159. 
(3) Difficulties of course arise when OLS is applied to 
a lagged dependent variable such as this. A combination of 
autocorrelation and lagged dependent variables implies that 
OLS estimates will be inconsistent. Furthermore, the DW stati-
stic is biased towards 2. 
(Johnston, (1960); p.307). 
(4) Data used were U S wholesale prices in the case of barley, oats 
and rye and the Australian export price in the case of wheat. 
Source: F A 0 :Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Econo2nics and 
Statistics (varIOUS-issues)-:----
(5) See Figs.12-15, pp.203~206. 
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6.5.4 The simulation is suggestive rather than precise 
and, ·although the simulation was constrained so that 
= 1 h l < < 1 Th 1 a. - , t ere is no reason w iy o _ a. _ _. e va ues 
it i 
obtained have therefore been adjusted on a pro rata basis to 
meet this condition. 
6.6 SUMHER CROPS 
6.6.1 A similar exercise was carried out in the case of 
certain summer crops. A reasonable combination of products 
suggested by the matrix (l) is: 
MZ GS GT SF 
MZ 1,0 
GS , 77 
j 
1, 0 
GT ; 63 '41 1 0 '·· 
SF '74 '76 .40 1 0 ,, '· 
Key: 
MZ maize 
GS = grain sorghum 
GT = groundnuts 
SF = sunflowers 
This group appears to be less self-contained than was the case 
with the winter cereals. We note relatively high correlations 
between maize and cattle c,,55)' pigs ( ,55) and hay and feed 
(,?5) so it may be argued that in a comprehensive model, these 
products should also be included. To expand the model in this 
way would, however, be an immense undertaking, particularly 
in view of the difficulty of defining a suitable price variable 
in the case of cattle. 
6.6.2 Our initial apprehension in this regard is not signi-
ficantly reduced by a consideration of the correlation matrix: 


























GSGAt GRTAt SF At MZPt-l GSPt-l GTP t-1 SFPt-l 
1,0 
-,26 1,0 
-~;14 ,01 1,0 
- 110 
' 
'237 - 149 
' 
1,0 
-,061 -068 - 308 1 0 
~· ' ' 
,)80 -,591 131 1 0 
' 
'108 '174 567 1 o· ,,. 
' 
proportion of area devoted to maize cultivation in 
year t 
maize price adjusted by Fisher index in year t-1. 
Similarly for sunflowers (SF), grain sorghum (GS) 
and groundnuts (GT). 
This reveals that on the assumption that the four products are sub-
stitutes in production only 8 of the 16 price elasticities are of the 
correct sign and the magnitude of the coefficients is less than impres-
sive. It may be noted, however, that the relation between MZ and SF 
areas and prices is correct and, in the case of SF area, the correlations 
are relatively large. 
6.6.3 In a further attempt to disentangle th2 relationship 
beti;,·een these produc:ts, a correlation matrix of first differences 







FDMZAt FDGSAt FDGTAt FD SF At 
1,0 
, 21 1,0 
,48 ,08 1,0 
-, 72 -,31 -,21 1,0 
FDMZA =first differences, maize area 
t 
(year t) - (year t-1) etc. 
Again there appears to be a strong relationship 
between MZ and SF. If we consider only the signs of the 
coefficients, it seems reasonable to suggest land is substi-
tuted between SF and the other three products, but not 
between MZ, GS and GT. This would suggest equations specified 
as follows: 
(i) MZA = f (MZP, SFP) 
(ii) GSP = f (GSP, SFP) 
(iii) GTP f (GTP, SFP) 
(iv) SFP = f (MZP, GSP, GTP, SFP) 
MZP = maize price etc. 
6.6.5 I~spection of the correlation matrix reveals that the 
signs of the correlation coefficients are not consisient with 
this interpretation. All correlations have incorrect signs. 
However, the equations estimated for MZ and SF are less unsatis-
factory. (l) Explanatory power is law but the price response 
appears to be reasonably significant in equations (a) - (d). 
(1) See pp. 122-123. 
: !. 
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Equation (d) has the best established properties and yields 
a price elasticity of 0,981. Expanding the model to include 
the price relative (e) leads to a much less satisfactory 
model. 
6.6.6 In addition, four other expressions .were estimated, 
(f) - (i). The statistical properties of these equations are 
not satisfactory, though again the MZ and SF equations yield 
parameters of the predicted sign (except for the MZP 
variable). GSP 
6.6.7 These equations have been estimated by the ridge 
regression programme without producing any significant changes. 
In addition, estimations were made weighting area by yield. 







,732 + ,045 TIM 
(4,527) 
,516 + ,030 TIM 
(3,555) 
,450 + ,014 TIM 
(3 ,045) 






= 0,459 DW 
O, 336 DW 
R2 = 0,265 DW 
,478 DW 






6. 7 .1 In a sense, all that these equations can suggest is 
that farmers respond to market price signals, an unsurprising 
result. In fact, nn.e can turn the argument on its head and 
argue that since farmers can be expected to respond to market 
price signals, we :require a model that gi1,'es parameters of the 
correct sign. It is ic-:1portant to realise tl-:at we are testing 
l 18 
the model, not the theory. If the signs are wrong, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the specification of the model was 
incorrect rather than that farmers behaved economically irra-
tionally. 
6.7.2 The anticipated signs are positive for own price 
elasticity and negative for other price elasticities. There 
are, however, other possible reasons why the signs may not be 
in the predicted direction. 
6.7.3 
(i) The goods may be complements in production; 
(ii) Risk - if the output of one good increases, 
the output of some quite 'independenti good 
may also increase as .farmers diversify to 
spread their risks; 
(iii) Even if the model is correctly specified, 
technical estimation problems of multicollinearity 
may lead to incorrect signs of the parameters; 
(iv) Technical constraints on production may cause 
output to increase at the same time as its relative 
price is falling. (l) 
What is important in ~his exercise is not so much to 
discuss whether farmers respond to market price signals. We 
can assume they do, since this involves no more than the 
assumption of rational economic behaviour. The problem is 
firstly to determine whether, amidst the conflicting influences 
of other variables (changing costs, technology, etc.), any 
consistent price response car. be discerned because such a res-
ponse is a prerequisite for a centralised pricing policy. 
6.7.4 Secondly, a centralised pricing policy demands a 
---------------~--------------------------------------------~-------------
(1) Richard H Day, 'Recursive programming and supply prediction,' 
in Readings in the Economics of Agriculture, ed. by Karl.A Fox 
and Gale D Johnson, (London; Allen & Unwin, 1970), p.115. 
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reasonably accurate '.mowledge of the degree of response to 
price.signals, so that alternative policies can be consid~red. 
Unless these requirements are met, price fixing can be no 
more than a purely haphazard adventure. There seems no reason 
to suppose that central planners can outguess the market. 
6.7.5 On the basis of this exercise, it can be suggested 
that price response models can be built and some estimates of 
price elasticities can be made, at least for these particular 
crops. It does not follow from this that output can be 
determined with any real precision. Nor does it follow that 
centralised price fixing is either desirable, or better than 
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TABLE 6.2 
ESTIMATES OF SUPPLY FUNCTIONS FOR Sffi.frlER CEREALS 
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CH,~PTER SEVEN 
AGRICULTUR,~L POLICY rn SOUTH AFRICA - AN EVALU.~TION 
7. I. INTRODUCTION 
7. I. 1 The student of South African agricultural policy is not 
hampered by a lack of official documentation. Information is readily 
available and 1s set out in numerous Commission Reports, government 
white papers and parliamentary debates. No purpose would be served 
by a description of these official reports, not by a recounting of 
historical events. (I) The object here is rather to turn the spot-
light of economic rigour on published official documents which form 
the basis for State planning and policy making in the agricultural 
sector. This chapter will, therefore, attempt to survey this 
official literature. It will be a critical survey. 
7 .1. 2 A notable feature of the official literature 1s the 
repetitiveness of the problems, combined with a lack of perceptiven~ss 
(or willingness) to define exactly what. the fundamental causes of 
these problems are. Most disturbing of all, perhaps, is the tendency 
to accept opinions as articles of faith, without submitting them to 
the test of strict economic analysis. In reading the Reports of 
Commissions of Enquiry, it is striking how, over time, while the 
fundamental problems remain the same, the explanations offered for 
these problems vary. Generally, however, the a<1swers are designed 
to treat the symptoms rather than the causes. This tendency is 
clearly illustrated by the following: 
'An argument as to the why and wherefore of over-
production is not going to advance matters. The position 
is that there is beyond a shadow of a doubt a very 
serious amount of overproduction and the position has 
to be faced, 1 (2) 
(I) For an account of this, see Francis Wilson, Farming 1866 - 1966 
·in The Oxford History Qf South Africa, ed. by Monica Wilson & -
Leonard Thompson (Oxford: C:!.Rrendon Press> 1971) , Ch .3. 
(2) Report by Chas. W H Kohler to the Government Liquor Commission, 
1931, p.6. 
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7 .1. 3 This failure to accept, investigate or admit the funda-
mental causes of the agricultural problems is basic to rr.uch official 
thinking on the subject of agricultural policy. As a result, it 
has been necessary to find other causes or scapegoats. If the 
unsatisfactory state of agriculture is not to be blamed on the 
farmers, .then clearly the fault must lie elsewhere. (l) A major 
theme of official discussion has, therefore, taken the form of a 
search for a villain. 
7. I. 4 Incorrect diagnosis, of course, seldom leads to correct 
prescription. The second major theme has, therefore, been the constant 
(and generally successful) pressure towards increasing centralisation .J 
and control of the agricultural sector as a means of solving 
problems. 
7.2 VILLAIN NO. I: FOREIGN COMPETITION 
7. 2. 1 South Africa is, in most agricultural corrnnodities, a 
price taker in world markets; as a relatively small producer in 
world terms, local traders are seldom in a position to influence 
world prices themselves. This can be a source of strength. In times 
of surplus, exports can be increased without the risk of driving 
down the world price. Conversely, however, little protection is 
available against violent fluctuations in world prices or against 
secular market changes. It is, therefore, unsurprising that at 
a fairly early stage the blame for farmers' problems should have 
been laid at the door of for~igners - in this case, the Cold Storage 
companies. With the new technology of cold storage it was possible 
to transport meat, principally from Australia, but also from the 
Argentine, and retail it in South Africa at below the ruling local 
prices. This reduction in local prices, while of obvious advantage 
--------------------,----------------------------------------------------~-----
( l). An example of this is a statement by the Minister of Agr ic.ulture: 
"One section of our community has lagged behind through no fault 
of its mm ·, ••.•• I refer, of course, to our farmers." 
Hansard Col. 945, F.ebruary 193 7. 
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to consumers, was understandably unpopular with local producers. 
The solution in their view was a protectionist policy. 
7.2.2 The issues were clearly illustrated in the following 
exchange before the 1905 Weeber Commission: 
'Do you think that the re-imposition of the duty of 
2d per lb on meat would enable the farmer to compete 
successfully against cold storage companies? - It would 
enable the small local butcher to start again and 
become the buyer from the farmer. At the present 
moment, he is almost extinct. 
How is he excluded? ..... He has been crushed out by Cold 
Storage. 
Have you any 
against cold 
of the duty? 
be necessary 
monopoly. 
other scheme for protecting the farmers 
storage companies other than the imposition 
- No, but it is possible that it may yet 
to legislate in connection with the 
Really then, the 
monopoly? - That 
whole thing is the Cold Storage 
is at the bottom of the whole thing.' 
(I) 
7.2.3 The solution suggested was, therefore, clear. The monopoly 
power of the cold storage companies was .to be reduced or removed; 
the consumer was to bear the burden of the lack of competitiveness 
of South African agriculture. 
7.2.4 
'What would be the result of the re-imposition of 
.2d per lb duty on meat to the consumer? - That I am not 
in a position to give any evidence on; but judging from 
the fact that the taking off of the duty did not cheapen 
the price of meat to the consum:r, ~ t is not ':1nrec;-sonable ( 2) to think that putting it on again will not raise it ..... 
One is left to speculate on the question of who, then, 
was to pay the duty, since the suggestion. is that the consumer 
would not pay a higher price, but the produce.r would presumably 
receive one. A further unusual aspect of the argument is the 
suggestion that the cold storage companies were using their monopoly 
power to reduce prices. The normal cci.se against monopolies, of 
--------·---------------------------------------------------------------·-----
(i) Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Advisability of 
Re-organising the Existing Agricultural Department, G2/1905, 
paras. 5481, 5482, 5484, 5485. 
(2) G2 / l 905, para. 5487. 
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course, is that they tend to raise prices. The fact is,that the <f 
lower prices which cold st:orage companies were able to offer were 
a function, not of monopoly power, but of the relative efficiency 
of foreign meat producers and technical advances in cold storage 
transportation. This was clearly spelled out some years later by 
the Department of Agriculture: 
7.2.5 
'Formerly, when marine transport was slow, irregular 
and expensive, the isolated position of South Africa 
was sufficient guarantee against .... importation •••. 
at low prices from overseas • . . • With the advent of 
faster and cheaper marine transport and less expensive 
methods of production in overseas countries, particularly 
in Australia, Canada and the United States, the position 
of the local producer was endangered, and it was found (l) 
necessary to protect him against foreign competition.' 
Aside from pure cost considerations, however, there was 
the question of quality, particularly relevant in the case of wheat: 
7.2.6 
1935: 
dealers and millers are usually prepared to pay 
from sixpence to 1/- more per bag for imported wheat 
than for South African wheat. The reason for this is 
simply that the imported article is usually better 
graded and produces a better quality of bread.' (2) 
The problem of foreign competition was clearly stated m 
'It is a well-known fact that South Africa is by no 
means suitable for the production of wheat and that it 
is impossible for the South African wheat farmer to 
compete on the basis of world wheat prices.' (3) 
To i1 lustrate this, the Report provided appropriate dat.2-: 
(1) W J Pretorius, An Economic Study of the Wheat Industry in the Union, 









141, p. 10. 
141, p.5. 
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There is, of course, fluctuation from year to year, but 
there is no doubt that generally speaking South Africa is at the 
bottom of the league. The mistake in official reasoning was to 
deduce from this that it was 'impossible for the South African 
farmer to compete on the basis of world wheat prices.' The real 
difficulty was not so much the competitiveness of South African 
farming arrangements, but rather the problem of reconciling an 
efficient agricultural sector with a formidable array of compelling 
and contradictory policy constraints.. In this respect, the dilemma 
regarding wheat production is typical of South African official 
policy in general - the difficulty of reconciling economic rationality 
with political reality. 
7.2.8 Given the fact that cheap and better quality wheat was 
available abroad, the possible options were: 
i) The development of a more extensive form of farming 
so that the individual farmer earned enough on the land 
to equal his alternative earnings in town. Given a 
political commitment to maintain a large agricultural 
population, this option was unlikely to seem attractive, 
however, since larger farms imply fewer farmers. 
ii) The imposition of tariff barriers. There are 
political costs here also, however, in terms of increased 
prices to consumers. The Department of Agriculture was 
-
aware of this difficulty. 
(l ) Bu 11. No. l 4 l , p. 5. 
7.2.9 
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'It is most unlikely that the wheat farmers will be 
afforded any further protection, consequently •••. 
land values will have to drop to a level which will place 
the wheat farmer economically on a sound footing.' (1) 
This would imply requiring wheat farmers to accept 
a reduction in value of their principle capital asset -
a politically unpopular, but inevitable, result of 
lower output prices. (2) 
iii) The possibility that farmers could transfe.r their 
efforts to the production of a different crop. This 
obvious possibility, unfortunately, clashed with a further 
political objective. 
'From the purely economic point of view, therefore, it 
seems very doubtful whether wheat farming is to be 
justified. From the national point of view, however, 
it is desirable that the country should be partly, if 
not entirely, self-supporting in respect of wheat.' (3) 
This self-sufficiency argument underlies most official 
thinking on the agricultural problem. 
Given this array of political commitments, it is clear 
that a way had to be found to maintain the price of wheat at a 
reasonably high level for producers whilst keeping it relatively 
low for consumers. The obvious solution was to separate the 
producer and consumer prices by means of a subsidy. This policy 
was, in fact, adopted, The justification for this subsidy was not, 
however, stabilisation nor a reduction in distribution costs. 
It was rather the result of political commitments to cheap food, 
high producer prices and national self-sufficiency. 
(1) Bull. No, 141, p.81. 
(2) Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the economic theory underlying 
this argument. 
(3) Bull. No. 141, p.79, 
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7. 2. 10 The self-sufficiency argument has often been used (l) 
but seldom carried to its logical conclusion. The Report on the 
Distribution of Food, howe~er, did so. Discussing maize, Sir Henry_ 
French argued: 
7.2.11 
"This is a crop in which this country should be entirely 
self-supporting ..... The right course, I submit, 
is the one followed in England during the war in the 
case of potatoes, ie - arrange for the planting of such 
an acreage that even if the yield should be more than 
.the lowest on record, there will still be enough potatoes 
to feed our people for twelve months. The result was 
that we never had a shortage of potatoes ..••• To import 
maize from the Argentine to fill, even to a small extent, 
the shortfall in the home crop, is not economical." (2) 
The economic content of this type of argument scarcely 
merits conunent, but taken together with other references quoted, 
it serves to illustrate a fundamental fallacy in much of the South 
African literature. The fallacy is to confuse relative and 
absolute price levels. If the price of wheat is raised, it is 
likely that farmers will respond by producing more 'Nheat - but only 
at the expense of something else.' Since agricultural products are 
usually fairly close substitutes in production, the extra wheat 
production will be at the expense of some other agricultural 
cormnodity. Thus, since most agricultural commodities are foodstuffs, 
the cause of overall self-sufficiency is not rnaterially advanced by a 
high wheat price. Nor, interestingly enough, is it obvious that a 
rise in price of all agricultural corrnnodities will lead to an increase -
in aggregate agricultural output. The evidence on this is mixed, but 
fundamentally the question revolves around the question of.the 
elasticity of substitution of resources between agriculture and 
other sectors. Evidence from the USA suggests that the possibilities 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) See for example C van der Herwe, Agricultural Policy in Economic 
Policy· in South Africa, ed. by J A Lombard (Cape Town: Raum, 1972), 
ch.s. 
(2) Report of the Commission on the Distribution o:: Food, UG3l/1946, 
p.6. 
-. 
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r • • h 1 ( l ) h. 1 . S h Af . ror substitution are rat er ow, w i e in out rica, the 
1 . . ' h .h. h (
2) N h 1 • • 1 h e as ti.city is somew1 at ig er. evert e_ess, it is c ear t at 
little purpose is served by the arbitrary increase in the price of 
one commodity. 
7.2.12 To summarise, therefore, the argument that South African 
producers were unable to face overseas competition is, on its own, 
unsatisfactory. They could, of course, corn.pete, but only after 
significant adjustments to the industry. These were likely to 
involve the consolidation of farming·units, a reduction in the 
number of farmers and a change in the output mix. Given the 
political parameters existing, however, the normal economic ad-
justment process was unacceptable - hence some alternative had to 
be found. 
7.3 VILLAIN NO~ 2: THE DISTRIBUTOR 
7. 3. 1 By the 1930s, the case against overseas competition 
could no longer be used. Farmers were well protected from low price 
competition on the import market .. 
(3) 
In addition, the co-operative 
movement was well established, based on the principle of compulsory 
co-operation. It was, therefore, necessary to find a villain 
elsewhere. ·A suitabie candidate was not hard to find, nor original 
in form. 
. \ 
'Few are the men - they need rare natural gifts and the 
best of education - who can show moderation when assailed 
by wants and desires~ few who are sober when they have 
a chance of making large sums of money and who are 
content with moderate profits. The rr:ass of mankind arc. 
the exact opposite; their desires are unbounded, their 
appetite for gain unlimitedo This explains the attacks 
on suc.h occupations as retail business, commerce and 
------~---------------------------------------·-------------------·-----..- ..i..-- -----
(1) Z Griliches, 'Estimates of the Aggregate US Supply Function,' ~FE 42 
(1960), pp.282-293. 
(2) W' L Nieuwoudt, 'Die Aanbodelastisiteit van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Landbou,' SAJE 40 (i972). pp.249-253 . 
. -~ . 




hotel-keeping and the disrepute under which they 
lie. ' ( l) 
In short, the distribution system had 2.11 the requirements 
for a satisfactory target. The gap between producer prices and 
consumer prices was often easy to see and apparently indicative of 
inefficiency. The fact that the distribution of agricultural 
products is an enormously complex undertaking, (2) far from being a 
disincentive to investigate the distribution process, was rather 
taken as proof of inefficiency. What had been a confusion of 
opportunity ~ost and absolute cost in dealing with foreign 
competition became, in the hands of the Distribution Costs Commission, 
a confusion of normal and supernormal profits (ie - profits due to 
monopoly power and profits due to efficiency). 
7.3.3 The reduction of the distribution margin had been one of 
/ 
the prime objectives of the 1938 Marketing Act, despite a lack of 
evidence at the time that the distribution margin was, in fact, too 
high. The objective of the Marketing Act as stated by the 1939 
Report of the National Marketing Council was primarily to provide 
benefits to the producers: 
7.3.4 
'In tne main, it is the intention of this measure to 
promote producers' interests by the application of 
conscious direction and control •.••• in the expectation 
that the following advantages will accrue: ••.• an 
improvement in producers' returns •..• by reducing the 
distributive and manufacturing margin by, say, eliminating 
uneconomic practices, centralising sales or rationalisittg 
the processing industries.'--(3) - -
While this may be taken as a candid statement of the 
perceived objectives of the Act, it is, nevertheless, an unfairly 
one-sided view of a rather complex situation. In fact, of·course, 
(l) Plato; Republic, circa 386 BC, quoted in Report of the Committee of 
Enquiry into Distribution Costs, UG28/1947, p.l. 
(2) See diagram at the back of UG28/1947, illustrating the distribution 
networks. 
(3) Annual Report of the Nation21 Marketing Council, UG26/1939, p.7. 
\ 
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if distribution costs can be reduced, then it is possible both 
for the farmer to achieve a higher price (or his product and for the 
consumer to pay less. The decrease in the middleman's margin is 
equal to the gain to the producer and the consumer, while the 
precise division between producer and consumer is inversely related 
to the relative elasticities of the supply and demand schedules. 
Subject to certain important qualifications, (I) the party with the 
I 
more elastic curve gets the smaller share. It is also worth 
noting that a decrease in the distributive margin is predicted to 
lead to an increase in both production and consumption. Welfare 
is increased. 
7 .3 .5 The objective of the Act in attempting to reduce the 
distribution margin was, therefore, a worthy one. The difficulty 
in practice is twofold. For the Act to be justified it is necessary 
first to show that th~ free market distribution system is relatively 
inefficient (ie - expensive), which in practice requires a careful 
study ·of botb the free market system and the alternative centralised 
system. Second, for the comparison to be meaningful, it is necessary 
that the marketing board provide the same quality of service as the 
privat~ distribution system in terms of the location o.f sales outlets, 
etc. In practice, of course, there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that centralised distribution systems are in fact more efficient (2) -
in fact, there is evidence to suggest the reverse. 
7.3.6 Such studies are, of course, extremely difficult to carry 
out, given the complexity .of the operations involved. It is, however, 
unclear as to why the distribution of agricultural products, in 
particular, should have been regarded as particularly inefficient 
as compared to other sectors of the economy. A wide differential 
between producer prices and consumer prices might simply reflect 
the physical problems associated with the difficulty of transporting 
_, _____________________________________________________________________ , _____ _ 
(l) GS Shepherd, Agricultural Price Analysis (Iowa State University 
Press, 1950), 3rd ed., p.212 • 
. (2) This view has been expressed by, among others, Gordon Tullock, 
The Vote Vi0tive, Institute of Economic Affairs, Occasional Papers. 
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products of a widely dispersed farming community to a few scattered 
urban areas. There appears to be little evidence to support the 
contention that distribution was inefficient before 1937 - indeed, 
the task of determining the distribution margin alone would have 
been a difficult one - and even if the information had been 
available, it would have been difficult to compare these costs 
' 
with the activities of hypothetical marketing boards which did not 
then exist. Unsurprisingly, therefore, official arguments in 
favour of centralised marketing were based on statements of faith 
rather than factual analysis: 
7.3.7 
'For years, the marketing and distribution of agricultural 
products have been in an unsatisfactory state, and there 
has been no sound system of organisations and regulations, 
particularly from the point of view of ensuring an . 
even and orderly flow of products from producers to 
the markets and from the markets to the consumers. 
This has not only resulted in a maldistribution of 
supplies between the different sections or groups of 
the population, but has, on the one hand, also severely 
handicapped development of the local market to a level 
of full efficiency and utility, while making, on the 
other, for an undue margin between the prices received 
by producers and those paid by consumers.' (1) 
The major effort to investigate distribution costs came 
almost a decade after the passing of the Marketing Act. The 
Stratford Committee (2) focused its attention on answering two 
major questions: 
i) What, if anything, is wrong with the distributive 
machine in South Africa? 
ii) What remedies and improvements can be suggested? 
7.3.8 In attempting to answer these questions the Commission 
( 1) Reconstruction Cormnit tee of the Department of Africult ure and 
Forestry, Reconstruction of Agriculture, 1944 - 5, Government 
Printer, Pretoria, 1943, pp.7-8. 
(2) UG28/ l 94 7. 
1 35 
'declined to take sides in the wide controversy between the pro--
tagonists of State control and those of private enterprise,' but 
chose intsead the 'school of the middle course,' (I) adopting an 
essentially pragmatic approach to the problem and thereby avoiding 
the central issues. 
7.3.9 Indicative of the confusion of the Commission was their 
investigation of the distribution of fruit and vegetables. This 
should have been an important part of their study since price 
fluctuations are extremely wide in this sector and it can be shown 
that prices often differ widely between markets located very close 
to each other - presumably a situation where the superiority of 
centralised control would be easy to illustrate. The Commission 
notes that: "With very few exceptions, the retailing of fruit has 
attracted only the poorer and less educated class of trader •••• 
The result of this is a very large number of very small units" and 
it is probable "that most of these units ••••• are undercapitalised; 
they are unable ·... . • • • to trade on the scale or with the necessary 
equipment ••••• to bring about a reduction in unit costs 11 (2) 
7.3.10 The Connnission fails to show how such a change would be 
beneficial. A smaller number of larger retail outlets, while it 
might reduce unit costs to the retailer, would certainly raise costs 
to the average consumer, if only in terms of incr~ased travel costs 
to the retail outlet. The Report, however, continues with the 
further remarkable statements: 
110n the assumption that. the very considerable price 
spreads to which we have referred have resulted in 
unduly high profits to the retailer ••.• the natural 
question that arises is, 'How is it that these profits 
have not been reduced to normal by competition?' The 
answer may be found in the existence of tacit price 
agreements subscribed to by all the traders operating 
in the same area .••. the Cormnission received abundant 
evidence, but no proof of the existence of such tacit 
price agreements. It is a remarkable fact testified 
. ----------------------------------------------------------------------.. ------
(i) UG28/1947, p.14. 
(2) UG28/1947, p.75. 
, 
7. 3. 1 i 
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in evidence, but of course, not conclusive that (to 
give an example) in any one street, at any one time, 
the price of, say, peas and beans or tomatoes or apples 
are_ the same in every shop. This is not easy to account 
for by the operation of supply and demand factors, since 
the produce of this kind generally, supply and demand 
fluctuate so violently within short periods that price 
uniformity, even over short periods, is not to be 
expected." ( 1) 
There is, of course, no reason why price spreads should 
result in high profits at all - they may simply reflect the different 
costs involved in distributing different goods to different places. 
In any event, it is contradicted a few lines further down by statements 
regarding the uniformity of prices. Apparently, therefore, when 
prices are different, profits are unduly high and when prices are 
the same, prof its are also unduly high, assuming, of course, that 
one could be clear about what was meant by 'unduly.' Even if profits 
were high, the argument remains unsatisfactory. Price agreements 
can only be enforced in the long run on the assumption of barriers 
to entry. The Corrnnission does not enquire into the existence of 
these at all. The sentences which follow are even more remarkable. 
The fact that prices are the same is, of course, the prediction for 
a competitive.situation. Could supply and demand fluctuate 
significantly in the time taken to walk across the street from 
one shop to another_? 
7.3.12 In fact, one would imagine that it would be difficult 
to enforce a price 'ring' in a market such as this where there are 
(2) 
a large number of small traders, but, as the Corrnnission warns 
us, many of the traders are Asians, so_perhaps anything is possible 
with Oriental cunning! 
~---------------------------~-------------------------------------------~----~ 
(1) UG28/1947, p.75. 
(2) The 1972 Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture argued that there 
are such trading rings, but in the case, they were considered to 
function to the disadvantage of small traders. Third (Final) Report 
of the Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture, RP19/l972, p.151. 
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7.3.13 The most obvious way to determine whether collusion 
has, in fact, taken place is to investigate the existence of super-
normal profits. (l) The Commission has clearly not done this 
and is forced to admit that the assumption of profits cannot be 
made "with confidence until the actual costs of distribution and 
handling - transport, wastage through perishability, delivery 
credit, etc. - have been properly analysed." (2 ) Supernormal 
profit can only be maintained in the long run, of course, if there 
are barriers to entry. One suspects that if there were such barriers 
they would have been in the form of trading licences - but control 
of these would presumably be outside the influence of Asian traders~ 
in the hands of local municipalities. 
7 .3.14 "Having regard to the popular comment and criticism 
to which these large price spreads have given rise, 
the Commission requested the cost accountant to conduct 
a special enquiry into the retailing of fruit and 
vegetables. The results of this investigation, through 
not fault of the cost accountant, have unfortunately 
proved largely inconclusive." (3) 
Exactly what the cost accountant could have hoped to prove by such 
an investigation is by no means clear, since cost accountants do 
not have a comparative advantage in the art of measuring opportunity 
costs. In fact, it is a basic weakness in the approach of the 
Committee that profits are taken as a sign of inefficiency in 
distribution rather than the reverse. It is accepted by them that 
the lower the profits, the better. Profits are calculated as 
'p~rcentage net profit on turnover,' and although it is admitted 
that profit as a percentage of capital invested would be_ a better 
figure to use, there are practical difficulties in calculating it; 
b~t the Commission goes ahead and draws conclusions any-way. C4) 
----------------·-------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Though supernormal profits would appear to be inconsistent with 
earlier statements that the trades are undercapitalised. 
(2) UG28/19~7, p.75. 
(3) UG28/1947, p.75. 
(4) UG28/1947, p.54. 
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7.3.15 On this costing basis, bakers get a clean bill of 
health ("a reduction in the net profits of bakers will make no· 
significant difference to the price paid to. the consumer") ( 1) 
whereas in the case of biscuits, the;re are "profits considerably 
higher than would have accrued norIP.al competitive conditions." (2) 
7.3.16 In practice it is difficult to define inefficiency 
and profit level certainly does not constitute a useful index. 
Even if one could, it would still not follow that the marketing 
board option tvas the best of the available alternatives to reduce 
distribution costs. The quality of service offered, delays in 
meeting orders, etc. are also relevant. It is, therefore, doubtful 
whether in practice any definite calculation is possible. The whole 
exercise was, in fact, doomed to failure. 
7.3.17 After publication, the report was subject to some 
criticism. 
(3) In the light of the above, one must conclude 
Samuels was extremely generous to the authors. Perhaps, however, 
the most cogent criticism is to be found in uhe Memorandum of 
Reservations to the Commission Report, submitted by Richards and 
Penver: 
"In brief, the emphasis which has, in the past, been 
placed on marketing difficulties is, in our opinion, 
to a great extent misplaced, since the underlying 
weakness of agriculture lies not in the sphere of 
marketing but in the sphere of production." (4) 
~---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) UG28/1947, p.57. 
(2) UG28/1947, p.57. 
(3) See L H Samuels, 'Aspects of Controlled l.'farketing in the Union,' 
~AJE_l5 Ct947), pp.47--59 1• 
(4) UG28/1947, p.95. 
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7. 4 VILLAIN NO. 3: THE CONSUMER 
7. 4. 1 Having failed to reach any satisfactory conclusion 
regarding the behaviour of middlemen, it was necessary for the 
finger of guilt to be pointed in another direction. "Broadly 
speaking, consumers' choices are frequently irrational and mis~ 
informed and to this extent the distributive system fails to 
( 1) 
reach optimum performance.' (ItalFcs added). While there 
may, of course, be differences of opinion about what is meant 
by 'optimum performance,' ( 2) the irrationality of consumers 
is clearly a point to be stressed. "Most consumers are not 
rational buyers. Plain consumer ignorance increases distributive 
costs. Few of us realise that by our trial-and-error process 
of shopping, we have wasted too much of our time and nervous 
energy," (J) and then, in total contradiction of this, "The 
great majority of consumers have not shown any interest in becoming 
better informed •••• " despite the fact that "the consumer is at a 
disadvantage." (4) If trial and error shopping is not a means of 
acquiring information, then one wonders what it is for. (S) 
7.4.2 It is also interesting to _note that in this passage, 
the consumer is considered to be at a disadvantage. More usually 
it is the producer who is perceived to be at a disadvantage. 
Clearly, however, any argument is considered to be good enough 
if it serves to back up an argument, however weak.· The approach, 
as always, is to seek evidence which will serve to justify a 
predetermined policy measure rather than to attempt an objective 
analysis of the situation. 
(1) UG28/1947, p.29. 
(2) See Gordon.Tullock, op.cit. 
(3) UG28/1947, p.29. 
(4) UG28/l947~ p.29. 
(5) For a discussion of shopping as D. means of acquiring price 
information, see G J Stigler, 'The Economics of Information,' 
Journal of Political Economy 69 (1961), pp.213-225. 
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7.5 THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDIES 
7. 5. l Having solved the problem of low priced imports by 
imposing import controls and having, on the basis of unsatisfactory 
evidence, determined that distribution was best handled by a 
system of control boards, it was only to be expected that the 
problems of the agricultural sector should reappear, though, as 
always, in a different form. Although the marketing boards offored 
farmers a substantial degree of control over output prices (though 
not as much as had been orginally intended), it was soon argued 
that this was insufficient, Control of input prices (ie ± subsidisation) 
was also necessary. While this form of intervention can be justified 
on narrow economic grounds, (I) .the argument normally presented is 
a socio-political one. As the 1947 Commission: noted bluntly: "The 
general 
a large 
public ••••• has as, much interest in the 
and stable farming industry in the Union 
maintenance of a 
as primary producers 
themselves." (2) Why was this so? The answer was presumably to be 
found in the stirling qualities of the rural poFG/Qation: 
7.5.2 
"The farmer, living close to the soil, believes that 
a power beyond his understanding makes the sun shine 
and the rain fall, makes the grass sprout and causes 
the seed to germinate and-burgeon into full growth. 
He has a childlike trust in, and a deep sense of 
dependence on, a Supreme Being Who knows all and ordains 
what shall be. This is what gives a na.tion its inner.: 
resources and spiritual strength to surmount even the · 
greatest setbacks and hardships ••••. " (3) 
These thoughts developed later, however. 






(1) See Nieuwoudt (1972). 
(2) Report of the National Marketing Council on the Marketing Boards 
1938-1946, UG27/1947, p.6. 
(3) Second. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture, 
RP84/1970, p. 179. 
(4) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of 
the Rural Areas, 1959. 
•' 
7.5.3 
I 4 I 
"It is in the best interests of South Africa to maintain 
on the platteland the maximum number of Whites 
who are assured of a worthy and safe existence 
Only a prosperous, well-established and vocation-
conscious farming population can make a positive and 
essential contribution to the continued existence and 
security of White civilisation." (1) 
This, of course, is the essence of the matter. Regardless 
of the economic rationale of the policy, the political considerations 
are considered to be overriding. Although admitting the economic 
irrationality of fertiliser subsidies, it is argued that: 
7.5.4 
" •••• the use of fertilisers is such a basic part of the 
existing farming pattern that the withdrawal of the 
subsidy and transport rebates would inevitably result 
in considerable increases in production costs and, there-
fore, ultimately consumer price increases as well." (2) 
Given cost-plus methods of price fixing in agriculture, 
one must admit that there is some truth in this - though normally 
causation works the other way. Fertilis~r subsidies are to be 
accepted even though: 
7.5.5 
"The subsidy on fertilisers might have the dis-
advantage of encouraging farmers to plough marginal 
land and raise crops on them .••• the subsidy might also 
lead to crops being grown outside their natural 
cultivation areas. (3) 
The problem of soil erosion is a spectre which appears 
at frequent intervals in official literature and is, therefore,. 
worth discussing briefly. The essential question is whether, 
in response to either increased output prices ·(or reduced input 
prices) farmers will plough and cultivate unsuitable land, thereby 
causing erosion. Land is, of course, the farmer's most important 
-------------.. ----------------·------.--------------------------------------.. ----
(1) Quoted in RP84/1970, p.179. 
(2) RP19/1972, p.112. 
(3) RPi9/1972, p.112. 
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capital asset. It is unlikely that he will lightly participate 
in its destruction. Ignorance may be a cause of bad farming methods, 
but this explanation is, of course, independent of price level. 
It also seems reasonable to imagine that if prices are very low, 
the farmer's time horizon ma.y contract in response to his own 
immediate and pressing needs. The long view is a luxury he simply 
cannot afford. 
7.5.6 This does not seem to be a very plausible explanation 
to apply to White farmers, though it may have had some validity 
in the Depression years of the 1930s when, in response to extemely 
low prices, farmers. may have overstocked to maintain.their income 
in the short run. It may well have some validity in the case of 
Black agriculture arid w~y provide a powerful explanation for the 
soil erosion found there. (I) 
7.5.7 But what is being asserted here is that land is being 
over-utilised because of high prices. It would appear, therefore, 
that there is a golden mean which is necessary to persuade farmers 
to safeguard their own capital assets. Such can hardly be the case • . 
The value of land is closely related to the value of the output of 
that land. If price rises, the value of the land can be expected 
to rise and it becomes even less rational to misuse the land. 
The only possible exception to this would appear to be the case 
where prices are high but expected to fall. In this case, a large 
output now would be sufficient to compensate for a smaller output 
later. This, however, is essentially a short-term situation. It 
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for land misuse in 
the longer term. 
7.5.8 The economic· forces underlyiP..g soil erosiorr, therefore, 
remain largely unresolved. Though there is, as far as one can 
discover, no real economic justification for input price subsidies 
(l) Though the explanation of, low Black agricultural productivity 
as a function of unsatisfactory land tenure arrangements is 
possibly more satisfacto~y. 
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and the link between subsidies and soil erosion, is a tenous one, 
we must admit that there is a good deal of ignorance in this area. 
The various Corrunission reports have done little to resolve these 
difficulties. 
7. 6 THE PROBLEM OF CENTRALISATION 
7. 6. I As a response to the continuing problems and pressures 
from the agricultural sector, the answer has always been to recommend 
greater government intervention and a greater degree of cen~ralisation. 
Though it may be argued that the 1930s were a 'watershed' in the 
development of agricultural organisation in South Africa, there is 
a sense in which the role of the State in agriculture can be seen 
a_s a steadily increasing one. With this accumulation of power at 
the centre, the question of who is to wield that power became 
increasingly important - a question which continues to be discussed. 
7.6.2 The membership of control boards has always been. a 
contentious issue. The 1934 Corruuittee expressed strong views on 
the subject. 
"The Commission is of the opinion that a price controlling 
body composed solely of producers is, due to its in-
herent weakness of representing the supply factor only, 
not fundamentally equipped to exercise that essential 
restraining influence in regard to price policy." ( l) 
More strongly, 
"Placing the control of an industry in the hands of 
producers by legislation virtually amounts to conferring 
the· power of taxation of the consuming public on a small 
·body of producers who are, generally S:='eaking, constitu-
tionally unfit to exercise such power in the best interests 
of both producer and c.o:csumer." (2) 
Indeed, the composition of the boards has been a continuous source 
o.f discussion. In their Memorandum of Objections attached to the 
194 7 Cormnission, Richards and Penver address the problem, arguing 
( J) Repo:;:-t 0£ the Comini~sion of Enquiry into Co-operation and Agricult1.iral 
Credit, UG16/l934, p.16. 
(2) UG16/!934, p, 19. 
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that, "the alleged safeguard of consumer representation on the 
• • • 1 l • ff • II ()) Marketing Boards is largely meaning ess an( ine ective. 
7.6.3 A perusal of the Marketing Act indeed suggests that even 
the 'safeguard' of consumer representatives is quite illusory 
and that a control board comprising only producers wopld have been 
quite consistent with the 1937 Act. 
(2) 
Thus consumer rep-
resentatives are not only in a minority, but appear to have no 
guaranteed right on these boards, though 1n the years immediately 
after the institution of the Marketing Act, no objection was raised 
to their presence. Reporting on the activities of the boards, the 
1939 Corrnnission reports cheerfully: 
"Moreover, the producers' members themselves freely 
admit that their experience of mixed boards since the 
inauguration of the first Control Boards in the Union 
has confirmed in their minds that, by virtue of the 
capacity and experience of their representatives, 
recognition of the other functional interests is of the 
greatest help in the exercise of marketing control." (3) 
Recently, however, the tone has changed and the latest Commission 
report has recoITu11ended that consumers' representatives be abolished. 
7.6.4 A closely related topic of concern in the unpublished 
reports has been the problem of price fixing and co-ordination. 
The fixation of price is, at least in the case of one-channel 
marketing schemes, the activity of primary importance since "a 
potent influence may .... he exerted ..... through the medium of the 
price factor. 11 .(S) Indeed, it was primarily to deal with thE:. low 
average level of agricultural prices that the Marketing Act was 
(4) 
____ ... _____________ .:._ __________ ~-----------·----------------------------------...--
(l) UG28/1947, p.97. 
(2) "A· scheme shall provide for the representation on its regulatory 
board of the persons concerned in the production of the product to 
which the scheme relates and may also provide for the representation 
on such board of persons concerned in the marketing, processing and 
consumption of such products .•.•• " Act No. 26, 1937, 18(2) (emphasis 
added). 
(3) UG26/1939, p.9. 
(tt) .See RP39i1976, p~93. 
(5) UG28/1947, p.22. 
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passed. But though the Marketing Act p~ovides Boards with the power 
for price fixing, rio indication is provided as to how prices are 
to be determined. 
7.6.5 In the absence of firm advice on this subject, costs have 
traditionally been used as a basis for price determination. 
Unfortunately, this raises further problems. The 1947 Cormnission 
posed the question: 
"What costs should be used as a basis for price fixation? 
a) If the highast costs are used, it will keep inefficient 
units in business •••••• b) If the lowest cost is taken, 
then all the firms with higher cpsts will sooner or later 
be forced out of business •••• c) To some extent, the 
above difficulties are overcome by taking the weighted 
average costs of an adequate sample as a basis." (1) 
This is the familiar and unsatisfactory cost-plus method of pricing. 
It has been much criticised and its weaknesses need not concern us 
here - basically, the problem is that costs are a function of price 
rather than the other way round. It follows that prices cannot be 
satisfactorily determined on the basis of costs. 
7.6.6 How else is price to be determined, though? The 19-39 
Commission provides some advice: 
"The determination of prescribed prices must naturally 
occur with due regard to the interests of consumers 
and while, as is also common to a competitive system of 
a private monopoly, the aim of any control board must be. 
to ma.ximise the producers' revenuej it is implicit in 
that objective that prices be adapted ~s far as possible 
to meet the position of the low-income groups, thus 
rendering their demand effective." (2) 
This statement, of course, is totally vacuous! 
(I) UG28/1947,p.22 .. 




Equally fatuous advice is to be found much h1ter, in 
"Apart from the income position, price fixing should 
also take account of changes in production costs, the 
elasticity of supply and demand (as well as the long 
term shifts that can be expected in the supply and 
demand curves), the production and consumption trends, 
prices of substitutes, the import possibilities and 
overall agricultural policy." (1) 
Exactly how, in practice, one is supposed to juggle these factors 
is by no means clear, nor is any practical advice given in the 
Commission's report. In fact, of course, the task is not possible. 
7.6.8 It is, ther.efore, clear that no practical advice has 
been given to control boards on the central problem of how to 
determine their prices. 'The reason is quite simple. There are 
far too many factors to be taken into account. Apart from these 
practical problems, there are fundamental difficulties related 
to the question of price co-ordination. Since the various control 
boards act independently, the task of effecting co-ordination 
devolves upon the Minister of Agriculture, advised by the National 
Marketing Council. This is inevitable and is a fundamental problem 
·associated with the structure of control boards set up on individual 
product lines. 
"Apart from the highest cost entailed by the tendency 
for control boards to proliferate, the fact that there 
are several control boards has meant that the approach 
co price determination has become so sectional that, in 
the opinion of the Department of Agriculture, equilibrium 
in agriculture is being disturbed." (2) 
The problem of price co-ordination, while it has been stressed in 
recent years, was noted much earlier. 
(1) RP19/1972, pp. 123-124. 
(2) RP19/1972, p. 138. 
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7.6.9 The ! 949 Cmmnission discussed the needed for greater 
co-ordination in price determination between marketing boards, 
but offers the depressing advice that: 
" ••••• the cyclical movements of prices cannot be predicted, or 
ignored when they occur." (I) 
... 
So that the possibilities for effective co-ordination would seem 
to be extremely limited. As usual, therefore, the Commission is 
torn between earnest advice and the practical difficulties of 
centralised decision making. 
7.6.10 OVer the years, official thinking has responded to a 
wide variety of practical problems. Always, the 'solution' to 
these problems has been found in terms of greater control and 
increased centralisation - import controls, price fixing, quotas, 
co-operatives. Recently, there is evidence of a subtle change in 
emphasis away from a discussion of problems of absolute price 
levels to a consideration of relative price levels. There may be 
two reasons for this. Firstly, since World War II, agricultural 
prices have generally been stable at a fairly high level, creating 
the imp~sign that marketing boards have been effective in achieving 
their objectives. This is largely il}u.29.!=:Y. World prices in many 
products appear to have closely approximated local prices in 
significant products, so that marketing boards have seldom been 
called upon to test their strength against market forces. 
7. 6. l l Secondly, the problems of price co-ordination have come 
to attract increasing attention. As usual, it is believed that 
greater centralisation in decision making will lead to increased 
efficiency, while the realisation that the boards are, in a sense, 
competing with each other for the custom of the farmer may also 
play a role. _____ . ___________________________ , _____________________ _.: _____________ , __________ _ 
(!) UG48/1949, p.23. 
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7. 6. I 2 While the case for increasing centralisation is no stronger 
now than it was in the 1930s, we are subject to the dangerous 
illusion that marketing boards have proved to be effective. 
some of the gloomier forecasts of the 1930s have not yet come true, 
there is little to suggest that the boards have solved any real 
problems. An equal cause for concern is the lack of any serious 
analytical foundation illustrated in the official documentation. 
It appears economics has been called upon to provide supportive 
arguments to policy measures already decided, rather than to 
supply techniques in an objective way. It is understandable, 
though unfortunate, that economists succumb to.this temptation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 
8 • I INTRODUCTION 
8. 1 • 1 Previous chapters have examined aspects of State 
intervention in agriculture. It was argued in Chapter 3 that 
no theoretical basis exists to justify State intervention in 
agriculture. There is no reason to suppose on economic grounds 
that agriculture is a special case~ ~~ny of the 'explanations' 
for this instability are inadequate and often mutually contradictory. 
In particular, such simple-minded models as the 'cobweb' and 
'rectangular hyperbola' model, whilst they may illustrate certain 
economi~ concepts, are as practical tools of policy so misleading 
as to be positively dangerous. 
8. I • 2 The question of State subsidisation of agriculture was 
examined in Chapter 4. Again, no case can be found to justify 
subsidies. It was argued that the net 'welfare loss' arising from 
these subsidies is less than is sometimes suggested, but equally, the 
long term effectiveness of subsidies is likely to be relatively 
small, the value of the subsidy simply being capitalised into 
returns to fixed factors. 
8. I. 3 Official policy documents were examined. It was argued 
in Chapter 6 that, from the economic point of view, the argwnents 
used are seriously inadequate. There appears to be a disturbing 
tendency to misuse economic arguments to support a particular point 
of view. The conclusions having been reached, economic tools are 
invoked to justify them. In formulating agricultural policy in 
South Africa, political forces have overruled economic analysis. 
This is not td argue that 
judgement would be beyond 







necessarily bad - such a 
this thesis. But it can 
c1:1oice. has been made to 
l 5 0 
sacrifice efficiency as measured by value of output in return for 
other social and political objectives. 
8.1.4 A. particular feature of official doctrine in South Africa 
is the belief that markets are inherently unstable and, therefore, 
State intervention is justified to achieve stability. (l) The 
possibilities of centralised price control were examined in Chapter 
5. A technique for specifying agricultural supply functions was 
suggested, but difficulties were encountered in estimating satisfactory 
price response models. Thus central control would seem to rest 
ultimately upon the intuition and judgement of policy makers. 
8. 1.5 The results of this form of control were examined in 
Chapter S. Certain empirical evidence was presented. Our task 
in this chapter is to examine these results in an attempt to 
provide a general explanation for observed behaviour. 
8. I • 6 Participants in the Marketing Act debate in the 1930s 
made a number of predictions clearly derived from their particular 
perspective as economists. Orthodox economic theory was used as 
a basis for predictions regarding the future beqaviour of economic 
variables. It was not their objective to e:x.-pand the frontiers of 
economic theory. They were not testing the theory 
using it as a basis for their policy arguments. 
they were 
8. 1.7 Forty years later, however, our intention must be rather 
different. We are concerned with the predictive value of the 
theory they were using. To what extent were theil'.' fon~casts valid? 
Having assembled the data and reviewed the historical evidence 
------------------------------------------------------------~-----·------------
(1) See for example, S J Terreblanche, 'Policy Objectives and Priorities 
in the South African Economy, 1 in Public Policy and the South African 
· 'Ec6n6my, ed. by M L Truu (Cape Town: OUP, 1976), p. 52: ' ...•• the 
market mechanism has a tendency to be unstable; price and income 
fluctuations are typical features of a market economy. It cannot 
therefore be denied that the government has an active role to play 
in a modern market economy.' 
l 
J ;. 
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we can now match the predictions with the observations to discover 
how well the theory has stood up to the test of time. 
8. 1 . 8 It is clear that dorninan t in the thinking of the economists 
was the theory of monopoly. (l) Richards quotes with approval the 
suggestion of Robbins: 
"Monopolistic bodies without _statutory powers may well 
be restrained from great exploitation of their position 
by the fear of potential competition. It is not so clear 
that restraints of this sort will dictf~1 the policy of 
monopolies backed by State authority." 
8.1.9 Not only would a monopoly situation exist (ie - the model 
was applicable), but the power would be used, (3) and, as the 
quotation from.Robbins makes clear, was more likely to be used by 
a State organisation tha}'by a private firm. 
I\ 
8.1.10 Other predictions were made: increased production of 
unwanted products, C4) increased costs of production, distributive 
margins and prices, (5) possible corruption, (6) chaos, bad organisation 
and lack of co-ordination between boards, heavy losses to the State 
1 









See C S Richards, 'Subsidies, Quotas, Tariffs and the Excess Cost 
of Agriculture in South Africa,' SAJE 3 (1935), p.397. Also 
C S Richards, 'The "New Despotism" in Agriculture,' SAJE 4 (1936) ,pp.469-504, 
p. 503 and R Leslie, et al. 'Economists' Protest: Marketing Act 
1937, Scheme Relating to Marketing of Wheat,' SAJE 6 (1938), 
pp. J 8 7, J 90 • . 
· (T d n • Mac mil Ian, 1934) • • · The G•._·e-<>t Depres._sion .._,on o • Lionel RoboJ.ns,. ~ 
p. 139. 
R ~eslie et al. (1938), p.190. 
~-= 
c s Richards (1936), p.503. . . 
. ~~ 98 CS Richards (1936), p.503, R Leslie 
CSR1chards(19.JJ),p. 3 ' . P d~·and.MaizeMarketing 
ot al. 'Economists' Protest: Dairy ro uce. , 
s~hernes: Memorandum of Objectives,' SAJE 6 (19381, p.25. 
R Leslie et al., (1938 (b)), PP· 24 • 28 · 
CS ii~hards (1975), p.398, CS Richards (1936), p.503. 
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8. 2 THE THEORY OF MONOPOLY 
8.2. l The question of monopoly demands careful handling. 
We can easily see why the monopoly model appeared to be appropriate 
and useful to the economists of the 1930s. In terms of the Marketing 
Act, the maize, wheat and dairy boards were given powers which 
( 1) 
amounted to those of a monopoly. In addition, the majority of 
the board members were producers and a simple assumption of 
self interest would appear to lead to the prediction that they 
wouldattempt to achieve the highest possible producer price. 
It was true that the·Minister of Agriculture was to have overall 
control, but this was not s'een as an important factor, partly 
because the range of his duties i;~as so great that he could not 
effectively fulfil them all. (2) Besides, he could be expected 
to favour the producers in any event because of the dominant 
political influence of the rural electorate. And as a matter of self 
interest, he was himself a farmer. 
8.2.2 A comparison of the results and the predictions of the 
economists 
(3) 
suggests that their forecasts in this respect have 
not been very accurate and the ·question needs to be posed why 
this is so. 
8.2.3 To answer this question we need to return and review 
monopoly theory with some care. It is clear that, as Downs (4) 
has suggested, mon?poly theory yields useful predictions only 
because of specific ownership arrangements. The conventional 
(1) It should be noted,., that control over total output, normally 
associated with monopoly, did not apply. Nevertheless, the Boards 
could effectively control the quantity marketed, so the difference 
was not, therefore, a very important one. 
(2) CS Richards (1936), pp.487-8. 
(3) See Chapte~ 5. 
(4) A Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: iiarper and Row, 
195 7) , Ch. 2 .. 
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textbook theory of monopoly (single seller, etc.) needs to be 
more carefully defined. Implicit in the theory is the assumption 
that the decision maker also owns the fixed factors. Property 
rights are clearly defined. Given this particular arrangement, the 
mvner of the fixed factors can be expected to operate the firm 
. d. h (I) h in the way pre icted by monopoly ti eory. In ot er words, 
given our profit maximisation assumptions, we can test whether 
our assumption regarding property rights is correct. (ie - nsing 
profit levels as a indicator of the existence of a monopoly). 
Alternatively, if we know the. property rights situation, we can 
test the profit maximisation assumption. 
8.2.4 It follows from this 'property rights' view of monopoly 
that, since monopoly can be shown to be undesirable from a welfare 
point of view and since the behaviour of the monopolist is a 
function of both property rights and the utility function of the 
monopolist, there are two possible ways to deal with the problem. 
We might try to change his utility function by persuading him to 
'stop being selfish,' a policy which, as Downs has suggested, (2) 
is unlik~ly to be successful (ie - tastes are relatively fixed). 
Or we can attempt to change property rights, via regulations, 
taxation, etc. This latter approach is, of course, the normal 
procedure adopted. 
8.2.5 It is clear, however, that the predictions of the monopoly 
model rest on the twin assumptions of human nature and property 
rights. Tt is to these assumptions that we must look if we wish 
to understa11d the failure of the rnon.op·oly model to yield useft:l 
predictions of the behaviour of marketing boards. 
(I) This would be the case even if the owner had, say, a very high 
leisure preference. It this case it would be rational to sell 
the firm, intern.J.lising the rents and the new owner would have to 
operate in a monopolistic fashion to less normal profits. Sec 
J M Buchanan & G Tullock, 'The "Dead Hand" of Monopoly,' Anti trust Law 
arid Economic Revi_ew 1(4) (1968), pp.85-96, 
(2) See Downs, op. cit., pp.282-3. 
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8.2.6 As far as the utility function is concerned, it is correct, 
thuugh tautological, to s1Jggest that the members of the boards 
make choices consistent with their utility functions. It is not 
operationally useful, however, nor directly empirically testable, 
since it is actions which reveal utility fu..rictions, not the other 
way round. Observing actions is the only way to deduce information 
about utility functions. 
8.2.7 An attempt to investigate the utility functions of 
marketing board members is likely to be an unrewarding task, 
however. Though utility functions may, for reasons of analytice.l 
simplification, often be assumed given (the consumer has_ given 
tastes, etc.), in fact, realistically, they are not exogenous, 
but are themselves functions of other factors. We might 'suggest, 
as a reasonable approximation, however, that a high producer price 
is an important or even dominant variable in the utility functions 
of most producers. 
8.2.8 Property rights offers a more fruitful field for 
investigation, therefore, since we can only understand actions 
if we understand the constraints on those actions. This point 
has .been very well explained by Sowell. (I) 
"Since theory is meant to predict what emerges, it 
cannot proceed by aggregating or averaging the perceptions 
or behaviour of the individual actors in the drama, but 
only be seeking to construct the constraining relation-
ships which lead their mutual pulling and tugging to 
produce one result rather than another." 
In the case of marketing boards, we have a clear case of the 
separation of ownership from control •. The people who make the 
price decision are no~ the same as those who make the production 
decision and, crucially, there is no direct relationship betwe~n 
the decision and the rewards accruing to the decision makers. 
This means that the conventional micrott..models, based on important -/ 
but usually implicit assumptions reg'arding a coincidence of decision 
-----·--"-.:.---~---~-.:....---...;.-...:...----------------------------------------------------
(1). T Sowell; Say's Law (Princc.:ton UP, 1972), p.231. 
j 
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making and ownership, are simply no longer applicable. In the 
absence of ownership over resources, decision makers no longer 
maximise their utility in the simple way predicted by ec.ouomic 
theory, so that although a high producer price may be important 
to producer members, it is not necessarily their only objective. 
Other objectives are clear - leisure preference, the desire for 
stability, the desire to avoid adverse public criticism, etc. 
8.2.9 If, therefore, in terms of economic theory, the behaviour 
of marketing boards is difficult to understand, it is because 
'economic theories of government .•••• universally fail to 
assign any motives to the men in government.' (l) This is an 
important failing and is increasingly recognised as such as 
government activity spreads to cover an ever widening area of 
economic activity. (2) Once motives are assigned, in particular 
the· obvious motive of self interest, a framework starts to fall 
into piace within which we can examine the behaviour of marketing 
boards. 
8. 3. · THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
8. 3. 1 Much of the investigation of the activities of government 
has taken place in the United States, where government intervention 
in the economy often takes the form of 'regulatory agencies.' 
Exactly what these agencies have been doing is a matter of some 
dispute. Ostensibly, their function is to protect the p•..:blic against 
the adverse effects of monopoly. (3 ) 
(1) Downs, op. cit., p.282. 
(2) 'Perhaps one fifth of the US national income originates irr industries 
subject to some direct regulations and yet economists know very 
little about hm·T regulation affects the market performance of 
an industry.' RE Caves, 'Direct Regulation and Market Performance 
in the American Economy,' AER 54 ( 1964), pp .172-191, p. 172. 
(3) See R A Posner, 'Taxation by Regulation,' Bell Journal oi: Economics 
and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971), pp.22-50, p.22. 
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8.3.2 The case of falling costs or 'natural monopoly' is 
recognised as a theoretical justification for government intervention 
of this sort. In this respect, the situation in the United States 
does not parallel the South African experience. No one has ever 
attempted to justify marketing boards on the basis of falling 
average costs. In addition, other structural differences exist 
which could be expected to cause significant differences between 
the behaviour of American regulatory agencies as compared to Sooth 
African marketing boards. For example, regulatory agency board 
members are appointed, not from special interest groups, but, 
ostensibly, from those who have no particular liability or debt 
to any of the interested parties. They are enjoined to behave in 
a non-partisan manner. (I) In the case of the South African 
marketing boards, of course, members are appointed specifically 
to represent special interests (producers, millers, etc.). In 
South Africa,. however, policy makers receive the same advice 
regarding non-partisan pricing policies. (2) Other similarities 
exist. Th~ experience in the United States is that 'there is 
~nlikely to be effective organisation of the ••••. consumers as 
a group,' (3) which seems to parallel the South African e:iqlerience. 
8.3.3 Closer examination reveals other striking similarities. 
It seems to be the case that natural monopoly is not, in fact, the 
explanation for the use of regulation in the USA (though it may be 
the ostensible justification for it). Regulation occurs not to 
protect the consumer against unbridled monopoly power, but rather 
at the instigation of the regulated firms themselves. It is often 
a cheap (and legal) way to operate a cartel. (4) It would seem to 
':"--·-------·--------------------·----------------------------------------------------
(1) See M Russell and RB Shelton, 'A Model of Regulatory Agency 
Behaviour,' Public Choice 20 (SuTill!1er 1968), pp.47-62. 
(2) Report of· the Cormnission of Enquiry into the Marketing Act, 
(Act No. 59 of 1968), RP39/1976). 
(3) See Russell and Shelton (1968), p.50. 
(4) See G Tullock, 'Regulating the Regulators, 1 ia Government Controls 
arid the Free Market, ed. by S Pejovich (Texas AMf University Press, 
-1976), pp.144-146. - See also Posner (1971), p,22, "Regulation is 
procured by politi:--.ally effective groups, assumed to be composed of 
n1embers of the regd.ated industry itself, fo:i:: the own protection.! 
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be possible to find parallels here. between these explanations of 
regulatory authorities and the often expressed need for South 
African farmers to combine. 
8.3.4 Thus it would seem that the parallels, while not exact, 
are at least close enough to demand attention. In any event, a 
good theory of government activity should be able to explain 
both types of institution wfrh some degree of precision, so there 
are advantages in comparing institutions which are sufficiently 
differe~t to provide a good test for the theory. 
8. 4. .THE THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY 
8. 4. 1 It may be as well, before turning to the literature on 
US regulated industries, to consider briefly the conventional 
justifications for State intervention. Just as orthodox micro-
economics embodies implicit assumptions regarding ownership, 
property rights, etc., it also embodies certain assumptions about 
the motivations of bureaucrats and the functioning of the executive 
arm of the State. 1 In the Pigouvian tradition, the bureaucrat is 
both informed and incorruptible, in the Coase framework, he is 
ignorant and incorruptible.' (l) It was this belief in the efficiency 
of government relative to the free market which led to the theoretical 
argument in favour of regulation - a comparison of an imperfect 
(though technically efficient) free market system as opposed to 
costless and fully informed government intervention - an argument 
which was analytically sound though unsatisfactory in pract.ice. (Z) 
----------------------------------------·~~--·-·--------------------------------·--
(1) J M Buchanan, 'The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State,' 
Natural Resources Journal 13 (1973), p.592. 
(2) This approach, though simplistic, had the advantage of being 
clear-cu~, at least in theory. The realisation tha~ we are 
comparing two inefficient forms of operation leads to much more. 
difficult analytical problems. See RH Cease, 1 The Problem of 
Social Cost,' Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960), p.18. 
See also J W McKie, 1 Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem 
of Social Cost,' Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 




'There is no reason to believe that government reaches 
perfect solutions either. The number of cases w'here 
economists have argued that th2 market is imperfect ar.d 
therefor.e recomrnended that government should deal with 
the problem is very large . • . . . They· assumed that 
government reaches a perfect solution. No one really 
believes this, but economists frequently recorrnnend 
government action simply because the private market 
creates externalities and hence is not likely to function 
perfectly. This is clearly a mistake; we should 
compare the likely errors of both. in the real world and 
the use of the institution which will cause less · 
inefficiency, whether government or the market.' (1) 
Also, of course, the case for government intervention 
could only be made. in clearly defined circumstances. Government 
regulation was only justifiable in cases of 'natural monopoly.' 
Government was only justified in cases where property rights were 
ill-defined. There was no case for government intervention to recon-
cile ·or mediate between ditferent interests ~ only the market could 
do that. Clearly, however, South African marketing boards can be 
justified on neither of these grounds. 
8. 5 . THEORIES OF REGULATION 
8. 5. l Before we can evaluate government intervention in the 
economy we need to know what the objectives of this intervention 
are. Otherwise the discussion becomes pointless. In practice, 
however, it is often difficult to know what regulatory authorities 
are supposed to be doing since their terms of reference are so vague • 
. ~ As Caves has argued, "To put it mildly, the hierarchy of economic 
objectives pursued by a regulatory commission are often unclear from 
its decisions and authorising legislci.tioQ. At best, a list of 
regulatory objecti.v~s will b'e disce.r:nible, tut not the weigl1ts 
1 d h " ( 
2) Th. . 1 . .,. p ace upon t ..em. is appears to oe a genera view. \·Jhat. 
the regulatory commissions are trying to do is difficult to discover; 
what effect these commissions actually have is, to a large exte:i.t. 
---------------------------~--------------------------------------------------
( I) 
( ,.., \ .{_) 
G Tullock, The Vote Motive, Institute of Economics Affairs, 
Occasional Papers, p.6. 
See RE Caves, (1964), p.10, p.174 . 
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k h n it can be discovered, it is often absurd." (J) u:n nown; w e 
8.5.2 The problem with evaluating government is that even 
when objectives are explicit they are so broad and general - and 
oft2n, in fact, conflicting - that evaluation is difficult. 
·what is needed is a theory to explain the behaviour of these 
organisations in a satisfactory and empirically refutable way . 
. (2) . . r-. 
Tullock has discussed three broad 'schools of thoug~ in the 
behaviour of regulatory agencies in the USA. These are: 
; (3) 
a). Unbudgeted income transfer 
b) Random behaviour C4) 
c) Maximising the well-being of members of the board (S) 
These three approaches may be briefly su!Il!I'.a.rised: 
8.5.3 Posner argues that 'One of the functions of regulation 
is to perform distributive and allocative chores usually associated 
with the taxing or financial branch of government.'. ( 6) "Regulation,' 
he argues, 'is a method of public taxation and expenditure.' (l) 
8.5.4 Wilson's findings are in close agreement with a pa.th-
breaking study by Stigler and Friedland (3) on electric utilities. 
They argued that regulation in this sector had no observable 
effect when compared with performance in a comparable unregulated 
sector of the industry. They attributed this to the difficulty of 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
(1) RH Coase, Discussion on three papers, AER 54 (1964), p.194. See 
also R C Cramton, 'The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation - a 
Legal View,' AER54 (1964), pp.182-191 for a similar view. 
(2) G Tullock, 'Regulating the Regulators,' op. cit_., p. 146. 
(3) RA Posner (1971). 
(4) J Q Wilson, 'The "Dead Hand!I of Regulation,' The Public Interest 
33 (Fall 1971), pp.39-58. 
(5) J F Chant and K Acheson, 'The Choice of Monetary Instruments and 
the Theory of Bureaucracy,' Public Choice 12 (Spring 1972), 
pp. 13-23. 
(6) RA Posner (1971), p.23. 
(7) RA Posner (1971), p.29, 
(8) G Stigler and C Friedland, 'w1hat can Regulator.s Regulate? The Case 
of Electricity,' Jo1_:rnal of Law and Economics 5 ( 1962) 
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obtaining satisfactory information on which to base decisions and 
the absence of monopoly power (ie - competition from other energy 
s~urces). Wilson makes the important point that lack of specific 
rules is an advantage to regulatory agencies - it provides them 
with more arbitrary power to deal with specific cases. 
8.5.5 Chant and Acheson argue that agencies are 'concerned 
with prestige and self-preservation.' ( l) Consistent with this 
desire to avoid conflict and criticism is the fact that they 
provide confusing and ambiguous information about their own 
behaviour. Ambiguity is an important part of their image. The 
authors argue that. rules are better than allowing a wide degree of. 
discretion to regulatory agencies. 
8.5.6 The parallel with our findings in the case of South 
Africa would appear to be simple and direct. We can point to 
cases of income transfer - in fact, any deviation of local prices 
from world prices indicates an income transfer, intentional or 
otherwise. It is also clear that self-advertisement is not 
characteristic of the boards, though occasionally it is in their 
interests to establish some sort of public image. Producer members 
may find it useful.to appear as champions of their own particular 
interest groups. In general, however, they keep a low public 
profile. 
8.5.7 The 'random behaviour' argument may perhaps be re-
specified as neutral behaviour in the South African context. This 
was roughly what we discovered in the case of some of the boards 
investigated. 
8.5.8 Let us examine the 'neutral behaviour' argunEnt a little 
more closely. It is, a£ter all, somewhat surprising that, given 
the formidable array of powers, they should behave in this neutral 
( 2) . 1 1 . . . way, par.ticu ar y since they derive their pow12rs not from the 
(1) J F Chant ar:.d K Acheson (1972), p.14. 
I 
(2) This applies in particular to the maize and meat boards. 
« 
' 
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uncertainties of the market, but from the State which, as Stigler 
! • h ' ( 1) has noted, has one basic resource - t ,e power to coerce. 
8 .5 .. 9 'Neutral behaviour' perhaps becomes. more explicable 
if we consider the problems faced by the board in making its 
decision. Output is clearly a function of numerous factors of which 
only the price of that product is in the hands of the board. 
Weather, costs, natpral hazards and the decisions of individual 
farmers are not. Most importantly, the prices of substitutes in 
production (and even complements) are often beyond their control 
(eg - sunflowers, in the case of maize). In other cases, of course, 
it is not so. The wheat board is a clear example of this anci it 
is clear that policies in this case have been directed to maintaining 
a constant ratio between the prices of the various winter cereals. 
Apart from this problem, an important fact overlooked during the 
1930's ~debate, is that the boards are, in effect, in competition 
with each other. (Z) This affords some protection to consumers 
since it constrains boards in raising prices. It would, therefore, 
appear that, in this kind of situation, following a firm line of 
policy, particularly against what might be described as 'norinal' 
market forces, would be extremely difficult. 
8.5.10 A further important factor was not considered during 
the debate of the 1930s. With the exception of vegetables, which 
significantly are not controlled, few agricultural products are 
sold directly to the consumer. (3) Most undergo further processing 
and (an important point) are often sold to other farmers (eg - a$ 
cattle food). Thot.igh clearly consumers may be a diffuse, disorganised 
--··---------------------------------------------------------------·-----·-·- ... -·-------
( J) G Stigler, 11'he Theory of Economic Regulation,' Bell Journal o[ 
Economics and Management Science 2(1) (Spring 1971), p.4. 
(2) The relationship between boards was noted as posing a problem of 
co-ordination during the 1930's debate, but the relationship between 
boards was not seen as a competitive one. The suggest.ion of the 
importanc.e of competition between boards is supported by Downs (1957). 
'Every large organisation is in partial conflict with every other 
social agent it deals with.' (Ch.17). 
(3) See R G Noll, 'Refocming _E~~latio~-. Studies in the Regulation of 
Economic Activicy,'The Bookings Institution (1971), p.73. --
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group, the food processing industry is probably re&sonably powerful 
and gro~ing more so. This is not, of course, a cause for con-
gratulation. It leads though, to two possible conclusions. If 
continuous clashes are to be avoided, some modus vivendi needs to 
be established. Indeed, it is more likely to be established 
anyway, since costs of reaching agreement are likely to fall as 
the size of the group falls as are the costs of arranging 
a conspiracy. (l) 
8.5.11 We recall CS Richard's prediction regarding conspiracy 
' . (Z) d . . 1 h . . f h ana corruption, an it is c ear t_at opportl.h~ities or sucl 
arrangements exist, particularly at the rather indistinct boundary 
between regulation and private enterprise. (3) 
8.5.12 J.3.eturning to th_e.economist's predictions, 'unwanted 
products' are difficult to define. If we mean 'more than the 
equilibrium quantity,' then the answer may be 'yes,' though we 
have argued that if this is so, the results are not as costly as 
Richards argued. Distribution costs are, of course, more difficult 
to assess because we are asking a counter-factual question here -
had the marketing boards not existed - or had some other form of 
regulation existed - would distribution costs have been lower? 
./ 
We cannot, of course, answer this question because different 
arrangements for distribution would lead to different quality of 
service as well as different costs. It is clear that pressures 
exist on both the maize and wheat boards to keep producer prices 
high and consumer prices low. Crossf...country corr:parisons of costs 
are not useful in this case since, of course, the physical distance 
of farms to markets differs. In the United States, for example, 
-Ii 
distance.s are much greater, but so also ·may be ec.onor.:iies of scale 
in transportati.on, so it is not clear what so;:t of conclusions one 
--------------·----------------------------------------~-------·------------- ... -----
(l) :F H Westfield, 1 Regulation and Conspiracy,' AER 55 (1965), pp.424-L,43. 
(2) CS Richards (1936), p.502. 
(3) See J W McKie ( 1970) . 
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could draw from available data. Nevertheless, the American 
experience seems to suggest that the operation on the free market 
does not pose insuperable obstacles to efficient distribution. 
Comparison of, say, meat packing and marketing arrangements in 
the USA with South Africa suggest that the meat marketing board 
may have held up innovation. Again, how would one measure this? 
To the extent that existing capital is producing less than it could 
per unit of output, this is a net loss to the community. To the 
extent that investment has been channelled elsewhere, the loss has 
to be offset against the production gained in other (though 
presumably less productive) uses. 
8.5.13 Failure there has not been, chaos occasionally, but this, 
of course, is a relative term. We are, after all, comparing two 
imperfect systems. Excess inventories and miscalculations, of course, 
occur in both systems. The fact that rewards are directly tied to 
success in prediction in the free market system suggests ' that 
performance is likely to be greater in this regime. As was shown 
in Chapter 6, there is no apparent reason to suppose that the 
centralisation of decision making leads to increased performance. 
The reverse is likely to be the case. 
8.5.14 On the question of co-ordination, the prediction of the 
economists would seem to have been proved correct. The current 
philosophy is to reduce the number of marketing boards to improve 
co-ordination. Chapter 6 discussed practical problems of co-
ordination and suggested that rn practice, the possibilities were 
limited. Reducing the number of marketing boards is more likely 
to reduce competition than to imp=ove co-ordination. This tendency 
towards centralisation was noted abcve. (l) It is clear that, 





8. 6. I It would seem therefore, bro~dly, that our findings 
regarding the behaviour of South African marketing boards are 
consistent with observations of similar reg,ulatory organisations in 
the United States. The difficulties of the investigation have been 
much the same - to discover what they have been doing, and secondly, 
to interpret their behaviour. To pass judgement on their performance 
is more difficult since we do.not know what they~are really supposed 
to have been doing - what 'success indicators' (l) are we to use? 
8.6.2 There would seem to be something more that we can say. 
At the beginning of the chapt·er we m<:!ntioned the need to produce 
some theory, empirically testable, to account for the behaviour of 
t.hese organisations - otherwise one is left in the unsatisfactory 
position of simply describing their behaviour - a procedure which 
amounts to an acceptance of the hypothesis that organisations are 
beyond rational explanation - 'politics are imponderab.le.' (Z) 
While it is true that we have the useful tautology that members of 
boards benave to maximise their own utility and although this is a 
useful corrective to the belief that regulatory organisations ca.n 
be expected to act in the 'public interest' (though it does not 
contradict or deny the. possibility that they might - a well-designed 
system would allow utility maximisation of board members to co-
incide with the public interest), it. does not seem to yield useful 
predictions. We would anticipate that the behaviour of the boards 
will vary as the inunediate constraints on their actions vary. It 
would be diffici1lt to devise a test to disprove this. 
------------------- ..__ ---------______ , _____________________ ---------------- ___ ,,_ __ -
(1) This term was used by Noll (1971), p.40, who discusses a similar 
p:rcblem, 
{2) G J Stigler ( 1971). Similar views are e:-~pressed by N Perlman; 
"It is after all very embarrassing for the economist always to r1ave. 
to reply: 'That depends on political decisions, 1 whenever he is 
asked to predict economic events." 
Corrnnentary 3 (1977), p.64. 
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8.6.3 A useful way to observe or to understand the behaviour 
of government agencies may be to interpret their behaviour in terms 
of a 'Golden Rule.' One would argue that regulatory authorities 
find a 'golden rule' or a rule of thumb and stick to it. Having 
been given confusing and often contradictory guidelines to follow, 
it would seem to be sensible for them to choose some simple rule 
of thumb to follow. If the rule is well chosen, the organisation 
appears to function efficiently. (I) 
8.6.1+ There is nothing inherently bad about such a procedure, 
of course. Indeed, from the point of view of the decision makers, 
it is highly desirable, since it reduces their costs in terms of 
time spent studying and understanding and interpreting the hundreds 
of variables relevant to a decision on, say, the maize price. 
Though it reduces costs to the decision makers, it does not reduce 
costs to the organisation as a whole. It is necessary to conceal 
the fact that such a simple rule is being followed, partly because, 
as Coase has suggested, the rule may actually be absurd (2) and 
partly because it is important for the prestige of all parties to 
maintain committees, a lexge research department, survey teams and 
top level discussions - this is, after all, part of the psychic 
income cf the board members. 
8.6.5 The advantages of the Golden Rule theory are that it 
-
is empirically testable and appears to be consistent with much of 
the available evidence. 
8.6.6 Wilson's argument that behaviour 1.S 'r2ndom1 may simply 
mean that the rule is there, but he has not disco~ered it. In tha 
-------.. --------------------------~--------------·-·--------- ---·------·-~------- --- -
( l) 
' (2) 
Ideally, the rule should be independent of their own actions. Thus, 
cost-plus would be a bad rule to follow (See Appendix 3 ) whereas 
world prices would be a useful guideline. Similarly, a central 
bank might decide to increase the money supply by ;:;_ steady, say, 
5% per annum. This would be better than 'last year's inflation rate 
plus 5%,' a policy that would be likely to prove inflationary. 
See p. 159. 
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case of the Stigler and Friedland investigation, the rule is 
presillnably to set the price level at the same level as comparable 
companies in the .free market sector. Hence, economists who interpret 
the data would obviously conclude that regulatory authorities do 
nothing - not because they are unable to, but because they choose 
not to, 
8.6.7 The analysis of Russell and Shelton is, of course, only 
understandable in terms of a 'golden rule' style of operation. 
As they themselves explain, "The analysis is limited to the rate-
of-return on base rate regulations of firms which provide utility 
services under conditions of controlled entry." (I) Once the rule 
is explicit, in other words, behaviour becomes understandable. 
8.6.8 We can find other evidence to support the hypothesis that 
organisations, rather than try to disentangle and interpret an 
infinite number of economic signals, resort to the 'simple rule' 
approach. It has been suggested that Soviet planners follow this 
(2) 
sort of approach. As further evidence, we would expect the 
early years of regulatory agencies to be marked by mistakes and 
erratic behaviour. · This may, of course, be due to decision maker! ~ 
learning new jobs, but could be explained in terms of the 'golden 
rule' theory by the fact that the organisation has not yet defined 
a suitable rule to follow. Naively, the decision makers may even 
be trying to follow their confusing instructions. 
8.6.9 Chant and Acheson's remark that the explanations of the 
rJ..'{- orgafilnlsatiods behaviour put out by the organisation itself must be 
·V 
ambiguous, is interesting. It is necessary, of course, to conceal 
the rule. It might seem that if, in fact, 'organisations do simply 
follow a rule-of-thumb in determining their actions, it would be 
- - - -~ ---------..,..-------- ..---------------·------------------------·---------------
( l) 
( ')' .-1 
M Russell and RB Shelton (1968), p.47. 
See P Craig Roberts, Marx's Theory _"of Exchange, Alienation and 
··crisis (Hoover. Institution Press, Stanford, 1973). 
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better for them to be provided with a specific rule to follow 
rather than have them evolve it for themselves. Such a suggestion 
would be quite useless, however. No political consensus could be 
reached on the rule which the organisation should follow. Indeed, 
it is precisely because of this lack of consensus that regulatory 
organisations are established in the first place. 
8.6. 10 One might, however, tentatively, suggest some golden 
rules for establishing the 'Golden Rule.' 
i) The variable chosen as the datum should be independent 




Ideally, it should be a variable determined by the 
free market to minimise strains and distortions as 
much as possible 
Ideally, it should be a relatively stable variable. 
If this interpretation is correct, we are forced to view 
recent literature favouring market intervention policies in a more 
sceptical light~ It is always possible, of course, to make one 
person better off at the expense of somebody else. Further, when 
two parties engage in trade, we can conclude that they do so because 
both parties expect to benefit. If a third party is engaged to 
oversee this trade, if he has coercive powers, privileged access 
to information and functions with altruism, then both trading parties 
may be better off than they would be in the absence of the third. 
party. On such foundations recent theoretical work is based. 
8 .6. 12 These simplifications (which are, of course, readily 
acknowledged by the authors of many recent models) may not matter 
much if the models are seen as mathematical toys; but one imagines 
that they are intended to be something more than that. Though they 
are largely abstract from political factors, they are designed to 
provide some sort of representation of the real world. Yet political 
d~cision making is the essence of marketing boards. They are step-
children of the political process. The market provides a certain 
distribution of wealth, This is judged to be unsatisfactory by 
certain powerful interest groups and a markedng board is established. 
to attempt to provide a different.one. If the South African ex-




maximise economic welfare. They are intended to re-distribute it -
thou'gh in this way they may not be as successful as the architects 
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APPENDIX 2 
NUMBER OF STAFF EMPLOYED AND SALARIES PAID BY 




White em- .. White 
White White ployees Total (R) (R) 
31 33 64 142 926 15 796 
10 2 12 55 056-44 1 500 
15 1 16 82 686-93 1 023-31 
86 116 202 362 348-75 101 467-06 
5 1 6 39 966-73 284 
2 1 3 2 252-42 75 
143 18 161 673 895-07 15 002 
4 4 15 331 
67 15 82 307 014 17 305 
318 39· 357 1 293 980-64 36 246-77 
43 5 48 203 085-30 5 137-50 
53 99. 152 355 641-74 108 550-03 
379 115 494 1 638 027 123 682 
7 7 42 575-57 
4 18 .22 22 875-28 8 733 
169 46 215 935 365 58 387 
19 52 132 203 99 846 74 222 
315 64 379 1 581 602 31 669 
197 120 317 954 851 99 977 
37 10 47 232 343 
,., 860 L. 
10 2 12 63 039 2 062-80 
, 1 















1 330 227-41 
208 222-80 
464 191-74 





1 613 271 




9 885 511 
Hansard, 11th February, 1975. 
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INFLATION INDEXED PRICE SUPPORTS 
In a recent issue of the AJAE Harris (1) describes a model illustrati.ng 
the effect on land values of a certain form of price support policy. 
The model shows that under a defined set of conditions land values may 
rise rapidly, sometimes indeed explosively. 
The model, though relatively simple, serves well to illustrate a funda-
mental problem and it would be unproductive to criticise it on the basis 
of its van.ous simplifying assumptions. It might though legitimately 
be asked whether, given a rapidly rising support price Xt such as occurs 
when Y · = O. 70, farmers would continue to expect the price suggested in 
expression (11). 
This is, however, incidental to the main thrust of the model which is 
to illustrate the dangers of using costs as a method of establishing 
price. South Africa provides a useful case study in this respect. The 
price of maize has been set in recent years partly on the basis of cost 
data, while over the same period land values have risen extremely fast. 
Harris' model provides a credible explanation why this should be so. 
The model leaves several problems unresolved however, and these deserve 
careful attention, especially in view of the interest which this method 
of price fixing is apparently attracting in the United States. 
It would be unfortunate if the question of cost based price supports 
were to become confused with 'the question of inflation indexing. The 
two problems are conceptually quite different. The Harris model is 
presented as an 'inflation index' model, and yet inflation is not a 
necessary feature for its oper'.3-tion. Indeed,, in the numerical example 
provided (pp.492-3) it is assumed that inflation rate is zero (o = 1,00). 
A further feature· wl1ich is not obvious from the model is the nature of 
the factor markets. It is, in fact, a two factor model - land and 
1 operating costs' or variable factors. The assumption behind expression 
(l) Harris Inflation indexed price supports and land values, AJAE 59(3) 
(August 1977), pp. 489-495. 
(2) J A Sharples:" Adjusting Price Supports: Comparison of 
Alternative Hethods",AAEA Conference paper, San Diego 1977.· 
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(7) is that _agriculture is a price taker in the market for variable 
factors. Furthermore, the value of land is determined as a residual, 
once payment has been made for the variable factors. These are both 
perfectly acceptable assumptions, of course, but they need to be made 
explicit, since it implies that we are dealing with rather special 
kinds of factor markets. ' 
It is also quite clear, by reference to the numerical example that in 
this situation the only sensible value for Y
1 
is zero in a situation 
where all prices are stable. Any positive value implies a quite unjus-
tified increase in the value of land. 
The rule is more general than this, however. Since the value of land 
is determined exclusively by the value of output, it is quite unsound 
to incorporate the value of land as part of the basis for calculating 
output prices. An explosive, or at least a very rapid increase in land 
values, is likely to result. What Harris' model illustrates clearly is 
that the only possible value for y1which is consistent with sound policy 
is zero. · This argument applies with equal force to any factor with a 
perfectly inelastic supply curve. 
Let us consider·two cases of price increases: 
(1) The inflation case. If we consider a situation where 
all prices rise a•': the same rate, this is equivalent to ·multi-
plying expression (1) through by some fixed value. Since we 
are assuming that the rate of inflation affects all prices to 
the same extent, both Pt and C will be equally affected. R~L· 
t ' 
and consequently Vt will r~se by the same proportion. In real 
terms price ratios stay exactly the same. The argument is 
essentially a trivial one, the only q•_1estion being why it 
should be necessary to use this form of price fixing at all,. 
since the market achieves the same effect by itself. 
(2) A change in relative factor prices. This is a far 
more interesting case. Suppose that the general price level 
stays constant, but the price of one of the input factors 
changes. W~ are not forced to ask the fundamental question: 
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what is the object of our price fixing? Because if 
the product market was in equilibrium before the 
factor price increase, and if we allow this increase 
in production costs to raise our product price, then 
the product market will no longer be in equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if we do not, then farmers are 
worse off than before. The only justification for 
cost-based pricing is to preserve the capital value 
of the farmer's assets. 








S supply of variable factor 





To simplify the argument,_assume we are dealing with straight 
line supply and demand functions of known slopes. Assume the 
initial point is X(P1Q1). Now, the supply curve shifts to the 
left, causing the price to rise. The new point is W. Recalling 
that the residual, after paying for the variable factors, accrues. 
to land, the return to land has shrunk from ZP 1 X to ZKW. The 
.L 
problem is to compensate the farmer for this price increase. 
If we adopt the device of fully compensating the farmer for the 
price increase, we should increase the product price until D ' 
shifted over to D1 • The new equilibrium point would be R ancl 
net social cost would be illustrated by triangle RhTX. (Hallacl1) ) • 
-----------------------------------------------------------~---------------
(3) T D lfallace, Measures of Social Cost of Agricultural Programs, 
JFE 44 (1962), pp. 580-594. 
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The effect of this is to protect the farmer fully against 
all price increases (ZP
1
X = NLR), while the increase in 
product price itself tends to drive up the factor price 
the problem discussed in the Harris model. 
If the policy is to increase prod~ct prices to cover the 
increased cost of factor inputs, then point R is the new 
logical equilibrium point. 
Consider demand curve D". If the new demand curve were D" 
and if the price of the variable factor remained at OK, the 
farmer would be as well off because the return to land NKV = 
ZP1X. In fact, of course, if the demand curve were D", the 
new equilibrium point would be A, because as demand shifts 
from D to D", producers drive .the price up against themselves. 
It would seem to be reasonable for the price support agency 
to cover producers for the amount of the increase P1K. If 
they attempt to cover KL, however, the possibility exists 
of an explosive increase in the price of the factor. 
The ratio KL 
P1K 
AB 
1 tan BC = - ex 
tan ex + tan (J 
If agriculture is a price taker in the factor market, tan a = O, 
and the entire price increase is incorporated in the product 
price since AB = 1. The possibility of an explosive escallation 
BC 
in costs does not exist on the price taker assumption. As the 
supply function becomes steeper AB 
BC 0 
so that in the case of 
an inelastic factor input such as land, none of the price increase 
in the factor is incorporated in the product price. 
Point A is not, of course, an economically efficient point in 
any sense. The only point which satisfies the requirements of 
efficiency is W. Point A does have the advantage, though, that 
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farmers are compensated for the shift of the S curve to the 
left, but there is no possibility of the pricing system 
generating explosive increases. The return to land also 
declines, so that farmers are not totally shielded from the 
effects of the increased factor prices - the increased costs 
are simply apportioned between taxpayers and farmers in a 
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The farmer is assumed to be a price taker in the fertiliser market. 
· Assume he is in a situation of declining marginal productivity (given 










existing price of fertiliser 
marginal revenue product curve as farmer perceives 
it 
marginal revenue product curve as it really is 
quantity of fertiliser he will choose to use given 
his information 
social optimum quantity of fertiliser 
Using OV fertiliser the farmer expects total revenue of OABV. Actually 
he gets a total revenue of OCDV. Thus area ACDB = the 'pleasant sur-
prise' area. To persuade him to use the economically optimum quantity OW, 
we need to lower the price of fertiliser to OP11 • Then,total expendi-
ture on fertiliser = OP
11
EW (which may be more or less than OPBV) and 
his total revenue is OCFW. His net revenue is P11CFE. Had he been fully 
informed, his total use of fertiliser at price P1 would have been OW and 
total expenditure on fertiliser OP
1
FW. Thus the area P1P11FE represents 
the additional revenue which accrues to the farmer as a result of his 
ignorance. It is also a measure of the wealth transfer from tax payer 
to producer. Of course, the situation is not quite so simple. Though 
one farmer may be·a price taker in the fertiliser market, farmers as 
a whole are not. As Nieuwoudt points out: 
(The) 11 farmer 1 s share of the subsidy on fertiliser and the share 
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of the fertiliser manufacturer depend on the elasticity 
of demand for and supply of fertiliser. The more elastic 
the supply, the bigger the farmer's share and the more 
elastic the demand, the bigger the manufacturer's share." 
Nevertheless, the principle remains clear. 
(1) 
(1) w L Nieuwoudt, I Factor Subsidies and Certain Policy Implications' I 
Agrekon 11(3) (1972), pp.5-8, p.5. 
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APPENDIX 5 
THE COBWEB MODEL 
(a) THE SIMPLE COBWEB 
Mathematically, the cobweb model is normally specified as 
x s a + b Pt-1 
= c + d p 
t 
a< o b > 0 
c > 0 d < 0 
i.e. Demand is dependent on current price, whereas supply 
relates to a price one period previously, i.e. producers 
assume that the current price will continue. Assuming again 
that price is such as to clear the market at time t, 
a + b pt-1 = c + d p t 
a first order difference equation, which solves to 
where 
Po the initia.l price and P = (c-a) 
(b-J) 
-Clearly P is positive. If the initial price is the equilibrium 
price (i.e., P 
0 
= P), the first term on the right hand side 
zero; and the equilibrium price is maintained. 
In other cases, the important factor is the relative magnitude 
ofb and d. By assumption, b>o, <l<o, hence t.he price Pt will 
oscillate about its equilibrium value. If I bl< l d I , these 
oscillations will be damped and Pt will ultimately return to P. 
In the alternative case, lbl>ldj, and the oscillations will 
steadily increase, while i£ I b I = Id I• a constant. amplitude will 
be maintained. 
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(b) A variant of model assumes that production is lagged not 
one period, but z. As before, demand is determined by the 
current price level. 
.·.: 
Supply: x = a + bP s t-z a<o, b>o 
Demand: c > o, d < 0 
Assuming that the price clears the market. 
x 
s 
and the equations solve to 
a very similar result to model (a), and the same conclusions 
may be derived regarding the behaviour of the price level under 
different values of b and d. 
(c) The above models imply a fairly rigid response of production 
to prices. Demand and supply are both directly linked to 
crirrent or past prices. 
A more realistic model would include some element of speculation 
some allowance for foresight on the part of buyers and sellers, 
d . f . Al' (l) d 1 . ' an expectations as to uture prices. Len ea s witn a 
simple case of this. 
Assume that current demand and supply depend on current price 
and on the rate at which prices are changing, i.e. Pt and P't. 
-!.. 
-----------------------------------~----------------------------------------
(1) R G D Allen, Mathematical Analysis for Economists (London: 








x = a + bP + gP' s t t 
a< b > o, > o, go;- 0 
< 
xd c + dP + fP' t t <l< 
> . 
c > o, o, f.:c_ o 
< 
xd the model solves to 
-
- i>)e Lt pt = p - (P 
0 
-P = (c-a)/(b-d) and L = (b-d)/(f-g) and P = the 
0 
initial price 
-Ignoring the special case where P = P, the crucial term is 
0 
clearly L. If L is positive, the price steadily diverges 
from the equilibrium price P over time. If L is negative, 
the price path converges to the P level. 
Since we defined b > o, d < o, the numerator of L will be 
positive between price levels P' and P". The values of f and 
g are, however, undefined. Positive values imply that a rising 
price stimulates both demand and supply. It could equally well 
be argued, however, that a rising price causes producers to 
hold back in expectation of higher prices in the future, i.e. to 
speculate. 
In the case where L is positive, a price level that diverges 
will cause a price controlling body to sell from stocks conti-
nously. A falling price will, on the other hand, require 
continuous use of financial resources to maintain the floor 
price. 
A further significant point is that whether price diverges 
- > upwards or downwards depends on whether _(P
0 
- P) < O, i.e. the 
price path depends on the price level at the time the scheme 
was introduced. 
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' Given the following cobweb models for two markets interrelated on 
the supply side but not the demand side: 
Demand: D 
v 
(D, V < o) pl cQl p wQ2 ·2 
B 




= log c + lJ iog Ql 
log Pz = log w + v log Q2 
Supply: log Ql = log A + B log pl - B log p2 
log Q2 log X + y log p2 - y log pl 
Then solving 
M = [~ 01 N [~ -~] v"' 
So MN r-dB dBl 
l VY -VYj 
Calculating roots we conclude that if 
dB + vY < 1 
= 1 
>.l 
Cobweb stable and damped 
Cobweb constant amplitude 
Unstable 
Interestingly enough both prices are either stable or unstable. 




Ordinary Least Squares 
Assume a linear relationship exists between a variable Y and 
(k-1) explanatory variables x
2
, x
3 ~ and a disturbance 
term u. For a given observation i from a sample of size 
we specify this relationship as: 
Yi S1 + Sz x 2i + ••• + f\. ~i + 
u. 
l 
= l 1,2 .... 
or in matrix notation as 
y x s + u (1) 
A 
n 
In order to obtain estimates of f3 (defined as S ) it is neces-
sary to make certain assumptions about this model. The simplest 
possible set cf assumptions' are 
(i) E(u)' = 0 
'(ii) E (uu') 
2 
In = C5 
(iii) x is a set of fixed numbers 
(iv) x has rank k<n 
A 
To derive the least squares estimate S we rewrite (.1) as 
A 
Y XS + e 
where e is the column vector of observed residuals (Y-X S ) . 
Then 
/\. 2 
L: e. e'e 
i=l 1. 
(y-X s ) I (y - x B ) 
y'y -2 §1x1y + @ 'X'X 6 
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A 
To find the value of S which minimises the sum of squares, we 
differentiate 
Cl e'e A -2x'y + 2x 1 xB 
o (for extrenum) 
So 
A 
B = (X'X)-l X1 y and it can be show-rt that 
"' var (S) = a 2 (X'X)-l 
u 
Under assumptions (i) - (iv) the Gauss-Markov theorem shows 
that this estimator is best linear unbiased. 
Various techniques are available to deal with frequently 
encountered situations where the classical assumptions are 
not satisfied. If nonsphericalness is present, assumption 
(ii) is respecified as 
E(uu') = o 2n where Q is synnnetrical, positive 
definite 
In this situation the ordinary least squares estimates will 
be biased and less efficient than the alternative estimate. 
which is unbiased. 
RIDGE REGRESSION 
If assumption (iv) is not satisfied, ordinary least squares 
estimation procedures are inappropriate since the matrix (X'X) 
cannot be inverted. Serious difficulties, however, are likely 
to be encountered when explanatory variables are highly (but not 
perfectly correlated). This very common situation is defined 
as multicollinearity. 
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The major consequences of multicollinearity are as follows: 
i) The precision of estimation falls so that it 
becomes very difficult to disentangle the relative influences 
of the various X variable; 
ii) Variables may be incorrectly dropped from the 
analysis because their coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero, but this may be a reflection of estima-
tion difficulties rather than the lack of dependence; 
iii) Estimates become very sensitive to particular 
sets of sample data; 
iv) It is possible to have a high R
2 
while 't' values 
suggest that no single coefficient is different from zero. (l) 
The consequences of multicollinearity can be illustrated in the 
two variable case: 
Consider the model 
Rewriting in deviation form 








L: Vt = o f v x = o ~ "t L.t 
t=l .. ; ..• n 
(1) Goldburger, Econometric Theory, (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 
1964), p.193. 
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Then 
(X' X) = [~:] 
Inverting 
(X 1 X)-l 
A 2 1 
and var ( S ) = au (X' X) -
2 r 
= 0 I 1 
u ! "' -- 1-u. 
ie: =var 3 P3 




= - a J~ 
1 -a 2 
Clearly as a increases toward 1. 0, var (3 will increase 
explosively. Correspondingly, estimated 't' .values will fall. 
Indications of Multicollinearity 
i) High correlations between X values; 
ii) High correlations between Y and X; but low 't' value 
A 
iii) Changed of sign of S. To illustrate this, consider the 
model 

















Sy is the standard deviation of Y. 
. J 
xl and y ' 
etc. and 
Now suppose Y, x1 and x2 are all positively correlated. 
Then S should also be positive. However, if 
~X1Y 
negative. 
<. rx: y rx X then B, is 
A d h . 2 dl 2 . . i · k 1 • f n t is con 1t1on is quite i eLy l rv X 
1'-1 · 2 
is large, i.e. if x
1 
and x2 are cl6sely c6rrelated. Ridge 
regression has been introduced as an attempt to deal with 












cs - 8) 
(X'X)-l 
where (X'X) is in correlation form. 
If the eigen values of X'X are denoted by 
A. A. >i> >A. A."> max = 1 - "z - . . . • _ p ,... ,... min o 
then the average squared distance from 13 to S is 
E L' 
2 = cr 2 t (l/A. i) 
1 i=l 





2 = 2 cr 4 ·JI 
1 i=l 
-2 
= Trace (X'X) 
2 
Lower bounds for the average and variance are 0 /A. min and 
2 a 4 /A. 2 min respectively so that an X'X matrix possessing 
or more small eigenvalues will tend to a large L1 . 
one 
To control this problem associated with the non-orthogonality 
of the (X'X) matrix, the following estimate has been suggested: 
(X'X + kl)-l X'Y k > 0 
Clearly this estimate will be biased for k> o but it can be 
shown that it is possible to obtain estimators with a reduced 
mean square error if k is correctly chosen. 
A E Hoerl and R W Kennard, 
Non-Orthogonal Problems', 
1 Ridge Regression: Biased Estimators of 
Technometrics 12 (1970), pp. 55-67. 
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Defining 
2 ( ) . ( 0 ~·~- .B ) 1 (a * _ a ) E I.
1 
k = E µ µ µ 
this can be shown to be equal to the variance of the estimator 




X'X (Ip + k (X'X)-l)-l X'Y 
(Ip + k(X'X)-l)-l(X'X)-l X'Y 
-1 -1 ZB where Z = (Ip + k(X'X) ) 
E CB.,- S)' ( S -s) 
A A 
= E ( B - $) 'Z' Z ( f3 -13 ) + (Z !3 - S ) ' (Z S - S ) 
= o 2 Tr(X'X)-l Z'Z + f3' (Z-I)' (Z-I) $ 
o 2 [Tr (X'X + kI)-l -k Tr(X'X +kI) 2] + k 2 S'(X'X + 
= O 2 L _lL 2 + k2 13' (X'X + kI)-2 S 
(Ai+k) 
= Y1 (k) + Yz (k) 
The first term, y1 (k) can be shown to be the sum of the variances 
of the perameter estimates. The second term, y 2 (k) is the squared 
distance from Z f3 to S • 
As k increases, total variance decreases while squared bias increases. 
It can be shown (by differentiating and taking limits) that it is 
possible for reasonably small k to trade off minimum variance in 











THE WELFARE TRIANGLE 
Area of 6 BCD = ~ (CD)_ (FE) 
pl = OK Ql 
T = JK 
,OK 
"'l .... 




-. ~ • OK • OF • 
which reduces to 
~ (CD) (FE) 









Q.E .D •. 
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APPENDIX 8 
THE NERLOVE MODEL 
Following Nerlove (I) we consider the model 
{I} 
so that area planted is linearly related to expected price in the 
same time period. 
We specify the expectation function 
{2} 
O<f3<1 
so that expected price at time t is last period expected normal price 
plus an adjustment factor depending on the difference between last 
year's observed and expected prices. 
{2} can be rewritten as 
f . d rl . .c.;: C> • 1-.. h b 1 d (Z) a irst or er ~1LLerenc- equation Wt11c can e so ve to 
t t-A. 
P* = E B(l-B) PA.~l 
t A=O 
(I) M Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply, (John Hopkins, 1958), Ch.8. 
(2) M Nerlove, op. cit., pp.54-55. 
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so that expected price can be expressed as a weighted function cf 
past (observed) prices. 
Substituting into{!} we get 
\ 
t t-A 
at= a0 + a 1 {L S(l-S) PA_ 1} A=O 
+ u 
t 
Lagging one period, multiplying through by (l-(3) and subtracting, 
we obtain 
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